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Summary 
Sayyid Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi (1903-1979) was one of the most prominent Islamic revivalist 
thinkers of the twentieth century. He wrote more than 150 books and treatises on different 
aspects of Islam, such as jihad, the Islamic state, the position of women, and the shari‘a. A 
central concept in the Islamic revivalist movement is that Allah has entrusted the Muslim 
umma (the community of the faithful) with the spiritual and political leadership of the world. 
Other religions and their followers are regarded inferior. The implementation of shari‘a will 
have dramatic consequences for the non-Muslim communities living in the Islamic state. 
This dissertation provides a commentary and a Critical Discourse Analysis of 
Mawdudi’s texts Muslim aur Kāfir kā Aslī Farq (The Fundamental Difference Between a 
Muslim and a Kāfir) and Islāmī Riyāsat mēṅ Zimmiyōṅ kē Huqūq (The Rights of Dhimmīs in 
the Islamic State). The first text addresses spiritual realities, such as people’s standing before 
God in this life and the hereafter. It is a text that establishes a sharp distinction between the 
believer (the Muslim) and the unbeliever (the kāfir). Mawdudi also discusses the bewildering 
aspects of Muslims being ruled by kāfirs. The second text can be regarded as an attempt at 
codifying the shari‘a injunctions regarding dhimmīs (the indigenous non-Muslims). It is a text 
about the minority policies of the Islamic state. It identifies social actors like “the ruling 
class” (the Muslims) and “the subjects” (the dhimmīs). The dhimmīs are obliged to pay the 
poll-tax, jizya, while Muslims don’t. If elected to the parliament, “the influence of non-
Muslim members would be strictly limited”. Mawdudi also reproduces the discourse of the 
books of fiqh, according to which the dhimmīs have to pay jizya on pain of being slain, 
enslaved or dispossessed. Both texts were written with special reference to South Asia and 
have been contextualised with examples from the history of Islam in the Indian subcontinent. 
In Mawdudi’s discourse there is a cultural categorisation of people on the basis of 
religion. We find a positive self-stereotyping of Muslims and a negative stereotyping of 
kāfirs. This is a typical feature of ethnocentrism as described by social identity theory. 
Mawdudi favours the Muslims in economic, social and political competition with the kāfirs. 
This discrimination is legitimated by allusions to Qur’ānic teachings and references to the 
shari‘a and the classical books of fiqh. There is also an implication of ethnocide (i.e. cultural 
destruction) of indigenous non-Muslims in the suppressive educational and cultural policies of 
the Islamic state as envisioned by Mawdudi.
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Sayyid Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi, theologian, author, ideologue and politician, was born in India 
in 1903 and migrated to Pakistan at the time of partition, where he lived until his death in 
1979. He made a lasting impact on Pakistan and the rest of the Muslim world. Imam Dr. 
Abduljalil Sajid, who is a prominent British imam and a member of the European Council of 
Religious Leaders, refers to Mawdudi as “one of the most respected teachers of Islam”.1 In 
South Asia Mawdudi is often referred to as “maulana”, meaning “Our Lord”, which is a title 
of respect. But first and foremost his name is associated with the Islamic revivalist movement 
and Islamic revivalist discourse.  
A central concept in the Islamic revivalist movement is that Islam is more than just a 
religion; it also has a political agenda. One of the basic beliefs is that Allah has entrusted the 
Muslim umma (the community of the faithful) with the spiritual and political leadership of the 
world. The unbelievers, the kāfirs, have no right to rule any country whatsoever. For this 
reason they call for the establishment of Islamic states all over the world. Other religions and 
their followers are regarded inferior. Mawdudi makes it clear that the Islamic state is not 
going to be a democracy with equal rights for all. The dhimmīs, the indigenous non-Muslims, 
will have no business interfering with the policy-making or the governance of the Islamic 
state; they will not hold any key positions. Once the Islamic state has been erected, the shari‘a 
will be implemented. Mawdudi maintains that all of shari‘a will have to be implemented; you 
can not just pick and choose from it.2 It is evident that the implementation of shari‘a will have 
dramatic consequences for the non-Muslim communities living within the borders of the 
Islamic state.  
The primary aim of this dissertation is to analyse and comment on Mawdudi’s texts 
Muslim aur Kāfir kā Aslī Farq (The Fundamental Difference Between a Muslim and a Kāfir) 
and Islāmī Riyāsat mēṅ Zimmiyōṅ kē Huqūq (The Rights of Dhimmīs in the Islamic State). 
The analysis will be undertaken with the help of Critical Discourse Analysis and related 
theories presented in chapter 1. There is no gender perspective in this material. While the first 
text is concerned with Islamic dogmatics, the second can be regarded as an attempt at 
codifying the shari‘a injunctions regarding dhimmīs. In this respect, the latter is a very 
important text as it gives us an idea of the implications of “implementing the shari‘a”, which 
                                                 
1 Aftenposten (Oslo), 11 February 2006. 
2 Mawdudi: Jamā‘at-e-Islāmī kā Maqsad, Tārīkh aur Lā’iha-ye ‘Amal: 18.  
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is a major step in the “islamization” advocated by the Islamic revivalist movement. A 
secondary ambition is to compare the original Urdu text with the edited English translations 
provided by Mawdudi’s co-workers Khurshid Ahmad and Khurram Murad, translations on 
which Western scholars base their interpretation of Mawdudi. 
Critical Discourse Analysis gives considerable importance to analysing and 
interpreting discourse with reference to context. For this reason I have sought to include 
relevant background information from the history of South Asia, the history of Islam and the 
discursive tradition of Islam, as well as a few examples of current issues in contemporary 
Pakistan (this mainly applies to chapter 6). While one of the leading Islamic scholars of the 
world today, Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b.1926), in his book Non-Muslims in the Islamic Society 
seems inclined to admit that there have been “occasional cases of mistreatment of the non-
Muslim minorities under Muslim rule in the past”,3 Mawdudi denies this, claiming that “No 
creed in the world has shown more tolerance to the devotees of other faiths than has Islam”.4 
For many Westerners, however, it is the other way around: To them, “…Islam has become the 
pre-eminent example of an intolerant religion…”5 Mawdudi’s text on dhimmīs should be 
interesting for any student of Islam as it deals with aspects of shari‘a legislation largely 
unknown to Western readers (and often omitted in textbooks6). Besides, Mawdudi is quoted 
in standard works on Islam and human rights, such as Ann Elizabeth Mayer’s Islam and 
Human Rights: Tradition and Politics.7 Mawdudi’s relevance is also supported by the fact 
that the world’s largest Islamic website IslamOnline (which is affiliated with Yusuf al-
Qaradawi) directs enquirers to his pamphlet Human Rights in Islam.8  
                                                
I have included a number of quotations from Mawdudi’s tafsīr (exegesis) of the 
Qur’ān, Tafhīm al-Qur’ān, which elaborates on some of the topics covered in the two texts 
that are the objective of this study. Unfortunately, I have not had access to the Urdu edition, 
so I have had to make do with the English edition, Towards Understanding the Qur’ān. 
 
3 Al-Qaradawi 2005: v. Yusuf al-Qaradawi holds a PhD in Islamic jurisprudence from Al-Azhar University in 
Cairo and is the founder and president of the International Association of Muslim Scholars and chairman of the 
European Council for Fatwa and Research. He has a weekly programme on Al-Jazeera called “Shari‘a and Life”. 
4 Mawdudi: Jihād fī sabīl illāh (Jihad in Islam), edited by Huda Khattab (Not paginated): See also the older 
edition of the same text, Jihad in Islam: 28. 
5 Mottahedeh, “Toward an Islamic Theology of Toleration”, in Lindholm and Vogt 1993: 35. 
6 See for example Knut S. Vikør: Mellom Gud og stat: Ei historie om islamsk lov og rettsvesen, Spartacus, Oslo 
2003. 
7 See also Sajjad Idris: “Reflections on Mawdudi and Human Rights”. 
8 http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1123996015766&pagename=IslamOnline-English-
AAbout_Islam%2FAskAboutIslamE%2FPrintAskAboutIslamE Accessed 2 March 2008 
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I have also attempted to include the position of other Islamic scholars on some of the 
issues addressed by Mawdudi, but this is by no means an exhaustive overview, which is partly 
due to the inaccessibility of the sources. Most of the sources are in Arabic, of which my 
command is limited, and although there are some translations in English and French, they are 
mostly in collections that have been out of my reach. As for those fluent in Arabic, a study of 
shari‘a  regulations pertaining to dhimmīs in the South Asian context would be incomplete 
without consulting the 6-volume Al-fatāwī ʼl-Hindiyya attributed to emperor Aurangzeb 
(1706).9 
Chapter 1 gives an overview of the theoretical framework for this study, while chapter 
2 introduces the reader to Mawdudi’s life and times, as well as some of the debated issues 
among his contemporaries in India and Pakistan. Chapter 3 and 4 are short chapters covering 
necessary background information, while the texts The Fundamental Difference Between a 
Muslim and a Kāfir and The Rights of Dhimmīs in the Islamic State are presented (for the 
most part in my translation), commented and analysed in chapter 5 and 6 respectively. 
Chapter 7 contains the conclusion. Appendix A and B contain transliterations of the excerpts 
from the original Urdu editions of the texts. I have also included a glossary with some of the 
most important terms. 
Teun A.van Dijk has written that in the study of racism (which I take to include 
ethnicism, see chapter 1), “it is sometimes difficult to maintain the usual academic style of 
detachment and distance”.10 That is a challenge I have had to face when working with this 
material, and it is up to the reader to decide whether or not my criticism is too sharp.   
 
9 See for example references to Al-fatāwī ʼl-Hindiyya in Fattal 1958: 94n40 on various restrictions on the liberty 
of the dhimmīs, and 114n103, regarding the inequality in the application of the talion. Fattal is referring to an 
edition of the Al-fatāwī ʼl-Hindiyya pulished in Cairo in 1892. 
10 van Dijk 1993: xi. 
1. Theoretical Perspectives 
The main object of this study is Islamic discourse as represented by two texts by Maulana 
Mawdudi. These are texts dealing with a number of aspects of cultural and ethnic difference, 
as well as what one might coin “Islamic imperialism and colonialism”. The two texts in 
question can, according to the theory presented below, be considered as “discursive events” 
shaped by certain situations and social structures. Eventually, these “discursive events” will 
also shape future social structures. Such texts can reproduce or transform the social status quo 
and have major ideological effects. In fact, these texts may serve as examples of discourse 
related to power abuse and the reproduction of social inequality. We will seek to analyse 
Mawdudi’s texts in their historical and intertextual context within the discursive tradition of 
Islam. 
1.1. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which is an interdisciplinary approach to discourse, 
developed as a direction of research in the end of the 1970s.1 According to CDA, “both 
written and spoken language is perceived as a form of social practice”.2 A “discourse” is 
defined as “a way of signifying a particular domain of social practice from a particular 
perspective”.3 
CDA takes a critical approach to how language is used “in organizing social 
institutions or in exercising power”.4 In fact, Fairclough and Wodak see a close connection 
between the discursive event and the conditions and social structures that frame it: 
Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical 
relationship between a particular discursive event and the 
situation(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: the 
discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That 
is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially 
conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and 
the social identities of and relationships between people and 
groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps 
to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense 
that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so 
socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. 
Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that 
                                                 
1 van Dijk 2007 Vol. 1: xxiv. 
2 Fairclough and Wodak cited in Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 35. 
3 Fairclough cited in Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 35. 
4 Wodak 2001: 11. 
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is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power 
relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, 
and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways 
in which they represent things and position people.5 
CDA is particularly concerned with the study of ideologically biased discourses and how 
these represent ingroups (us) and outgroups (them). Self-descriptions tend to be positive, 
while negative properties are attributed to “the Other”: 
Speakers or writers may emphasize our good things by 
topicalizing positive meanings, by using positive lexical items in 
self-descriptions, by providing many details about good actions, 
and few details about bad actions, by hyperbole and positive 
metaphors, by leaving implicit our negative properties, or by de-
emphasizing our agency of negative acts through passive 
sentences and nominalizations...6 
When undertaking the actual analysis, one may take the following three steps: 
1) Establish the specific contents or topics of a specific discourse. 
2) Investigate the discursive strategies (including argumentation strategies). 
3) Look into the linguistic means (as types) and the specific, context-dependent 
linguistic realisations (as tokens) of the discriminatory stereotypes.7 
According to Wodak, ”discourses are historical and can only be understood with reference to 
context”. Therefore, there must be a focus on “extralinguistic factors such as culture, society 
and ideology”.8 van Dijk sees ideologies as “the fundamental social cognitions that reflect the 
basic aims, interests and values of groups”.9 Furthermore, according to Wodak, “the approach 
is problem-oriented” and “multiple genres and multiple spaces are studied, and intertextual 
and interdiscursive relationships are investigated…”10 In fact, efforts should be made “to 
integrate systematically all available background information in the analysis and 
interpretation of the many layers of a written or spoken text.”11 
                                                 
5 Fariclough and Wodak cited in Weiss and Wodak 2003: 13. 
6 van Dijk 2001: 108. 
7 Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 44. 
8 Wodak 2001: 15. 
9 van Dijk 1993: 258. 
10 Wodak 2001: 69-70; Wodak 2006: 6. 
11 Wodak 2006: 15. 
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1.2. Discourses of Difference, Racism and Ethnicism 
According to Stuart Hall’s definition, “discourses of difference” are understood to be racist 
practice when they serve “to establish social, political and economic practices that preclude 
certain groups from material and symbolic resources.”12 These are discourses “that make a 
distinction between ‘usʼ and another group … on the basis of a selection of specific traits 
attributed to one group, traits which are seen, in some sense, as being significant.”13 Wodak 
has made a list of five questions which could identify discriminatory discursive elements: 
1) How are persons named and referred to linguistically? 
2) What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them? 
3) By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or 
social groups try to justify and legitimize the exclusion, discrimination, 
suppression and exploitation of others? 
4) From what perspective or point of view are these labels, attributions and 
arguments expressed? 
5) Are the respective utterances articulated overtly? Are they intensified or are they 
mitigated?14 
In order to answer these questions, it can be useful to look at five types of discursive 
strategies. A “discursive strategy” is “a systematic way of using language”.15 
1) Referential strategies or nomination strategies by which one constructs and 
represents social actors: for example, ingroups and outgroups. Selected strategies 
can for example be collectivisation using linguistic means such as deictics 
(“personal pronouns with unclear referents”16) and collectives (family, tribe, 
community, class, majority etc.), religionisation, using religionyms such as 
Christians, Muslims, Jews, and politicisation, using politonyms of different kinds, 
such as citizens, nationals, voters.17 According to van Leeuwen, “classification” is 
                                                 
12 Hall cited in Wodak 1996: 111. 
13 Wodak 1996: 113. 
14 Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 44; Wodak 2001: 72-73. 
15 Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 44. 
16 Ibid., 110 
17 Ibid., 48-51. 
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a form of identification according to “the major categories by means of which a 
given society or institution differentiates between classes of people”.18  
2) Predicational strategies – the attributing of negative or positive traits in the 
linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates. “Predication” is the process of 
“assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social 
phenomena. Through predication, persons, things, events and practices are 
specified and characterised with respect to quality, quantity, space, time and so 
on.”19 In discourses of difference, the predications are often oppositional and 
dichotomic and the speaker will be seeking to “polarise and to divide the world of 
social actors into ‘black and whiteʼ and into ‘good and bad’”. There are 
predications of identity, similarity, of difference, of autonomy, of dependency, of 
inclusion, of fragmentarisation, and so on. Stereotypes can also be predicated by 
means of metaphors relying on concepts of materiality and body, and of spatiality, 
to name a few. Metaphors of spatiality are such as “internal” versus “external”, 
“height/top”, “up” and “down/low”.20 
3) Argumentation strategies and a fund of topoi through which positive and negative 
attributions are justified, through which, for example, it is suggested that the social 
and political inclusion or exclusion, the discrimination or preferential treatment of 
the respective persons or groups of persons is justified. 
4) The perspectivation, framing or discourse representation by means of which 
speakers express their involvement in discourse, and position their point of view in 
the reporting, description, narration or quotation of discriminatory events or 
utterances. 
5) Intensifying strategies on the one hand and mitigation strategies on the other. Both 
of them help to qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition. These 
strategies can play an important role in the discursive presentation by sharpening it 
or toning it down.21 An example of a mitigation strategy is minimisation, often in 
                                                 
18 Leeuwen cited in Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 47, 52. 
19 Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 54. 
20 Ibid., 58-59. 
21 Ibid., 45, 48-51. 
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the form of euphemisms, pleasant replacements for unpleasant words, which may 
be used with an intention of obscuring, disguising and minimising.22 
Within argumentation theory, there are more than a dozen different topoi that can be 
considered in the discussion of social exclusion and discrimination. “Topoi” or “loci” can be 
defined as parts of argumentation that belong to the obligatory premises. They are the content-
related “conclusion rules” that connect the argument with the conclusion, the claim.23 We will 
include some of them here: 
1) The topos of advantage or usefulness. If an action under a specific relevant point 
of view will be useful, then one should perform it. There are several subtypes of 
this topos, such as “to the advantage of all”, “to the advantage of ‘usʼ”, and “to the 
advantage of ‘themʼ”. 
2) The topos of uselessness/disadvantage.  
3) The topos of danger or topos of threat. If a political action or decision bears 
specific dangerous, threatening consequences, one should not perform or do it.  
4) The topos of humanitarianism. If a political action or decision does or does not 
conform to human rights or humanitarian convictions and values, one should or 
should not perform or make it. This topos can be employed in every situation 
where one argues against unequal treatment and discrimination and for the 
recognition of “racialised”, ethnic, religious, gendered or other differences. 
5) The topos of justice. This is based on the principle and claim of “equal rights for 
all”. It means that if persons/actions/situations are equal in specific respects, they 
should be treated/dealt with in the same way. 
6) The topos of responsibility. In this case the conditional formula is this: Because a 
state or a group of persons is responsible for the emergence of specific problems, it 
or they should act in order to find solutions of these problems. This topos is very 
often used to argue against discrimination or for “compensation” for a committed 
crime. 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 109-110. 
23 Ibid., 74-75. 
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7) The topos of burdening or weighing down. If a person, an institution, or a 
“country” is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish 
these burdens. 
8) The topos of finances. If a specific situation or action costs too much money or 
causes a loss of revenue, one should perform actions that diminish the costs or help 
to avoid the loss. (This is a topos of consequence.) 
9) The topos of reality. This is a somewhat tautological argumentation scheme: 
because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be performed/made. 
10) The topos of law or topos of right. If a law or an otherwise codified norm 
prescribes or forbids a specific politico-administrative action, the action has to be 
performed or omitted. 
11) The topos of authority. This topos is related to the conclusion rule: X is right or X 
has to be done or X has to be omitted because A (= an authority) says that it is 
right or that it has to be done or that it has to be omitted. This topos is not easy to 
separate from the fallacy called argumentum ad verecundiam, which is the 
misplaced appeal to deep respect and reverence for authorities. This fallacy 
consists of backing one’s standpoint by means of reference to authorities 
considered to be competent, superior, sacrosanct, and so on. The appeal to an 
authority is fallacious if the respective authority is not competent or qualified, if he 
or she is prejudiced or if he or she is quoted inaccurately.24 Quotes often serve as 
topoi of authority or as fallacious argumenta ad verecundiam.25 Instead of quotes, 
we may find allusions, in which case “a writer tends to assume an established 
literary tradition, a body of common knowledge with an audience sharing that 
tradition and an ability on the part of the audience to ‘pick upʼ the reference”.26 
12) The topos of history. Because history teaches that specific actions have specific 
consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation 
(allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to. 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 72. 
25 Ibid., 111. 
26 Cuddon 1982: 31. 
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13) The topos of abuse. If a right or an offer for help is abused, the right should be 
changed or the help should be withdrawn or measures against the abuse should be 
taken.27 
In order to understand how the word “racism” is used in Critical Discourse Analysis, we will 
have to look at several definitions in turn. Pierre André Taguieff defines it in the following 
way: 
Racism is an ideology, the hard core of which consists of an 
asserted inequality. This is founded on natural differences 
between groups (races). An assumption implying the practices of 
exclusion, discrimination, persecution and annihilation is 
ushered in, and accompanied by forms of hate and disdain.28 
Wodak offers a list of eight examples of distinguishing features: 
1) physical traits (real or attributed ones such as skin and hair 
colour, sex, physiognomy, etc.) 
2) spiritual-cultural (socio-historically acquired) traits 
3) religion (“the Muslims”, “the Jews”) 
4) nationality in the sense of belonging to a specific ethnic 
group 
5) nationality in the sense of belonging to a certain national 
state (“the Americans”, “the Israelis”) 
6) social traits 
7) socio-economic ones (economic system, prosperity) 
8) political (power system) (“the Communists”).29 
Albert Memmi describes “racism” as “the generalised and absolute evaluation of real or 
fictitious differences that is advantageous to the “accuser” and detrimental to his or her 
victim. With this negative judgement, the accuser wants to legitimise his or her privileges or 
aggressions.”30 Reisigl and Wodak “assume that racism is both an ideology of a syncretic 
kind and a discriminatory social (including discursive) practice that could be institutionalised 
                                                 
27 Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 74-80. 
28 Taguieff cited in Wodak 1996: 112. 
29 Wodak 1996: 112. 
30 Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 5. 
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and backed by hegemonic social groups”.31 Teun A.van Dijk speaks of racism “essentially a
a social system of group dominance”. In his opinion, racism also includes ethnicism, which he
defines as  
s 
 
                                                
… a system of ethnic group dominance based on cultural 
criteria of categorisation, differentiation, and exclusion, such as 
those of language, religion, customs, or worldviews.32 
In his discussion of the historical background of Eurocentrism and racism, van Dijk writes 
…it should be recalled that for centuries the predominant 
practice of the political and other elites in Europe has been the 
derogation, inferiorization, exploitation, subjugation, and 
occasional genocide of non-Europeans. These Others were 
variously seen and treated as barbarians, savages, infidels, … 
slaves, subordinates, “niggers” (and related racist words), … or 
many other categories combining the concepts of threat, 
inferiority, and alien origin, appearance, and culture.33 
As we will see in the following chapters, this kind of elite discourse has not been confined to 
Europe. 
1.3. Some Approaches to Explaining “Racism” 
Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak (2001) list nine of the most significant approaches to 
explaining the causes and motives for racism. We will briefly consider some of the most 
relevant ideas for our data: 
According to social identity theory, concepts like categorisations and self-stereotyping are 
explained in the following way: 
Categorisations are assumed to be necessary for reducing the 
complexity of the social world… Self-stereotyping is the basic 
psychological process of group phenomena like social cohesion, 
ethnocentrism, cooperation, altruism and acting together. The 
socially learned patterns of perception tend to favour the own 
ingroup and to derogate the outgroups.34 
According to this view, the differences between the ingroup and the outgroups are 
overemphasised. Racism is explained as follows: 
 
31 Ibid., 10. 
32  van Dijk 1993: 5. 
33 Ibid., 51-52. 
34 Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 11. 
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Racism and ethnocentrism are, in large part, seen as the 
interpersonal result of group membership and as the 
psychological effects of identifying with a specific group in 
economic and social competition with other groups. According 
to this theory, self- and other-categorisation follows the 
relativistic “principle of metacontrast”: on the one hand, 
similarities between the members of a group are exaggerated, 
whereas similarities between different groups are understated; 
on the other hand, differences within a group are played down 
and perceived as being smaller than differences between groups, 
which are overemphasised.35 
Critical theory places importance on the idea of “the authoritarian personality”. According to 
this theory, a “specific character structure – the authoritarian personality” – makes an 
individual susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda.” These personalities are taken to be  
…persons who, on the one hand, are receptive to blind 
obedience, subordination and execution of orders, and who, on 
the other hand, are capable of discriminatory, racist, antisemitic 
and ethnicist aggression – can be seen as sado-masochistic 
characters, who readily submit to the powerful and despise the 
weak, since they have a strong desire for super-ego domination 
and want to escape from the uncertainty of autonomy, self-
determination and freedom of decision into irrational, security-
giving authoritarianism and totalitarianism that are closely 
connected to destructiveness and conformism.36 
According to these theorists (Adorno, Horkheimer and others), character alone does not 
determine behaviour, but is “a reaction potential that determines ideological preference, and 
strongly depends on the socioeconomic and political conditions as well as the general 
intellectual climate within a society.” 
The “colonial paradigm” sees racism as an outcome of colonialism and imperialism – from a 
Marxist viewpoint. This view assumes that “racism was created to legitimise colonial 
exploitation”, but does not account for racism directed at minorities in Europe.37  
Homi K. Bhabha, known for his contributions in the fields of post-colonial theory and 
postmodernism, builds on this paradigm in his essay “The Other Question: Difference, 
Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism” (1986). Bhabha discusses topics like “the 
construction of the colonial subject in discourse” and “the exercise of colonial power through 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 11. 
36 Ibid., 14. 
37 Ibid., 15. 
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discourse”. He also discusses “the discursive and political practices of racial and cultural 
hierarchization.”38 He perceives colonial discourse as an apparatus of power, whose objective 
is “to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, 
in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction.” 
Although there are different systems of colonization, he defines this discourse as “a form of 
governmentality that in marking out a ‘subject nationʼ, appropriates, directs and dominates its 
various spheres of activity”.39 Bhabha further explains how the practices of this form of 
governmentality “institutionalize a range of political and cultural ideologies that are 
prejudicial and discriminatory…” Due to its racial theories, administrative colonial experience 
and other factors, “discriminatory and authoritarian forms of political control are considered 
appropriate.”40 
For postmodernists (Horkheimer, Adorno, Wieviorka and others), it is a common 
theme to associate racism with modernity. Reisigl and Wodak sum it up in this way: 
Postmodern researchers in racism regard Western genocide 
against aboriginal people, slavery, imperialist and colonial 
domination and exploitation, and the Holocaust, in all of which 
Western doctrines of “racial” and cultural superiority have 
played a constitutive role, as the other side of Western 
modernity.41 
1.4. The Challenge of Cultural Diversity 
After the First World War, the idea of self-determination for ethnic groups became the 
international norm. There was also an “assumption of homogeneity as an ultimately normal 
condition of political society”.42 However, today the majority of the nation-states in the world 
are multicultural, and cultural pluralism can be regarded as “a natural attribute of political 
society”.43 According to Crawford Young, this diversity demands acknowledgement, and in 
order to prevent hostilities and ethnic crisis, there should be “effective policies of 
accommodation” of ethnic groups.44 In the search for successful measures one should be 
aware that 
                                                 
38 Bhabha 1986: 150. 
39 Ibid., 154. 
40 Ibid., 171. 
41 Reisigl and Wodak 2001:17. 
42 Young 1998: 1-2. 
43 Ibid., 4. 
44 Ibid., 3-4. 
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Policies viewed as beneficial by some communal segments may 
be seen as discriminatory by others. Outcomes which appear 
positive to state managers may seem less benign from the 
cultural or social margins of society… Conflict – class, interest 
and ethnic – is a natural aspect of social existence; the heart of 
the matter is that it be conducted by civil process, by equitable 
rules, through dialogue and bargaining, in a framework of 
governance facilitating cooperation and reconciliation.45 
In Young’s opinion, there are no such things as ”universally applicable formulas for 
accomodation of ethnic diversity”. The circumstances of each state should be taken into 
account, as well as “the parameters set by the past” and “the cultural definition of the state 
itself”.46 One of the primary concerns of the state should be “the material well-being of 
society as a whole”, and “respect for human rights and the rule of law is the hallmark of a 
civil state (état de droit)”.47 Young claims that “the structural relations between groups, and 
the issues that define them, are in continuous evolution.” He sees construction of identity as a 
continuous process.48 
According to Young, “many states invest their national personality with the cultural 
attributes of the leading ethnic community.” However, state policies of accommodating 
minorities (if such policies exist) may not be in the interest of the dominant ethnic group.49 As 
for constitutional formulas for the accommodation of ethnic diversity, one should strive for 
“sharing of power amongst major communal segments, provide incentives for intergroup 
cooperation and assure voice through reasonable representation.”50 Moreover, there should be 
an acknowledgement of “the shared civic values” and “a common interest in the well-being of 
the polity as a whole.” Ideally speaking, there should also be an “incentive for the stronger 
communities to share resources with the weaker.”51 Regarding the issue of minority 
commitment (or the lack of it) to the state, Young writes: 
The national minority issue arises in those polities where the 
state personality – the discourse of nationhood – is tied to a 
dominant ethnonational group. In such a setting, the minority 
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48 Ibid., 6. 
49 Ibid., 8. 
50 Ibid., 10. 
51 Ibid., 16. 
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may appear suspect in its commitment to the state 
“nationality”.52 
The issue of loyalty will have bearing on whether minorities will be allowed to serve in the 
armed forces or not, as we shall see later. Young sums up his main points in this way: 
Basic principles for accommodation are simple to state: 
guarantees of cultural autonomy and security, regional self-rule, 
adequate representation in the central institutions, assurance of 
language preservation. Such notions were initially codified as 
international norms in the League of Nations framework…53 
1.5. The Perspective of “Indigenous Peoples” 
We will now seek to consider the perspective of the dhimmis as that of indigenous peoples 
who have “a history of being conquered and overrun by incoming populations of sharply 
different cultural orientation” and, as a result, are being pushed to the margins of “the 
dominant society”.54 Rodolfo Stavenhagen writes 
The indigenous are considered to be the descendants of the 
original inhabitants of a territory which at some date that is still 
alive in the historical memory of the populations concerned, 
were conquered or otherwise subjugated by a more powerful 
outside group and incorporated, usually against their will and 
without their consent, into a larger polity that might have been 
either a colonial empire or an independent national state.55 
There is no general agreement on how to define indigenous peoples, but Martínez 
Cobo, the UN special rapporteur on discrimination against indigenous peoples, defined them 
like this (in 1987): 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, 
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-
colonial societies that developed on their territories, considered 
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in these territories, or parts of them. They form at 
present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to 
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their 
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of 
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their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their 
own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.56 
The indigenous peoples have often lost their land due to “immigrant colonists”and “state-
sponsored settlers”. As a result of pillage, destruction and the loss of land, their economic 
survival is in peril.57 Another issue of great concern for the indigenous peoples, is the loss of 
their cultural identity. This may happen partly as a result of “modernization”, but also due to 
state policies “designed to hasten the disappearance of indigenous and tribal cultures”. These 
policies have been adopted due to a state ideology of creating a single national culture. This 
has been particularly evident in the area of education, where school curriculums have been 
used to instil national values and suppress native cultures. This process has been labelled 
“ethnocide” (i.e. cultural destruction).58 In order to counteract this tendency, indigenous 
peoples are now demanding the right to their own culture “as a fundamental human right”. 
This requires a change in educational and cultural policies and a greater respect for “cultural 
pluralism and the preservation of cultural diversity”.59 As a result of this new discourse, 
Curricula and textbooks are being modified to include local 
cultures and history. The challenge for educators and policy-
makers is how to balance the nation-state’s objective of 
instilling national values and a shared culture in all its citizens 
with the legitimate desires of indigenous peoples (or other 
ethnic minorities for that matter) to preserve and develop their 
own cultures. Still, for many indigenous peoples the 
multicultural approach in public policy, to which much attention 
has been given in recent years in international meetings and 
organizations as well as at the national level in some countries, 
is more of an ideal than a reality.60 
International human rights instruments speak of not only cultural preservation, but cultural 
development. Again, this leads to a controversy over whether it applies to the development of 
each cultural community or whether it should be exercised by the state in promoting “national 
culture”. According to Stavenhagen, “all of these issues boil down fundamentally to questions 
of control over resources and political power, which indigenous peoples have generally been 
in short supply of.61 
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As far as their individual and collective human rights are concerned, indigenous 
peoples are now claiming “equal protection under the law, equal opportunities in education 
and employment … and the package of international economic, social and cultural rights that 
most states have now ratified”. Their collective rights also comprise the right to “religious 
practices and the exercise of traditional customs and social organizations”.62
 
62 Ibid., 144. 
2. The Life and Times of Maulana Mawdudi 
2.1. Mawdudi’s Life 
2.1.1. Mawdudi’s Background and Education 
Sayyid Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi was born in Aurangabad, Deccan, India, on 25 September 1903. 
The Mawdudis were descended from one of the branches of the Chishti Sufi order, who traced 
their origins back to a family of sayyids (descendants of Muhammad). One of his forefathers 
had moved to India from Afghanistan in the sixteenth century, and according to Mawdudi, the 
family had settled in Delhi in the eighteenth century. Mawdudi never ceased to live according 
to the Muslim culture of Delhi. His paternal grandfather, Mir Sayyid, had been close to the 
court of the last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar. The fall of the Mughals following the 
British sack of Delhi in 1858 had affected the Mawdudis socially and politically. Mawdudi’s 
father, Ahmad Hassan, who was a lawyer, had moved to Aurangabad in 1896, where he 
practised law until 1915. Mawdudi’s mother, Ruqiyah Begum, belonged to a prominent 
family of Turkish origin that had served the Mughals and later the nizāms (governors) of 
Hyderabad. Ahmad Hassan wanted Abu’l-A‘la to become a maulavī, a theologian and 
religious scholar, and he was initially educated at home together with his elder brother. They 
studied Persian, Urdu, Arabic, mantiq (logic), fiqh (jurisprudence), and hadīth (traditions and 
sayings of the Prophet). When Abu’l-A‘la was eleven, he was enrolled at the Madrasah-i 
Fauqaniah of Aurangabad, where he continued his education in religious subjects. There he 
also became acquainted with the natural sciences. In 1915 his family moved to Hyderabad and 
Mawdudi enrolled at the local dāru’l-‘ulūm (seminary). However, not long after that his 
education was disrupted because of his father’s illness and death and the family’s 
deteriorating financial situation.1 
2.1.2. Mawdudi’s Career in Interpreting Islamic Thought 
In 1918 Mawdudi turned to journalism in order to earn a living. He worked as a journalist for 
ten years, writing for various Muslim journals and newspapers, such as Madina, Taj, Muslim 
and Al-Jam‘iat. The latter two were published by Jam‘iat-e ‘Ulama-e Hind (Society of 
‘Ulama of India). During this time Mawdudi also wrote a treatise on jihad, which was first 
serialised in Al-Jam‘iat in 1927.2 In 1928 Mawdudi moved to Hyderabad, where he became a 
scholar of Islamic history and the Muslim culture of India. He also helped translate the Al-
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Asfar al-Arba‘ah (Four journeys) of Mulla Sadra, the Persian philosopher, from Arabic into 
Urdu.3 
During his years as a journalist, Mawdudi starting reading a wide range of topics. He 
read the works of Muslim modernist thinkers, as well as numerous Western thinkers, and he 
sought to understand the philosophical differences between tradition and modernity. While in 
Delhi, he studied English with a tutor, which later enabled him to read a greater range of 
Western sources.4 He was never able to speak English fluently, though.5 In Delhi Mawdudi 
also studied Arabic and the dars-e nizāmī (a syllabus for the education of the ‘ulama), and he 
received his ijāzats (certificates to teach religious sciences) from the Fatihpuri mosque’s 
seminary in 1926. Mawdudi thus became an ‘ālim of the Deobandi school. However, he never 
went public about his Deobandi training or his ties to the ‘ulama.6 In fact he later criticized 
the institution of the ‘ulama openly.7 
In 1932 Mawdudi wrote the Risāla-e Dīniyāt (Dīniyāt), later published in English as 
Towards Understanding Islam, a book about the basic beliefs of Islam. It was intended to be 
used as a textbook for senior matriculation students.8 The same year Mawdudi bought the 
journal Tarjumānu’l-Qur’ān (Qur’anic Interpretation), published in Hyderabad, which 
became the main vehicle for the presentation of his ideas.9 Many of the articles first published 
in this monthly journal were later issued as books.10 He remained the editor of Tarjumānu’l-
Qur’ān until 1979.11  
2.1.3. Mawdudi Adopts a More Activist Position 
In 1937 Mawdudi married Mahmudah Begum, a distant cousin from a wealthy family in 
Delhi. They had nine children.12 His marriage improved his financial situation a lot; he no 
longer depended on outside income.13 In March the following year Mawdudi and his family 
moved from Hyderabad to Pathankot in the Punjab in order for him to fill a position as waqf 
overseer of Daru’l-Islam (Land of Islam), a project initiated by the famous poet and 
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philosopher Muhammad Iqbal. The purpose was “to train a number of capable Muslim 
students and young leaders in Islamic law as well as modern subjects.”14 However, Iqbal died 
a month after Mawdudi had moved there, and Mawdudi left Pathankot for Lahore in January 
1939 after disagreements with the trustees of the waqf. Once in Lahore, Mawdudi’s interests 
changed from pursuing an educational project to creating a political party, a jama‘at. 15 In his 
own words, when the partition of India was agreed upon as the communal policy of the 
Muslims of India, he saw the need for a party  
…which on the one hand could go beyond communal interests 
and strive for the genuine establishment of dīn, and on the other 
hand would be able to face the circumstances that seemed to be 
appearing as a result of the struggle for the partition of India.16 
His ambition for Pakistan was that it should not be established as just another Muslim state, 
but 
…that a genuine Islamic state would be established that would 
present a perfect model of the Islamic way of life to the world.17 
In fact Pakistan became “the first state in modern times to be created on the basis of 
religion”.18 The Jama‘at-e Islami was established in Lahore in 1941 and Mawdudi was elected 
its first amīr (president). He remained so until 1972. In 1942 the Jama‘at moved to Pathankot, 
where they stayed until 1947, forming a community and consolidating the organization 19 The 
party’s structure was pyramidical, and the amir had the final word in all affairs, both 
organizational and ideological. His Majlis-e Shura (consultative body) was bound by 
constitution to yield to him. Disagreement occurred several times within the Jama‘at, but the 
dissenters always had to leave.20 
At the time of partition in 1947, the Jama‘at was split into an Indian and a Pakistani 
wing. Mawdudi opted for Pakistan and moved back to Lahore. He and the Jama‘at joined the 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 34-36. 
15 Ibid., 38-39. 
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‘ulama and other Islamic groups in demanding an Islamic constitution for Pakistan.21 Their 
agitation was successful, and the first constitution of 1956 contained Islamic provisions: The 
title of the state was the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, divine sovereignty was affirmed, the 
constitution required that the head of state be a Muslim, and no law was to be repugnant to the 
injunctions of Islam. Mawdudi had been involved in drafting the constitution.22 Over the 
years there was constant tension between the Jama‘at and those in power, Mawdudi blaming 
those in power for failing to transform Pakistan into a truly Islamic state. Mawdudi was o
arrested and spent several years in prison. Each time he was considered a threat to public 
order.
ften 
                                                
23 After General Muhammad Zia ul-Haqq seized power in 1977, Mawdudi’s influence 
increased. Khurshid Ahmad and others close to Mawdudi joined Zia’s government, and 
Mawdudi approved the general’s Islamization efforts. Mawdudi died on 22 September 1979 
and was buried in his garden in Lahore.24  
2.1.4. Mawdudi’s International Influence and Contacts 
Mawdudi was a prolific writer. He wrote more than 150 books and treatises on different 
aspects of Islam. His magnum opus is considered to be the Tafhīm al-Qur’ān, his translation 
and tafsīr (exegesis) of the Qur’ān, which it took him thirty years to complete.25 His books 
have been translated into Arabic, Turkish, English, French, and a number of other languages. 
His writings have influenced Muslim thinkers all over the Muslim world, and he has been one 
of the most widely read authors in Pakistan.26 He has also been referred to as the most 
systematic thinker of modern Islam.27 His thought and terminology were extremely influential 
in the writings of Sayyid Qutb.28 Mawdudi also commented on contemporary events, such as 
the Armenian genocide that took place in the Anatolian and Arab provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire during the years 1915 – 1917. (It was a combination of massacres, deportations, and 
enslavement.29) Mawdudi defended Turkey and wrote a pamphlet called Turkī mēṅ ‘Īsāiyyōṅ 
kī Hālat (The State of Christians in Turkey) in1922.30 
 
21 Esposito and Voll 1996: 41-42. 
22 Esposito and Voll 1996: 105; Nasr 1996: 44. 
23 Ahmad and Ansari 1979: 9; McDonough 1984: 57. 
24 Esposito and Voll 1996: 109; Nasr 1996: 46. 
25 Mawdudi: Towards Understanding the Qur’ān Vol.1: xiii, xx. The original Urdu version consists of six 
volumes, each of approximately 700 pages. The Islamic Foundation’s translation into English is expected to be 
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During the years 1956 – 1979 Mawdudi undertook a number of journeys to the Middle 
East and the West, lecturing and participating in international conferences. He also 
established contact with the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, meeting activists who were living 
in exile in Saudi Arabia.31 
2.2. Currents of Islamic Rhetoric in Mawdudi’s Time 
2.2.1. Two Major Discourses in Islamic Thinking 
There is a great diversity of interpretations of Islamic teachings in the Muslim world. In their 
anthology of Islamic thought, Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof place Maulana 
Mawdudi (1903-1979) among Islamic fundamentalists such as Imam Ruhullah Khomeini 
(1902-1989) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) as opposed to Islamic modernists such as Sayyid 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Modernist theologians tended to 
acknowledge the superiority of the West and favour the separation of religion from politics.32 
Islamic fundamentalists … rejected the notion of social 
evolution and portrayed the West as having an aggressive 
political system, exploitative and materialistic economic 
institutions, and decadent culture. Rather than attempting to 
reform and modernize Islam, they aimed at Islamizing virtually 
all social institutions. They rejected the separation of religion 
from politics, defended Islamic political hierarchy in society, 
and male domination and polygamy in the family.33 
2.2.2. A Central Issue: Living under Non-Muslim Rule 
One of the debated issues in Mawdudi’s time was whether or not it was permissible for 
Muslims to live under non-Muslim rule, which in the Indian context meant colonial or Hindu 
rule. The leader of the Jam‘iat-e ‘Ulama-e Hind (The Organization of Indian ‘Ulama), 
Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, who was gathering support for the Congress party, argued 
in favour of a pluralistic Indian society in his 1939 pamphlet Muttahida Qaumiyat aur Islam 
(United Nationalism and Islam). A different view was held by Muhammad Iqbal (1875-1938), 
who argued that Indian Muslims comprise a distinct nation and must live in a Muslim state. 
This is known as the two-nation theory, which was accepted by the Muslim League from the 
end of the 1930s.34 As for Mawdudi, he had decided never to live under a Hindu government, 
and he fiercely opposed Madani, challenging his religious and political authority.35 In his 
                                                 
31 Ahmad and Ansari 1979: 10; Jameelah 1990: 178. 
32 Moaddel and Talattof 2002: 3. 
33 Ibid., 4. 
34 Esposito 1995 Vol. 3: 121; Esposito and Voll 1996: 102; Ahmad and von Grunebaum 1970: 15. 
35 Nasr 1996: 31-32. 
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pamphlet Muslim aur Kāfir kā Aslī Farq (The Fundamental Difference Between a Muslim and 
a Kāfir) he claims that being ruled by kuffār (unbelievers) is a punishment for the crime of not 
valuing the gift of Islam.36 In other words, being ruled by unbelievers is something unnatural, 
something to be avoided. 
2.2.3. Illustrative Viewpoints on This Central Issue 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), aristocrat, magistrate, historian, and founder of the Anglo-
Muhammadan College in Aligarh in 1875, is considered a pioneer of Islamic modernism in 
India.37 He held the view that all aspects of Muslim religious law should be reconsidered. He 
said that the Qur’ān was the sole authority in all matters of judgement and did not accept 
using hadīth as a basis for interpreting the Qur’ān. He was exhorting Muslims to abandon 
traditional notions of authority in all areas of life. All ideas had to be tested and debated, 
including the Qur’ān, the hadīth, and the shari‘a. He was calling for new commentaries on the 
Qur’ān that would indicate what the different interpretations had been and were. The 
individual would then be free to choose whatever meaning seemed satisfying. He thus 
broadened the scope of ijtihād (use of individual reasoning).38 In Mawdudi’s view there was 
usually only one right way to understand the various strands of Qur’ānic thought.39 Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan thought that it was permissible for Muslims to accept living under foreign rule. 
He based this on the Qur’ānic narrative of Joseph in Egypt, where Joseph lived under a 
political system not based on revelation. Mawdudi considered this interpretation to be wrong. 
40 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan used the word dīn for personal religiousness and he discouraged 
Muslims from seeking religious guidance on matters of clothes, housing and general 
conditions of life. These were not central to religion as far as he was concerned. He viewed 
shari‘a as the social and political aspects of the religious tradition, which were due to change 
as conditions of life in the world changed.41 Contrary to Mawdudi, Sayyid Ahmad Khan did 
not have a romantic idea of the virtues of the Indian Muslim past.42 However, the one thing 
they had in common was that neither of them thought much of the institution of the ulama.43  
                                                 
36 Mawdudi Muslim aur Kāfir kā Aslī Farq : 9. 
37 McDonough 1984: 23; Moaddel and Talattof 2002: 7; Metcalf and Metcalf 2006: 106. 
38 McDonough 1984: 41; Moaddel and Talattof 2002: 7; Ahmad and von Grunebaum 1970: 4. 
39 McDonough 1984: 68. 
40 Ibid., 40, 67. 
41 Ibid., 42. 
42 Ibid., 41. 
43 Moaddel and Talattof  2002: 7; Nasr 1996: 29. 
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2.2.4. Discourses Diverging 
The theological seminary of Deoband, founded in 1867, became the antithesis of Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan’s Aligarh movement; it reaffirmed conservative orthodoxy and rejected 
rationalist speculation.44 Mawdudi was influenced by the Deobandi school of thought; he 
shared their dislike of colonial culture, the exaltation of religious law and their criticism of 
popular religious rites and customs, such as celebrations of Sufi festivals.45 However, on a 
number of occasions, Deobandi ulama criticized Mawdudi’s interpretation of Islam. The 
senior Deobandi ‘ālim Muhammad Manzur Num‘ani wrote that the Islamic revelation was not 
about the establishment of a government.46 During the fatwa campaign against Mawdudi from 
1951 – 1952, Deobandi ulama brought several accusations against him, such as giving 
unorthodox Qur’anic and hadīth interpretations, departing from the norms of Hanafi law and 
indulging in Wahabbism.47  
The Nadwat al-Ulama theological seminary in Lucknow occupied a middle position 
between the extremes of Deoband and Aligarh. One of its founders was Muhammad Shibli 
Nu‘mani (1857-1914), who had served for sixteen years as the Professor of Arabic at the 
Anglo-Muhammadan College in Aligarh. The founders of the Nadwat al-Ulama seminary 
attempted to create a tradition of liberal orthodoxy. One of Nu‘mani’s main works was on the 
life of ‘Umar the Great. He also wrote on jizya and the status of the dhimmīs.48  
 
44 Ahmad and von Grunebaum 1970: 5-6. 
45 Nasr 1996: 19. 
46 Ibid., 59. 
47 Ibid., 118. 
48 Ahmad and von Grunebaum 1970: 10-11. 
3. Mawdudi’s Idea of the Universal Call of Islam and the 
Islamic State 
Mawdudi’s pamphlet Jihād fī sabīʼl-illāh (Jihad in Islam) has been reprinted and distributed 
far and wide.1 Originally a speech delivered at The Town Hall, Lahore, on 13 April 1939, it 
gives valuable insights into Mawdudi’s ideas about the universal call of Islam, the superiority 
of the umma, jihad and the Islamic state. According to this speech, Islam is not a “religion” in 
the Western sense; it is “a revolutionary ideology… which seeks to alter the social order of 
the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals”.2 Mawdudi sees 
jihad as the struggle to achieve this objective. T.B. Irving, K. Ahmad, and M.M. Ahsan have 
attempted to define jihad in the following manner, 
Jihād (from the root J-H-D) means to strive and struggle. This 
refers to any effort, mental, moral or physical, made to make 
God’s Word supreme. It covers a wide range of activities, from 
fighting with one’s own evil promptings to being engaged in war 
for the cause of Islam. Qitāl (fighting and waging war), a word 
often used in the Qur’an, is the highest form of jihād.3 
The legislation which constitutes the codification of jihad, “was grounded in a few basic 
principles expressed in the Qur’ān, … early biographies of Muhammad, and the corpus of 
hadīths – the words and deeds attributed to the Prophet and reported on the authority of a 
chain of transmitters (isnāds) … The hadīths were compiled into a corpus of Traditions 
(Sunna) that were completed toward the end of the ninth century. Different interpretations of 
the Sunna were codified by the four principal Sunni schools of law from the eighth century”.4 
These are the Malikite, the Hanafite, the Shafi‘ite, and Hanbalite.5 The Hanafi school of law 
has been the dominant Sunni school in India, shared with central and south-west Asia, the 
exception being Maliki law in the south, due to their ties to Arabia.6 “Mawdudi claimed 
fidelity to the Hanafi rite, but in practice he developed an independent legal approach”.7 
According to Sura 3:106, the Muslim umma is “the best community ever produced for the 
                                                 
1 The Urdu copy I have got has been published by the International Islamic Federation Students’ Organization 
and printed in Kuwait. It was given to me at the Islamic Cultural Centre in Oslo in 2004. 
2 Mawdudi: Jihad in Islam: 5. 
3 Irving et al. 1979: 251. 
4 Yeʼor 2002:40. 
5 Watt 1968 (reprint 2003): 66. 
6 Metcalf and Metcalf 2006: 6. 
7 Nasr 1996: 114. 
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people urging what is reputable and restraining from what is disreputable, and believing in 
Allah”.8 If we turn to Mawdudi’s commentary on the Qur’ān, the meaning of this verse is,  
The Arabian Prophet (peace be on him) and his followers are 
informed that they are being assigned the guidance and 
leadership of the world, a position the Israelites had been 
relieved of because they had shown themselves unsuitable. The 
Muslims were charged with this responsibility because of their 
competence. They were the best people in terms of character 
and morals and had developed in theory and in practice the 
qualities essential for truly righteous leadership…9 
Mawdudi also places a great deal of importance on Sura 2:143, which in his translation reads 
And it is thus that We appointed you to be the community of the 
middle way, so that you might be witnesses before all mankind 
and the Messenger might be a witness before you.10 
In his commentary to the same verse Mawdudi writes that 
This constitutes the proclamation appointing the religious 
community (umma) consisting of the followers of Muhammad to 
religious guidance and leadership of the world…This position of 
standing witness before all mankind on behalf of God, which has 
been conferred on this community, amounts to it being invested 
with the leadership of all mankind. This is at once a great 
honour and a great responsibility.11 
“The umma forms the party of Allah and is perfect…, having been chosen above all peoples 
on earth it alone is qualified to rule…The pursuit of jihad, until this goal will be achieved, is 
an obligation (Sura 8: 40). The religions of the Bible, and Zoroastrianism, are deemed inferior 
as their followers falsified the true Revelation which their respective prophets conveyed to 
them… Albeit inferior, these peoples… have the choice between war or submission to the 
umma”.12 
Mawdudi continues: 
Islam wishes to do away with all states and governments which 
are opposed to the ideology and programme of Islam. The 
purpose of Islam is to set up a state on the basis of this ideology 
                                                 
8 Sura 3:106 according to Bell’s translation of the Qur’ān.  
9 Mawdudi: Towards Understanding the Qur’ān, Vol. 1: 278. Note that in Mawdudi’s translation of the Qur’ān 
the verses follow a different order, and the verse in question is Sura 3:110. 
10 Ibid., 120. 
11 Ibid., 120-121. 
12 Yeʼor 2002: 40-41. 
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and programme… Islam requires the earth – not just a portion, 
but the entire planet…because the whole of mankind should 
benefit from Islam...13 
Mawdudi’s point of view resembles that of Ibn Khaldun, renowned philosopher, historian, 
jurist and qādī (d. 1406), who wrote 
In the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, 
because of the universalism of the (Muslim) mission and (the 
obligation to) convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion 
or by force.14 
Mawdudi does, however, not put the same emphasis on conversion, but rather on dominion. 
He goes on to say that there are several kinds of jihad, one form being establishing a new 
order by the power of the sword, and there is jihad by using the medium of speech and the 
written word. Fighting in the way of Allah is about the struggle for the establishment of 
Allah’s just order in the world.15 “The fighter in the way of Allah aims to abide by the law of 
Allah himself and to enforce it among other human beings.”16 The call of Islam is addressed 
to the entire human race. When addressing the idea of sovereignty, Mawdudi asserts that it 
belongs to no one except Allah. No one has the right to appoint himself ruler of men – this 
would be equivalent to admitting him as a partner in the power and authority of Allah, which 
is shirk - polytheism.17 
Mawdudi continues:  
The call of the prophets has never been a merely metaphysical, 
spiritual call; it was and is a charter for social revolution… The 
revolutionary movement launched by the prophets (AS) … 
(sought) to establish a just pattern of society which would afford 
equal opportunities for all human beings… Those who affirm 
their faith in this ideology become members of the party of Islam 
and enjoy equal status and equal rights…18 
This is the party of Islam, the Hizb-Allah, also known as the umma (nation) of Islam. It is the 
duty of the functionaries of Allah “to wipe out oppression, wrongdoing, strife, immorality 
…and unlawful exploitation from the world by the force of arms… The authority of 
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government is to be wrested from the wicked and transferred to the hands of these 
reformers…” 19 A Muslim can not observe the Islamic pattern of life under the authority of a 
non-Islamic system of government. Muslims are compelled to strive for the elimination of the 
rule of an opposing ideology. The objective of the Islamic jihad is to establish an Islamic 
system of state rule in the whole world. The Muslim party should extend its sway as far as 
possible all around, eliminating un-Islamic governments and establishing Islamic 
governments in their place. Arabia was the first country to be subjugated and brought under 
the rule of Islam. The Prophet had to take military action against the neighbouring countries 
as they didn’t accept Islam voluntarily. Military action against a country or nation for the sake 
of Islamic jihad can not be called “attack” in the traditional sense as it is done for the noble 
cause of dismantling the rule of an opposing ideology and replacing it with Islamic ideology. 
In fact this kind of jihad can be considered defensive as the Muslim party is constrained to 
capture state power in order to protect the principles of Islam in space and time.20 
Here we note that Mawdudi’s ideas echo some of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya (1263-
1328), a Syrian jurist of the Hanbali school, as found in Le Traité de droit public d’Ibn 
Taymiyya, in particular with reference to the idea of the faithful believers being the legitimate 
heirs to everything that Allah has created.21 According to Nasr, Mawdudi placed himself in 
the tradition of Ibn Taymiyya.22 
Once conquered by the Islamic jihad, dhimmīs (non-believers) will no longer have the 
right to administer affairs of the state in their own country according to an evil un-Islamic 
system. Their women will have to dress according to Islamic Law and all their cultural 
activities will be censored.23 Mawdudi has this to say about the women:  
(Islamic jihad) … will force non-Muslim women to observe at 
least the hudūd restrictions of covering and will prohibit them 
from moving about enticingly as in the days of jahiliyya 
(ignorance).24 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See H. Laoust: Le Traité de droit public d’Ibn Taymiyya, Beirut, 1948; See excerpt in Yeor 1985: 172-175. 
22 Nasr 1996: 115. 
23 Mawdudi: Jihād fī sabīl illāh (Jihad in Islam), Edited by Huda Khattab (Not paginated):  
24 Mawdudi: Jihād fī sabīʼl-illāh, p. 34. “Islāmī jihād …ghair muslim ‘auratoṅ kō satr kē kam sē kam hudūd kī 
pābandī par majbūr karēgā aur unhēṅ tabarruj-e jāhiliyat kē sāth phirnē sē rōk dēgā”. Note that this is my 
translation. In the older English version of Jihad in Islam (1983): 27-28  it is rendered as “… it will make it 
obligatory for non-Muslim women to observe the minimum standards of modesty in dress as required by Islamic 
law and will forbid them to go about displaying their beauty like the days of ignorance [sic]”. 
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A Muslim Head of State can not make the slightest move without the sanction of 
Islamic Law. Ideally speaking, the governing class of an Islamic state should offer their 
service without any thought of personal benefits. Their salary should be very modest, as in the 
case of Abu Bakr and Umar, the first and second Caliph.25  
In this pamphlet Mawdudi refers to the doctrine of the perfection of the umma, a 
perfection that is tied to its obligation to rule over the whole world. “Any borrowing from 
another civilization is forbidden because perfection does not borrow from imperfection”.26 
Consequently, any un-Islamic system of government has to be discarded. 
Mawdudi goes on to say, ”No creed in the world has shown more tolerance to the 
devotees of other faiths than has Islam”.27 He makes the following statement,  
Islam, however, provides full opportunities for self-advancement 
to the people of other faiths, under conditions of peace and 
tranquillity. It displays such magnanimity towards them that the 
world has yet to come up with a parallel example of tolerance.28 
This statement is a minimisation on the part of Mawdudi and will be contradicted by his 
discourse on the rights of dhimmīs as presented in chapter 6. 
 
25 Mawdudi: Jihād fī sabīl illāh (Jihad in Islam), Edited by Huda Khattab (Not paginated):  
26 Ye’or 2002: 105. 
27 Mawdudi: Jihād fī sabīl illāh (Jihad in Islam), Edited by Huda Khattab (Not paginated): See also Jihad in 
Islam: 28. 
28 Mawdudi: Jihād fī sabīʼl-illāh, p. 35. “Lēkin islām ghair maslak vālōṅ kō pūrē aman kē sāth har qism kī 
taraqqī karnē kā mauqa‘ dētā hai, aur un kē sāth aisī faiyāzī kā bartā’ō kartā hai jis kī misāl dunyā mēṅ kahīṅ 
nahīṅ miltī.” I have quoted the edited English edition instead of offering my own translation. 
4. The Status of Dhimmis According to Shari‘a and Islamic 
History (A brief survey) 
4.1. The Legal Posistion of Conquered Non-Muslims 
W. Montgomery Watt wrote that “The phenomenal expansion of the Arabs in the century 
after Muhammad’s death in 632 was a continuation of Muhammad’s policy of jihad”.1 “This 
jihad, or Islamic war of conquest, unfolded for more than a millennium on three continents… 
Two violent waves of Islamization can be distinguished: the Arab wave (634-750) and the 
Turkish wave (c.1021-1689)”.2 During the Arab wave, the Arabization of the territories took 
place in two stages: 
1) The jihad – the military conquest and annexation of 
territories, governed by specific rules and based on the 
concept of election that justifies world domination; 
2) The dhimma – a system of dispossession and colonization, 
aimed at protecting and safeguarding the domination of the 
triumphant Islamic community.3 
According to Joseph Schacht, the legal position of non-Muslims is this: 
The basis of the Islamic attitude towards unbelievers is the law 
of war; they must be either converted or subjugated or killed 
(excepting women, children, and slaves); the third alternative, in 
general, occurs only if the first two are refused. As an exception, 
the Arab pagans are given the choice only between conversion 
to Islam or death. Apart from this, prisoners of war are either 
made slaves or killed or left alive as free dhimmīs … or 
exchanged for Muslim prisoners of war, at the discretion of the 
imām; also a treaty of surrender is concluded which forms the 
legal basis for the treatment of the non-Muslims to whom it 
applies. It is often called dhimma, “engagement”, “obligation”, 
“responsibility”, because the Muslims by it undertake to 
safeguard the life and property of the non-Muslims in question, 
who are called dhimmīs.4 
Eighth century Muslim jurists fixed the policy regarding the People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb) 
on the basis of decisions decreed by Muhammad concerning the Jews of Arabia, which were 
followed by other protection pacts granted to Jews and Christians. These proceedings 
constituted the normative rules applicable to all peoples conquered by jihad. The agreement 
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(dhimma) made between Muhammad and the Jews of Khaybar formed the basis of the dhimmī 
status. The Prophet allowed the Jews to farm their lands, but only as tenants; he demanded 
delivery of half their harvest and reserved the right to drive them out when he wished. On 
these conditions, he granted his dhimma, his protection for their lives and safety. Similar pacts 
were concluded with Jews living in other oases, as well as Christianized tribes. These tribes 
preserved their religion on payment of tribute (jizya), the symbol of their submission. The 
dhimma of Khaybar served the jurists as a model for drawing up treaties with populations 
which submitted to Islamic domination. The dhimmī condition suspended the conqueror’s 
initial right to kill or enslave followers of the tolerated religions, provided they submitted 
themselves to pay the tribute (jizya).5 The jizya is prescribed in the Qur’ān, sura 9: 29: 
Those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day – even 
though they were given the scriptures, and who do not hold as 
unlawful that which Allah and His Messenger haved declared to 
be unlawful, and who do not follow the true religion – fight 
against them until they pay tribute out of their hand and are 
utterly subdued.6 
In pre-modern shari‘a doctrine, non-Muslims who were not Christians or Jews were 
categorized as polytheists. When conquered by Muslims, they theoretically either had to 
embrace Islam or accept death. In practice, as Islam expanded eastward, the doctrines had to 
be adjusted and Muslims had to learn to coexist with Hindus and other polytheists. 
Zoroastrians, Hindus and Buddhists also became “protected minorities”.7 In his commentary 
to sura 9: 29, Mawdudi explains it like this, 
Initially the rule that jizya should be realized from all non-
Muslims meant its application to Christians and Jews living in 
the Islamic state. Later on, the Prophet (peace be on him) 
extended it to Zoroastrians as well, granting them the status of 
dhimmīs. Guided by the Prophet’s practice the Companions 
applied this rule to all non-Muslim religious communities living 
outside Arabia.8 
A non-Muslim who is not protected by a treaty is called harbī, “in a state of war”, “enemy 
alien”; his life and property are completely unprotected by law unless he has been given a 
temporary safe-conduct (amān).9 The peoples of the world are divided into two groups; the 
                                                 
5 Yeor 2002: 37, 41. 
6 Mawdudi: Towards Understanding the Qur’ān, Vol. 3: 201. 
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Muslims – inhabitants of the dāru’l- islām, regions subject to Islamic law; and infidels, 
inhabitants of the dāru’l-harb, the territory of war, destined to come under Islamic 
jurisdiction.10 Refusal to pay the jizya (poll tax) turns the dhimmī into a harbī, subjecting him 
to the rules of jihad – slavery or death. The dhimmīs were not allowed to carry or possess 
weapons and were thus unable to defend themselves. Among other obligations imposed on the 
dhimmīs were billeting and provisioning the army, both men and horses, and the duty to guide 
Muslims correctly on the road, while refraining from any collaboration with the enemies, such 
as Europeans. The obligation to lodge soldiers in churches, synagogues, and in their homes 
subjected the dhimmīs to a regime of extortions and humiliations, sometimes even the 
abduction of women.11 There were also regulations regarding their clothing and their houses, 
The non-Muslims must wear distinctive clothing and must mark 
their houses, which must not be built higher than those of the 
Muslims, by distinctive signs; they must not ride horses or bear 
arms, and they must yield the way to Muslims; they must not 
scandalize the Muslims by openly performing their worship or 
their distinctive customs, such as drinking wine; they must not 
build new churches, synagogues, and hermitages; they must pay 
the poll-tax under humiliating conditions.12 
4.2. The Covenant of ‘Umar 
The Covenant of ‘Umar is by Arab historians sometimes attributed to the caliph ‘Umar I (634-
644), sometimes to the caliph ‘Umar II (717-720).13 It is referred to by Arab authors like 
Turtushi (d. 1126), Ibn ‘Ashakir (d. 1176), Muhammad b. Ishaq b. Minda (d. 1004) and Ibn 
Hazm (d. 1064). The renowned Hanafi jurist Abu Yusuf (d. 798) attributes some of the rules 
found in the covenant to ‘Umar I.14 One of the versions of the Covenant of ‘Umar is found in 
the work Zakhīrat al-Mulūk (Treasuries of Kings) by the Persian scholar Mir Sayyid ‘Ali 
Hamadani (1314-1384), who is believed to have played a part in spreading Islam in Kashmir. 
According to Hamadani, “rulers should impose these conditions on the dhimmīs of their 
dominions and make their lives and their property dependent on their fulfilment.”15 These are 
the twenty conditions, in Muzaffar Alam’s rendering: 
1) They should not build places of worship, 
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11 Ibid., 56, 58. 
12 Scacht 1982: 131. 
13 Ye’or 1985: 48. 
14 Fattal 1958: 60n96. 
15 De Bary 1958: 481. 
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2) nor should they renew or rebuild the old and desolate ones. 
3) Muslim travellers should be allowed to enter and stay in 
their religious buildings, and 
4) if any Muslim wants, he can also stay as a guest for three or 
four days in their houses. 
5) The dhimmīs should not act as spies. 
6) If a relative of theirs is inclined to accept Islam, he should 
not be discouraged and dissuaded from doing so. 
7) They should give due respect to Muslims, and 
8) if a Muslim happens to visit a place where a non-Muslim 
occupies a seat, the latter must vacate it for the Muslim. 
9) They should not dress like the Muslims. 
10) They should not use Muslim names.  
11) They should ride on horses without reins and saddles. 
12) They should not carry weapons. 
13) They should not use rings with engraved stones (muhr-o-
nagin). 
14) They should not sell wine, nor should they drink in public. 
15) In order to look different from the Muslims, they should 
wear clothes in their own style. 
16) There should be no public demonstrations of their rituals 
and customs before the Muslims. 
17) They should not live in the neighbourhood of Muslims.  
18) They should not carry their dead bodies through Muslim 
graveyards.  
19) They should not mourn their dead in public; and 
20) they can not buy Muslim slaves.16 
By contrast, in Hamadani’s list of the ruler’s twenty duties towards his Muslim subjects, he is 
told to show respect toward all Muslims and to respect their privacy. He is “not to pry into the 
private households of Muslims and not to enter the houses and storehouses of subjects without 
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permission…”17 The dhimmīs, on the other hand, are obliged to let Muslim strangers stay as 
guests in their houses for three to four days. In other words, their right to privacy is not 
respected. 
We also note that the practical implication of point 17 is segregation. The author has 
observed that in old towns that have been under Muslim rule, there have been separate 
quarters for the different communities and some exist up to this very day. One example is The 
Old City in Jerusalem, which is divided into a Muslim, a Jewish, a Christian and an Armenian 
quarter. Likewise, in the towns of Morocco, the Jews used to live in a separate quarter, the 
mellah, and these quarters are still referred to as the mellah even after the Jews’ departure for 
Israel. There seems to have been separate quarters for Muslims and Hindus in Delhi, Lahore 
and other cities in South Asia as well. In many ways this was a practical solution, as mosques, 
temples and synagogues would located in the respective quarters. Jews and Muslims used to 
have separate cemeteries, as in Cairo up until now. Hindus, of course, cremate their dead. 
As for other versions of the Covenant of ‘Umar, restrictions other than those 
mentioned above are that the dhimmīs are not to teach the Qur’ān to their children, nor to 
preach their religion.18 They are not to insult, nor to strike a Muslim.19 They are not to raise 
their voices in prayer or chanting in their churches, not to carry a cross or their book in 
procession, not to take out Easter or Palm Sunday processions, and not to entice a Muslim to 
their religion “nor invite him to it”.20 “He who strikes a Muslim has forfeited his rights”.21 
According to Ghazi b. al-Wasiti, who wrote An Answer to the Dhimmīs, “He who breaks these 
conditions may be slain and his women and children made slaves”.22 According to the famous 
Shafi‘i jurist al-Mawardi (d.1058), the dhimmīs should be prohibited from riding horses, but 
allowed to use mules and donkeys.23 Sheikh al-Damanhuri (d.1778), head of Al-Azhar, also 
wrote that, “Neither Jew nor Christian should ride a horse, with or without saddle. They may 
ride asses with a packsaddle.”24 The German explorer Carsten Niebuhr (1733-1815), in his 
                                                 
17 De Bary 1958: 475-476. 
18 Fattal 1958: 61. 
19 Ibid., 63. 
20 Tritton 1930 (reprint 1970): 7. 
21 Ibid., 8. 
22 Ibid., 11. 
23 Al-Mawardi, in Yeʼor 1985: 179. 
24 Shaikh al-Damanhuri, in Yeʼor 1985: 203. 
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Travels through Arabia, wrote that when he was in Cairo in 1761, no Christian or Jew could 
appear on horseback. They rode only donkeys.25 According to Ye’or,  
The prohibition on riding horses remained in force for Jews 
until the beginning of the twentieth century in the countryside of 
Morocco, Libya, Iraq, and Persia, and in Yemen until their 
departure for Israel.26 
Regarding dress, Sheikh al-Damanhuri wrote that 
They (the dhimmīs) must not imitate the garb of the men of 
learning and honour, or wear luxurious garb, silk, or, say, fine 
cloth. They must be distinguished from ourselves in attire, as the 
local custom of each area may have it, but without adornment, 
so that it indicates their humiliation, submission and abasement. 
Their shoelaces must not be like ours. Where closed shoes are 
worn, not laced footwear, their shoes should be coarse, of 
unpleasant (unadorned) colour.27 
In other words, the dhimmī was a second-class citizen.This constituted a constant pressure on 
the dhimmī to convert to Islam. “Immediately after the Arab conquests, the dhimmīs 
constituted the vast majority of the inhabitants in the new provinces, but in the course of time, 
because of conversions and other adverse factors, such as deportations, their numbers 
dwindled and the Muslims formed the vast majority”.28 Deportations were “particularly 
frequent under the Ottomans in Anatolia, the Balkans, Kosovo and Armenia”.29 In India, the 
Muslims remained a minority. “When the first censuses were taken in the late nineteenth 
century, the Muslim population of British India was roughly one-quarter of the whole”.30  
 
25 Niebuhr 1994: 81. 
26 Yeʼor 2002: 98. 
27 Shaikh al-Damanhuri, in Yeʼor 1985: 203 
28 Watt 2003: 51. 
29 Ye’or 2002: 57. 
30 Metcalf and Metcalf 2006: 7. 
5. Mawdudi’s Text on Kāfirs 
In this chapter the main object of study is Mawdudi’s pamphlet Muslim aur Kāfir kā Aslī 
Farq. We will also look at some examples from previous Islamic discourse in order to place 
his text in the discursive tradition of Islam. 
5.1 Definitions of Kāfir and Takfīr with Examples from Islamic 
Discourse 
According to The Encyclopaedia of Islam, kāfir, plural kāfirūn or kuffār, once kafara (Sura 
80: 421) is an Arabic word that originally meant “obliterating, covering”, then “ungrateful”. In 
the Qur’ān it is used in the meaning “ungrateful to God” in some suras and in the more 
general meaning of “infidel” in others. The term is first used about the unbelieving Meccans. 
“In the early Meccan period a waiting attitude towards the unbelievers is still recommended 
… but later the Muslims are ordered to keep apart from them (Sura 3:114, also 27), to defend 
themselves from their attacks and even to take the offensive against them … In most passages 
the reference is to unbelievers in general, who are threatened with God’s punishment and 
hell.”2 Some of the hadīth literature deals with “the fate of the kāfir on the day of judgement 
and his punishment in hell… Eternal damnation for the kāfir has remained an established 
dogma in Islam.”3 In early Islam there was a controversy on the question “whether a Muslim 
should be considered a kāfir for committing a ´major sin’”.4 Renegades (murtadd) from Islam 
are also considered to be kāfirūn and they are to be sentenced to death, after first being given 
an opportunity to return to Islam.  
The others (other than dhimmīs), the unbelievers proper, who in 
this sense are also called kāfirūn asliyyūn … have only to expect 
death or slavery … if they fall as prisoners of war into the hands 
of Muslims; if they are fortunate, they may be exchanged or 
released… In several further points the law discriminates 
between kuffār and believers; the very strict interpretation of the 
law is however in practice only held by a small minority.5 
The Encyclopaedia of Islam has a discussion on the category of dhimmī under the entry on 
kāfir, but I will not include that here as the category of dhimmī is discussed elsewhere in this 
                                                 
1 ”These are the unbelievers, the scoundrels.” Bell 1960 Vol. 2: 637. 
2 Encyclopaedia of Islam 1986-2004, Vol. 4: 407. 
3 Ibid., 407-408. 
4 Ibid., 407. 
5 Ibid., 408. 
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dissertation. The Spanish word cafre and the French word cafard can be traced back to kāfir 
or kuffār.6 
The act of declaring someone a kāfir or unbeliever is takfīr, the verbal noun from the 
form II verb kaffara. This is an accusation that has often been hurled at opponents. According 
to Al-Ghazālī (d.1111), “A Muslim … who becomes a kāfir is an apostate, and apostasy is a 
criminal offense under the law, with severe legal consequences. Such charges should not, 
therefore, be lightly made.”7 The qādī ‘Iyād b.Mūsā of Ceuta (d. 1149), in his treatise on the 
status of the Jews of Tuwāt and their synagogue, went as far as pronouncing takfīr “against 
those who befriend the Jews and encourage or condone their ‘rebellion against the laws’, 
based on a restrictive interpretation of Qur’ān Sūra 5: 51.”8 In Mawdudi’s translation of the 
Qur’ān, this verse is rendered like this, 
Believers! Do not take the Jews and the Christians for your 
allies. They are the allies of each other. And among you he who 
takes them for allies, shall be regarded as one of them. Allah 
does not guide the wrong-doers.9 
Shāh Walī Allāh (1703-1762), the highly respected theologian and reformer10 of Islam in 
India, has defined “the unbelievers” (kuffār), in the following manner: 
…they are the defiant disobedient ones who refuse to say, 
“There is no God but Allah,” despite the maturity of their 
intelligence and despite true religious information having 
reached them, or they contradict the will of God to put into 
effect the command of the prophets, may peace be upon them. 
Thus they turn (people) away from the path of God, and are 
satisfied with the life of the world, and are not attentive to what 
comes after it. They are cursed eternally, and are imprisoned 
forever, and among them are the people of the Ignorant Age and 
some hypocrites who said they believed with their tongues while 
their hearts remained absolutely unbelieving, and God knows 
better.11 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 408. 
7 Encyclopaedia of Islam 1986-2004, Vol. 10: 122; Lewis 1991: 86. 
8 Encyclopaedia of Islam 1986-2004, Vol. 10: 122.  
9 Mawdudi: Towards Understanding the Qur’ān 1989, Vol.2:171 
10 Kværne 2002: 388. 
11 Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī 1996: 339. 
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Note that Shāh Walī Allāh’s definition of a kāfir is clear cut. According to him, a kāfir is 
anyone who refuses to pronounce the kalima, the confession of faith, by which you enter 
Islam. 
5.2. Mawdudi’s Text Muslim aur Kāfir kā Aslī Farq  
5.2.1. Introduction to the Text 
Mawdudi’s pamphlet Muslim aur Kāfir kā Aslī Farq belongs to a collection of Friday 
sermons entitled Khutubāt and was first published in Urdu in 1940. Some of its parts have 
been published as pamphlets or separate booklets, both in Urdu and other languages. The first 
English translation was published by Islamic Publications, Lahore in 1975 and was entitled 
The Fundamentals of Islam. A new translation with the title Let Us Be Muslims, edited by 
Khurram Murad and published by The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, appeared in 1982.12 
Khurram Murad writes that, “The purpose of editing … has not been to omit, add, modify or 
explain anything unless absolutely necessary.” 13An English translation of Muslim aur Kāfir 
kā Aslī Farq appears in this collection under the title Muslims or Kafirs? However, I have 
chosen not to use this translation, as it is not close enough to the original, and rather offer my 
own translation of selected excerpts. I will, however, cite Murad’s translation for reasons of 
comparison. In his preface to the first edition of Khutubāt, Mawdudi wrote, 
When, in 1357 A.H. [1938], I first came to the Punjab to live in 
Daru’l-Islam (near Pathankot, East Punjab), I started to 
organize the Friday Prayers and explain Islam to the nearby 
villagers. This collection comprises the congregational 
addresses which I then prepared. My addressees were farmers; 
they too from the Punjab, whose mother tongue was not Urdu. I 
therefore had to adopt a language and expression which could 
be easily understood by the common man. Thus has come into 
being this collection which, inshā’allāh, should be useful for 
teaching Islam to the masses.14 
In the following we will look at excerpts from the text, which will be supplemented with 
relevant comments. There are no subheads in the Urdu text, but we have sought to find 
suitable subheads for each excerpt included. The analysis will follow at the end of the chapter. 
                                                 
12 See Khurram Murad’s introduction to Mawdudi’s Let Us Be Muslims. 
13 Mawdudi: Let Us Be Muslims: 39. 
14 Ibid., 43. 
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5.2.2. Muslims Are Superior to Kāfirs 
The title Muslim aur Kāfir kā Aslī Farq can be translated as ”The fundamental difference 
between a Muslim and a kāfir.” Mawdudi starts each Friday address (khutba), also this one, 
with the same opening line, “Barādarān-e islām!” – “Brothers in Islam!” The word 
“barādar”15 can be translated both as “brother” and “co-religionist”. He goes on to say, 
Every Muslim has the understanding and certainly you do too, 
that the Muslim belongs to a rank16 above the kāfir. God 
approves of the Muslim and disapproves of the kāfir. The 
Muslim will obtain forgiveness and go to be with God, and the 
kāfir will not be forgiven. The Muslim will go to heaven and the 
kāfir will go to hell. 
Here Mawdudi is claiming that it is a common belief among Muslims that they are superior to 
kāfirs, and that Muslims have a privileged standing before God. This is an allusion to the 
Qur’ānic teaching that the Muslim umma is “the best community ever produced for the 
people” and therefore superior “in terms of character and morals” (see chapter 3). The 
assertion that the Muslim belongs to a class above the kāfir is not politically correct in our 
part of the world. In Islamic Foundation’s translation this clause simply reads “Muslims are 
different from Kafirs [sic]”. That is not true to the original and can be characterised as a 
mitigation strategy on the part of the editor. 
5.2.3. Heaven and Hell 
Mawdudi continues, 
Today I want you to consider why there is such a big difference 
between the Muslim and the kāfir in the end? Both you and the 
kāfir are offspring of Adam (on whom be peace). The kāfir is a 
human being just like you. He, too, has hands and feet, eyes and 
ears exactly like you do.  He breathes the very same air. He 
drinks the same water. He lives on the very same soil. He eats 
the same produce. He is born in the same manner and dies in 
the same manner. The same God that created you created him 
too. Why, then, is his rank inferior and your rank17 superior? 
Why are you rewarded with heaven and he is thrown into hell? 
Khurram Murad’s translation has omitted the rhetorical question that opens this paragraph. 
The next sentence is translated like this, “Kāfirs are as much offspring of Adam and Eve 
                                                 
15 According to Platts’ Urdu dictionary, the word can be pronounced both as “barādar” and “birādar”. Firōz ul-
lughāt Urdu to Urdu dictionary suggests “barādar” only. 
16 I have chosen to translate darja as “rank” instead of “position” or “class”. The Firōz ul-lughāt Urdu to Urdu 
dictionary gives the word jamā‘at, meaning “party”, “class”, as one of the synonyms for darja. 
17 or “his rank low and your rank high” 
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[emphasis mine] as you”.18 There is no mention of Eve in the Urdu edition that I have got. If 
the mention of Eve has been added to make Mawdudi sound better to readers in the West, I 
think it is stretching the text too far. As for the rhetorical question regarding the superior rank 
of the Muslim, Khurram Murad has translated it as “So why should they be ranked lower and 
you higher?” We noticed that he had omitted the idea of ranking in the first excerpt. 
In both of these first excerps there are allusions to the Qur’ānic teaching that hell is prepared 
for the infidels. Sura 3:126 reads 
And protect yourselves against the Fire which has been 
prepared for the unbelievers. And obey Allah and the 
messenger, mayhap ye will be mercifully treated.19 
If we turn to Muslim dogmatics and the ‘aqīda (creed) the Testament (Wasīya) of Abū 
Hanīfa, Article 20, it says that paradise “is prepared for the God-fearing” and that hell “is 
prepared for the infidels”.20 Mawdudi uses the word jannat for heaven. This is the Urdu form 
of the Arabic janna, which literally means garden. It corresponds to the Hebrew word gan 
which occurs in Genesis 2:8: “And the Lord God planted a garden [gan] toward the east, in 
Eden”.21 The descriptions of paradise and hell and the torments awaiting the damned 
constitute one of the major themes of the Qur’ān, and there are also numerous hadiths on the 
same topics. “Garden” is the term which usually describes the place prepared for the elect in 
the Qur’ān and Muslim literature. According to the Qur’ān, “The size of Paradise is equal to 
that of earth and heaven together. There will be pleasant dwellings for the chosen … and 
pavilions where Houris are kept. Lofty gardens, leaping fountains, streams of living water, of 
milk, wine and honey …, fountains scented with camphor … or ginger, shady valleys, all 
sorts of delicious fruits, of all seasons and without a thorn… There will be exquisite banquets, 
served in priceless vessels … by immortal youths.” “Pure consorts” (Sura 2:25) are promised, 
and these have been understood to be “Houris …, beings from the Other World ‘with modest 
looks and large fine eyesʼ …‘touched by neither man nor demon before.ʼ”22 Mawdudi offers a 
different interpretation of the azwāj mutahhara, or “pure consorts”. For one thing, the English 
translation of Tafhim al-Qur’ān renders azwāj mutahhara in sura 2:25 as “pure spouses”, and 
in his footnote Mawdudi writes that 
                                                 
18 Mawudi: Let Us Be Muslims: 53. 
19 Bell 1960, Vol.1:57. 
20 Wensinck 1932: 129-130. 
21 Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān,Vol. 4: 12. The Bible quotation rendered here has been taken from the New 
American Standard Bible (NASB). 
22 Encyclopaedia of Islam 1986-2004, Vol. 1: 447 
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 …If a man has been virtuous in this world while his wife has 
not, their relationship in the Next World will be sundered and 
the man will receive another spouse who will be pure and 
virtuous. On the other hand, if a virtuous woman has had an evil 
husband she will be tied in companionship with a virtuous man. 
Where husband and wife have both been virtuous their 
relationship will become everlasting.23 
In this passage it seems evident that Mawdudi is thinking in terms of monogamy both in this 
life and the hereafter. Other interpretations based on hadīths give the idea that the elect will be 
lead to their heavenly dwellings accompanied of an entourage of their wives, houris and 
youths, as well as their children.24 The Syrian scholar and reformer Rashid Rida (1865-1935), 
in his Tafsīr al-Manār rejects as inauthentic those matn (texts) of the traditions “which 
promise to the elect houris in abundance, and he refers to a hadīth reproduced by al-Bukhārī 
and Muslim, which awards to everyone in paradise his earthly wife and a single houri.”25 
Mawdudi, on the other hand, does not seem to allow for houris in addition to a wife. 
According to traditions and traditional exegesis, paradise is believed to be located 
under the Throne of God. There will be palaces of gold, silver, pearls, rubies, etc., as well as 
fruit trees and rivers of wine, milk and honey. There will be horses and camels. Each saint 
will be as tall as Adam and of the same age as Jesus (33 years). The prophet Muhammad will 
go in first, followed by poor believers, preceding the rich. They will be welcomed by angels. 
There will be wonderful music, and God will appear to the elect and greet them. The language 
of paradise will be Arabic.26 In his exegesis of the passage “This is the Paradise which you 
are made to inherit as a reward for your deeds” in Sura 7: 43, Mawdudi explains that  
                                                
… God will not impress His bounty upon the righteous; He will 
rather emphasize that Paradise is granted to them by way of 
compensation for their righteous conduct, that it is the fruit of 
their hard labour; that it is not like the crumbs of charity but a 
fair recompense for their striving…27 
In other words, according to Mawdudi, mere faith is not sufficient to enter paradise. Good 
works are required. 
 
23 Mawdudi: Towards Understanding the Qur’ān, Vol. 1: 55. 
24 Encyclopaedia of Islam 1986-2004, Vol. 1:448. 
25 Ibid., 451. 
26 Ibid., 448-449. 
27 Mawdudi: Towards Understanding the Qur’ān, Vol. 3: 28, note 33. 
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In our text, Mawdudi uses the Persian word dōzakh for hell. The Arabic synonym jahannam is 
also frequently used in Urdu. In the Qur’ān, however, the most frequently used word to 
describe hell is al-nār, “the fire”, followed by jahannam and some eight other terms. It is a 
place of punishment and torture of body and soul. There will be flames, black smoke, boiling 
water and a burning wind.28 There are seven gates, and the gates “will correspond to the kind 
of error and sin which a person commits, making him deserving of being cast into hell.”29 The 
people in heaven and hell can see and communicate with each other, and “those who were 
believers in life will laugh at the unbelievers (kuffār), looking down from their thrones.”30 
“The sinners will see the fire and recognize that they are to fall into it, and they will find no 
outlet… The fire will roast their skins and then roast them anew… They will be in chains with 
yokes around their necks… Their food will choke them … but will neither nourish them nor 
remove their hunger…The sinners will be all alone, with no intercessor or defender… They 
will be bound together with fetters …and curse each other…”31 According to Sura 19:71-72, 
everybody has to face hell; the pious will be delivered from it and the wrong-doers will be left 
in it. Those who will be left in hell are the unbelievers (al-kāfirūn), apostates, hypocrites, 
idolaters, vagabonds, the haughty, those who die in sin, those who deserted in battle, as well 
as some other groups. According to Sura 66:10, Noah’s and Lot’s wives will go to hell.32 In 
fact there are hadīths asserting “that the majority of the inhabitants of hell are women”.33  
5.2.4. Who is a Kāfir? 
Mawdudi continues his argument, 
This is something that puzzles you a bit. Such a big difference 
between people can not just stem from the fact that you have 
names like Abdullah and Abd ur-Rehman and he is called Din 
Dayal, Kartar Singh and Robertson and the like. Or that you 
practice circumcision and he does not, or that you eat meat and 
he does not. Allah, the Exalted One, who created all men, the 
Provider of all, could never be so tyrannical as to discriminate 
between his created beings on account of such small things, and 
then send one person to heaven and the other to hell. 
Here Mawdudi changes gears, using the Arabic word Allah for God, instead of the Persian 
word Khudā, which he has used in the previous paragraphs. When referring to kāfirs, 
                                                 
28 Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān, Vol. 2: 414-415. 
29 Mawdudi: Towards Understanding the Qur’ān, Vol. 4: 293, note 26. See also Mawdudi’s translation of  Sura 
15:44. 
30 Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān, Vol. 2: 415. 
31 Ibid., 416. 
32 Ibid., 417-418. 
33 Roald 1998: 27; See Muslim: Sahīh Muslim, Dar al Arabia, Beirut 1971, Vol.4: 1431. 
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Mawdudi gives examples of Hindu, Sikh and Christian names. It seems clear that Mawdudi 
divides humanity into two categories: Muslims and kāfirs. No third possibility exists. A 
different view is held by the British imam Dr. Abduljalil Sajid, member of the European 
Council of Religious Leaders. He claims that according to Mawdudi (who was his teacher in 
Pakistan), the dividing line does not go between Muslims and non-Muslims, but between 
those who obey Allah and those who don’t.34 I would contend that Mawdudi teaches that you 
have to be a Muslim and be wholly submitted to Allah in order to be sure of doing well in the 
hereafter.35 From a legal perspective, he considers anybody who enters into the Muslim umma 
a Muslim, and from this we deduct that a kāfir is anybody not belonging to the Muslim 
umma.36 In his preface to the eighth reprint of Khutubāt he wrote 
 I have asked Muslims not to be content with that Islam which 
merely ensures to keep them on its boundary so that they cannot 
be called kāfirs. Rather they should cultivate that Islam which 
would ensure that they are accepted as sincere and loyal 
believers in the sight of God.37 
Again, obedience to God is required. Merely professing to be a Muslim is not enough. 
5.2.5. Islam and Kufr 
In the following paragraph Mawdudi goes on to explain that as God is not unjust, the only 
justification for why he discriminates between a Muslim and a kāfir and sends one to heaven 
and the other to hell lies in the difference between Islam and kufr. He writes 
The meaning of Islam is obedience to God, and the meaning of 
kufr is disobedience. Both the Muslim and the kāfir are human 
beings. Both are God’s slaves. But one person becomes more 
excellent than the other because he recognizes his master, obeys 
his commandments and fears the consequences of disobeying 
them. The other person falls down from his high position38 
because he does not recognize his master and does not obey 
him. For this reason God is pleased with the Muslim and angry 
with the kāfir. He promises the Muslim that he will go to heaven 
and tells the kāfir that he will throw him into hell. 
Mawdudi is repeating that both the Muslim and the kāfir are human beings. Yet the Muslim is 
more meritorious because he obeys God’s commandments. There is no demonization or 
                                                 
34 Aftenposten (Norwegian newspaper), 11 February 2006. 
35 Mawudi: Let Us Be Muslims: 113. 
36 Ibid., 112-113. 
37 Ibid., 307. 
38 Literally “from the upper rank”. 
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dehumanization of the kāfir in this text. That is perhaps because there is no mention of the 
Jews here. We do, however, find examples of antisemitic sentiments in Mawdudi’s 
commentary on the Qur’ān. When commenting on Sura 5:60 which speaks of “the ones whom 
Allah has cursed”, Mawdudi writes that the verse alludes to the Jews, “who had sunk to the 
lowest level of evil, transgression and moral decadence”.39 In the passage above, Mawdudi 
goes on to say that the kāfir falls down from his high position. That is because he holds the 
belief that every child is born as a Muslim.40 This is a notion that is based on certain hadīths, 
of which the standard is “Every child is born in the fitra; it is his parents who make of him a 
Jew or a Christian or a Parsi. In the same way cattle give birth to calves without defects.”41 
The Shafi‘i jurist al-Nawawī (1233-77) wrote that  
Every child is born with a predisposition towards Islam. If one 
of its parents is a Muslim, the child remains Muslim as to its 
state in this world and in the next. If both its parents are infidels, 
the child follows their state in this world… When it reaches the 
adult age, it remains in the state of unbelief of its parents. If it is 
destined for eternal happiness, it will embrace Islam; otherwise 
it will die as an infidel…42 
Al-Nawawi also commented on the fate of children who die before reaching the adult age. 
First, he refers to other scholars who agree that children of Muslim parents go to paradise. He 
continues 
…As to the children of the infidels there are three opinions. 
According to the majority of the doctors, they will go to hell, like 
their fathers. Others take up an attitude of reserve. The third 
group – whose opinion is the right one – thinks that these 
children will go to paradise. This opinion is supported by 
various arguments; by a reference, for instance, to the tradition 
according to which Muhammad saw Abraham in Paradise 
surrounded by children. When those who were present 
exclaimed: Even by the children of the infidels? Muhammad 
answered: Even by the children of the infidels. Another 
reference is to sura 17:16: “And We punished not, until We had 
first sent an Apostle”.43 
                                                 
39 Towards Understanding the Qur’ān, Vol. 2: 175. Another example, among many, is found in Vol. 1: 85, 
where Mawdudi writes of “the historical record of the Jews, a record which is replete with perversion and 
corruption”. 
40 Mawdudi: Dīniyāt: 14. 
41 Wensinck 1932: 42.  
42 Ibid., 44. 
43 Ibid., 43. The hadīth is in Bukhārī: Janāʼiz, b. 93. 
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5.2.6. Knowledge and Works 
In the next paragraph Mawdudi elaborates on the two factors that separate a Muslim from a 
kāfir: 
From this it appears that there are only two factors that 
separate a Muslim from a kāfir. One is knowledge, the other is 
what you do. First of all we need to know who our master is. 
What are his commandments? How do we carry out his will? 
What can we do to please him and what angers him? When we 
realise these things, then the next step is to become the Master’s 
slave;44 to do the will of the master and to surrender your own. 
I omit the next paragraph, which is an elaboration of what it means to obey God blindly.  
5.2.7. The Kāfir Is Ignorant and Disobedient 
Mawdudi goes on to explain that it is the combination of the knowledge of God’s will and the 
carrying out of it that causes God to bestow favour on the Muslim. He writes, 
It is on account of this knowledge and these good works45 that 
the Muslim becomes God’s dear servant and God’s mercy and 
honour is bestowed upon him.46 The kāfir does not possess this 
knowledge, and due to the lack of knowledge he does not do 
these works. Therefore he is an ignorant and disobedient slave 
of God, and God deprives him of his mercy. 
In the following paragraph Mawdudi stresses that Islam is not a race or a family or a 
brotherhood where membership is passed down automatically from father to son and from son 
to grandson. He gives the example of Noah’s son, who in spite of being born in the house of a 
prophet, did not recognize God, but was disobedient. Therefore God took no notice of his 
family and punished him so that the world would be warned.  
5.2.8. Mercy Is Reserved for Those Who Obey God 
Mawdudi continues his reasoning in the following manner 
Therefore be fully aware that with God, any difference between 
one person and the other is due to knowledge and works. Both in 
the world and in the hereafter mercy is reserved for those who 
recognize him, know the straight path that he has revealed and 
obey him. As for the people who do not possess this quality, 
regardless of their name being Abdullah, Abd ur-Rehman, Din 
                                                 
44 Literally “to make oneself a slave of the master”. 
45 In the Urdu original, the word ‘amal is used in the singular, without the adjective “good”. However, I would 
contend that the meaning “good works” is implied. 
46 Literally “descends on him”. 
 52
 53
                                                
Dayal or Kartar Singh, before God there is no difference 
between those two categories, and they don’t obtain any right to 
his mercy. 
Clearly, Mawdudi’s point of view is faith plus works. 
5.2.9. Ruled by Kāfirs 
In the next paragraph Mawdudi addresses the political realities in colonial India and the 
humiliating aspects of being ruled by a kāfir government. As the footnote on page 5 in the 
Urdu edition points out, this Friday sermon was written in 1938, before independence. 
Brethren, you call yourselves Muslims, and you believe that 
God’s mercy is over the Muslim, but open your eyes for one 
moment and see! Is God’s mercy descending on you? Whatever 
happens in the hereafter you will come to know later on, but 
take a glance at how you are doing in this world. Here in India 
you are timid servants. There is such a vast number of you that 
if each one of you would just throw a pebble it would make a 
mountain. How come the kāfirs are ruling in a place with so 
many Muslims?47 Your necks are in their grip that they may turn 
you wherever they want.48 Your heads that used to bow to no 
one except God are now bowing to human beings. Your honour, 
which nobody dared to touch, has been ruined.49 Your hands 
that always used to give rather than receive are now begging 
from the kāfir.50 Ignorance, poverty and indebtedness have left 
you wretched and contemptible everywhere. Is this God’s 
mercy? 
The idea of kāfirs ruling over Muslims is contrary to Mawdudi’s interpretation of the Qur’ān, 
as we have seen in chapter 3. Non-Muslims have “absolutely no right to seize the reins of 
power in any part of God’s earth”.51 According to him, Muslims can not live according to an 
Islamic pattern under a non-Islamic government.52 This is nothing short of a catastrophe.  
 
47 Literally “Where there are so many Muslims there the kāfirs are ruling”. 
48 Literally “turn you where they want”. 
49 Literally “reduced to dust”. 
50 There are several ways of translating this sentence. One alternative is “You, who were always well off are now 
poor and begging from the kāfir”. 
51 Mawdudi: Towards Understanding the Qur’ān, Vol. 3: 202. 
52 Mawdudi: Jihad in Islam: 19. 
5.2.10. The Wrath of God 
Mawdudi continues 
If this is not a mercy, but sheer wrath, how strange to see the 
wrath of God coming upon Muslims! You are Muslims and 
humiliated! Muslims and slaves! This is just as inconceivable as 
it is for something to be black and white at the same time! When 
a Muslim is God’s beloved, how on earth can a Muslim be poor 
and humiliated? Is your God so cruel (Heaven preserve us!) as 
to give the disobedient overlordship over you and punish you in 
exchange for your obedience after you have come to know his 
truth and obey him? If your belief is that God can not be cruel, 
and if you are convinced that one can not reap dishonour in 
return for obedience to God, then you have to admit that there 
has to be something wrong in your pretension to be Muslims. No 
doubt your name may be entered as Muslim in government 
records, but with God matters are not settled according to 
certificates issued by a British government office. God’s records 
are different. Search and see if your names are written among 
those who obey or those who disobey. 
In this paragraph Mawdudi touches on the problem of pain. How come bad things happen to 
good people? To be more precise, how can it be that kāfirs are ruling over Muslims? This is 
the first time he uses exclamation marks in the text. He expresses his disdain. Being ruled by 
the British means that God’s wrath has descended on the Indian Muslims, he says. How can it 
be? As God does not repay obedience with disgrace, there is only one answer: they are not 
true Muslims, and that is why God is punishing them.  
5.2.11. Learn from the Prophet 
He goes on to talk about the Qur’ān and the Prophet: 
God sent you the book that you might read it and know your 
master and know the way to obey him. Did you ever try to find 
out what is written in the book? God sent his prophet, peace be 
upon him, to you that he might teach you how to become 
Muslims. Did you ever try to find out what the prophet, peace be 
upon him, taught? God showed you the way to attain honour in 
this world and the next. Do you walk in that way? God made it 
very clear which activities debase a man in this world and the 
next. Do you save yourselves from such activities? Tell me, what 
do you have to say to that? If you admit that you have neither 
obtained knowledge from God’s book nor from the life of his 
prophet (PBUH), nor have you followed his example, then when 
did you become Muslims that you should be rewarded for it? 
You are being rewarded according to what kind of Muslims you 
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are, and that is how you will be rewarded in the next world as 
well. 
Mawdudi tells his audience that there is probably no reason why God should reward them as 
he assumes that they have neither studied the Qur’ān nor followed the example of the prophet. 
He continues 
I have already explained to you that there is no difference 
between a Muslim and a kāfir except knowledge and works. If 
sombody’s knowledge and works is just like that of a kāfir, and 
he calls himself a Muslim, he is lying. The kāfir does not read 
the Qur’ān and does not know what is written in it. If the same is 
the case with a Muslim, then why should he be called Muslim? 
The kāfir does not know the teaching of the Messenger of Allah, 
peace be upon him, and what he showed us about the straight 
path that leads to God. If a Muslim is just as ill-informed then 
how can he be a Muslim? 
 The kāfir does his own will instead of doing God’s will. If the 
Muslim is as unyielding and headstrong as he is and follows his 
personal beliefs and opinions like he does, has no regard for 
God and is a slave to his own desires, then what right does he 
have to call himself a Muslim (somebody who is subject to 
orders from God1). The kāfir does not distinguish between halāl 
and harām (the lawful and the unlawful) and chooses to do 
whatever he thinks will bring benefit or pleasure regardless of 
whether that is halāl or harām in God’s eyes. If a Muslim 
behaves exactly like that then what is the difference between him 
and a kāfir? In short, if a Muslim is as unversed in the 
knowledge of Islam as a kāfir, and when a Muslim allows 
himself to do anything that a kāfir would do then why should he 
be superior to the kāfir and why should he not be treated the 
same as the kāfir in the resurrection? This is something we 
should consider very carefully indeed. 
At this stage Mawdudi finds it necessary to reassure his audience that he has not set out to 
accuse them of being kāfirs. He continues: 
My dear brethren! Do not take it to mean that I have set out to 
make Muslims into kāfirs. No, that has never been my intention. 
I have been thinking, and I would like each and every one of us 
to think that why, when all is said and done, have we been cut 
off from God’s mercy? Why are we being struck with disasters 
on every side? Why are those we call kāfirs, i.e. God’s 
disobedient slaves, domineering us everywhere? And why are 
we who claim to be obedient subdued everywhere? The more I 
have pondered the reason for this, the more I have been 
                                                 
1 This clause can also be translated “God’s servant”. 
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convinced that the difference that remains between us and the 
kāfirs is in name only, for we do not in any way lag behind them 
in terms of negligence of God, disobedience and the lack of fear 
of him. True, there remains a small difference between us and 
them, but we don’t deserve any reward just because of that; on 
the contrary, we deserve to be punished. For we know and 
confess that the Qur’ān is God’s book and in spite of that we 
treat it the way the kāfir treats it. We know and confess that 
Muhammad (peace be upon him) is Allah’s prophet, and yet we 
avoid following him, just like a kāfir. 
From this quote it seems evident that the experience of being dominated and subdued by 
kāfirs is something that has tormented Mawdudi a lot. 
5.2.12. Deadly Sins 
At this point Mawdudi lists a number of sins that the so-called Muslims have in common with 
the kāfirs: 
We know that God has cursed the liar, that he who gives and 
takes bribes he has assured of hell, that he who gives or takes 
interest is convicted as the worst offender, that slander he has 
said to be equal to eating your brother’s flesh, and foul speech, 
shamelessness and immorality he has threatened with severe 
torment. But in spite of being aware of this we do all these 
things with great liberty, as though we had no fear of God. This 
is the very reason why we are not rewarded, but punished: we 
just appear to be a little more Muslim than the kāfirs. The fact 
that the kāfirs are ruling us and that we are suffering 
humiliation everywhere is a punishment for the sin that the 
blessing of Islam was bestowed on us but we did not appreciate 
it.  
5.2.13. Recover That Which Has Been Lost 
Mawdudi starts exhorting his listeners: 
Beloved, whatever I have said in today’s sermon has not been in 
order to condemn you. I have not set out to rebuke you. My 
purpose is that one should consider how to recover that which 
has been lost. The idea of finding what has been lost comes the 
moment a person realises what he has lost and how precious it 
is. Therefore I try to awaken you. If you come to your senses, 
and you realise that you really had something very precious, 
then again you will think about how to obtain it. 
After scolding his audience for their shortcomings and lack of piety, he now attempts to put 
them on the right track. 
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5.2.14. Final Exhortation 
We have now reached the concluding paragraph of the pamphlet, which extends over more 
than one page. I have divided it into three paragraphs for the reader’s convenience: 
In my previous sermon2 I told you that in order for a Muslim to 
be a Muslim, you first of all need knowledge of Islam. Every 
Muslim ought to know what the Qur’ān teaches, the manner of 
conduct of the Holy Prophet, what Islam is supposed to be, and 
which matters constitute the fundamental difference between 
Islam and kufr. Nobody can be a Muslim without this 
knowledge. But what a pity it is that you are not concerned 
about obtaining this knowledge. It seems that you still don’t 
realise what a great blessing you are being deprived of. 
My brethren! Even a mother doesn’t give her child milk until he 
cries and demands it. When somebody is thirsty, he searches for 
water himself, and God even provides water for him 
supernaturally. When you are not thirsty, then even a well full of 
water is of no use if it were to come into sight in front of you. 
First and foremost you ought to understand what a big loss you 
are suffering when you remain unacquainted with the faith. 
God’s book is ready at hand for you, but you do not know what 
is written in it. Can there be a greater loss than that? You recite 
your prayers3, but you do not know what you are asking God 
for. Can anything be more futile than that? You do not even 
know the meaning of the kalima (the Muslim creed4), through 
which you enter Islam, and you don’t know which obligations 
are incumbent on you after the reciting of the kalima. Can there 
be an even greater loss than that for a Muslim? 
You know the damage of burnt crops, the misfortune of not 
finding a livelihood or losing your possessions, but you are 
unaware of the ruin inflicted by your ignorance of Islam. When 
you perceive this loss then you yourselves will come and say, 
“Save us from this loss.” When you say this, then if God wills 
there will be provision for redeeming you from this loss. 
In this concluding paraghraph Mawdudi sums up the main points of his sermon. There are 
frequent repetitions of what has been said before, and he is driving home the point that his 
audience is suffering a great loss due to their ignorance of Islam. In fact he uses the word 
nuqsān (loss, harm, damage) eleven times in this paragraph. Mawdudi goes on to speak about 
the kalima, “the confession of faith”, also referred to as the šahāda, “I witness that there is no 
                                                 
2 Mawdudi is probably referring to the sermon entitled ”Knowledge, the First Step”, which precedes “Muslims 
or Kafirs?” in Let Us Be Muslims. 
3 The prayers are recited in Arabic. 
4 i.e. lā ilāha illa ʼʼllāh; Muhammadu ʼr-rasūlu ʼllāh. 
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God but Allah” and “I witness that Muhammad is Allah’s Apostle.”5 It is by reciting the 
kalima that the kāfir can enter Islam and avoid going to hell.  According to Mawdudi, 
Those who recite it constitute one nation, while those who reject 
it form another. If a father recites it but his son refuses to, the 
father is no longer the same father, nor the son the same son. 
The son will not inherit anything from the father, his mother and 
sisters may even observe purdah from him.6 
In other words, those who recite the kalima form the umma of Islam. If a son refuses to recite 
the kalima, he will not inherit anything. This indicates that he is to be considered a murtadd, 
an apostate. Some of the Muslim jurists, such as the later Shāfi‘īs regard the rights of 
ownership of the apostate as suspended.7 In Islam, two persons belonging to different 
religions can not inherit anything from each other.8 
5.3. Analysis of ”The Fundamental Difference between a Muslim and 
a Kāfir” 
5.3.1. Establishing the Topics of the Text 
As the title suggests, this is indeed a “discourse of difference”. It is primarily a text dealing 
with Islamic dogmatics based on the teachings of the Qur’ān. It speaks of spiritual realities, 
such as people’s standing before God in this life and the hereafter, and what to do in order to 
be a good Muslim and avoid being damned and going to hell. It is a text that establishes a 
sharp distinction between the believer (the Muslim) and the unbeliever (the kāfir). Most of the 
text is devoted to explaining why there is such a big difference between the Muslim and the 
kāfir. Mawdudi also addresses the bewildering aspects of Muslims being ruled by kāfirs. He 
considers this to be a mishap as kāfirs are not supposed to have overlordship over Muslims 
due to their inferior status. 
5.3.2. Investigation of the Discursive Strategies, the Linguistic Means 
and the Linguistic Realisations 
Mawdudi starts off by constructing the ingroup (the Muslims) and the outgroup, the kāfirs, in 
the very first paragraph. This is what we may call “cultural criteria of categorisation”, as it is 
based on religion.9 As for referential strategies, he uses collectivisation and religionisation 
(which is a form of culturalisation). There are some examples of deictics (we, you), but more 
                                                 
5 Wensinck 1932: 3. 
6 See the khutba ”True Meaning of Iman,” in Let Us Be Muslims, p. 69. 
7 Encyclopaedia of Islam 1986-2004, Vol. 7: 636. 
8 Schacht 1982: 132. 
9 van Dijk 1993: 5. 
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of collectives (linguistic means) like “brothers in Islam” and kuffār (unbelievers) (called 
linguistic realisations). For the most part, he uses the words Muslim and kāfir (unbeliever) in 
the third person singular when referring to the whole category. At other times he addresses the 
audience as “you” (Muslims) versus the kāfir. In this particular text Mawdudi does not use the 
word umma that would normally be used when referring to “the community of the faithful”. 
The only religionym that Mawdudi uses is “Muslim”. He does not use the religionyms Hindu, 
Sikh or Christian, yet when speaking of the kāfir he gives examples of Hindu, Sikh and 
Christian names. He also writes that the kāfir does not practice circumcision and that he may 
not eat meat, a feature typical of Hindus. In other words, the references to Hindus, Sikhs and 
Christians are covert. This is a mitigation strategy, by which Mawdudi seeks to obscure who 
he is talking about. He might have feared that the British would put restrictions on the printing 
and distribution of his literary output. We know that his biography of Gandhi had been 
confiscated by the police.10 Besides, he might have been afraid of instigating communal riots. 
He refers to the colonial rulers as kāfirs twice, and as “the disobedient” once. The politonym 
“British” is used only once when speaking of birth certificates issued by the British 
government.  
If we attempt to investigate Mawdudi’s predicational strategies, we find that he is 
making extensive use of explicit predicates. The predications are indeed oppositional and 
dichotomic. In short, the Muslim is “good” and the kāfir is “bad”. Mawdudi writes that God 
approves of the Muslim but disapproves of the kāfir. The Muslim will obtain forgiveness, but 
the kāfir will not be forgiven. The Muslim will go to heaven, but the kāfir will go to hell. God 
is pleased with the Muslim but angry with the kāfir. The Muslim is God’s dear servant while 
the kāfir is an ignorant and disobedient slave. God’s mercy and honour is bestowed upon the 
Muslim, while the kāfir is deprived of God’s mercy both in this life and in the hereafter. The 
kāfir doesn’t read the Qur’ān and doesn’t know what is written in it. He doesn’t know the 
teaching of the Messenger of Allah. The kāfir follows his personal beliefs and opinions and is 
a slave to his own desires. He lacks the fear of God and does not distinguish between halāl 
and harām (the lawful and the unlawful). As a result of his ignorance and disobedience, the 
kāfir is inferior to the Muslim. It doesn’t help that he, too, is an offspring of Adam and lives 
on the same soil. The Muslim is more excellent due to his faith and obedience of God’s 
commandments. Therefore the Muslim “belongs to a rank above the kāfir”. From this follows 
                                                 
10 Nasr 1996: 16. 
 59
 60
                                                
that kāfirs are not supposed to have overlordship over Muslims. The Muslims are supposed to 
rule, not the kāfirs. 
We notice that Mawdudi is making use of metaphors of spatiality, which often occur 
in discourses of “races”, “nations” and “ethnicities”.11 He writes that the Muslim is above the 
kāfir. A kāfir is a person that “falls down [emphasis mine] from his high position [emphasis 
mine]” due to his unbelief and disobedience. According to Mawdudi, the kāfir started out in 
the high position because every child is born as a Muslim. 
According to the theory presented in chapter 1, “categorisations are assumed to be 
necessary for reducing the complexity of the social word”. Mawdudi has certainly reduced the 
complexity of his world; there are only two categories to take into account: Muslim and kāfir. 
We also make a note of his positive self-stereotyping, in which he favours the ingroup, the 
Muslims. 
As for Mawdudi’s perspectivation strategy, his point of view is that of the Islamic 
scholar and reformer. He presents himself as an authority. In this particular text, he does not 
make use of quotes in order to support his argument, yet the text is loaded with allusions to 
the teachings of the Qur’ān. He is using the argumentation scheme called the topos of 
authority. Anybody familiar with the discursive tradition of Islam will be able to “pick up” 
the references. It is obvious that Mawdudi is appealing to the authority of the Qur’ān. It is up 
to his audience then and now to accept this authority or reject it.  
 
11 Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 58-59. 
6. Mawdudi’s Text on Dhimmīs as Read in Its Islamic and 
South Asian Context 
6.1. Introduction 
The main focus of this chapter is Mawdudi’s article Islāmī Riyāsat mēṅ Zimmiyōṅ kē Huqūq 
(The Rights of Dhimmīs in the Islamic State) as it appears in the form of a pamphlet in its 
second Urdu edition of 1968.1 We may consider this a legal text as it bases itself on standard 
texts of Islamic law. It was first published as an article in his journal Tarjumānu’l-Qur’ān in 
August 1948. That year the Constituent Assembly had called for “the opinions of experts as 
well as of the general public about the position of minorities in Pakistan”.2 This article is 
understood to be Mawdudi’s response to that call. I will present my own translation, with the 
exception of a few sections towards the end of the article, and I will comment on some of the 
instances where there are significant differences between my translation and Khurshid 
Ahmad’s translation as found in Islamic Law and Constitution in its eleventh edition of 
1992,3 where this text is included along with other speeches and articles. Khurshid Ahmad 
(b.1932) worked closely with Mawdudi for many years and has held top offices in the 
Jama‘at-e Islami and the Islamic Foundation, UK. The text is quite long (36 pages plus 
appendixes), so I will only present excerpts of it.  
                                                
The Rights of Dhimmīs in the Islamic State can be considered as normative Islamic 
discourse on dhimmīs as Mawdudi is relying heavily on the works of the Islamic jurists from 
the classical period, with the exception of the sections on political representation, education 
and freedom of expression, where he is making use of his own ijtihād, seeking to apply the 
shari‘a on modern issues. Mawdudi’s text has, in turn, become normative for the next 
generation of Islamic scholars writing on the same subject: Both Yusuf al-Qaradawi (2005 
[1985]) and Abdul Rahman Awang (1994) of the International Islamic University of Malaysia 
seem to give importance to Mawdudi and have listed his text in their bibliographies, as well as 
some of the jurists that he refers to. 
 
1 Two appendixes have been added, and that seems to be the only change that has been made. 
2 Mawdudi: Islamic Law and Constitution, p. 273. 
3 I have also consulted the 3rd edition of 1967 and found the translation to be identical with the 11th edition, with 
the exception of the numbering of notes. 
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6.2. The Rights of Dhimmīs (Zimmiyōṅ kē Huqūq) 
The first section of the article is devoted to a discussion of how, on the one hand, the Islamic 
state, and on the other, a national democratic state, classify their citizens. We will look at the 
first section in its entirety. For a transliteration of the Urdu text, see Appendix B. All excerpts 
are rendered in my translation, unless otherwise stated. Mawdudi’s opening paragraph goes 
like this: 
Before we discuss the rights of non-Muslims under Islamic rule, 
it is important to bear in mind that Islamic rule is essentially an 
ideological rule, and its specific character is definitively 
different from that of a national democratic government. The 
implications this major difference has for the discussion of this 
issue, can be easily explained in the points below. 
Mawdudi seems to begin with an apology: Because Islamic rule is an ideological rule, it is 
totally different from a national democratic government. It is a rule of a different kind, where 
other ordinances apply. This is coming close to the argumentation scheme called “the topos of 
reality” 4 (because reality is as it is, specific decisions should be made), which we will address 
in the analysis in section 6.12. 
6.2.1. A Comparison of the Islamic State and the National Democratic 
State 
After the introductory words above, Mawdudi presents a five point comparison of the Islamic 
state on the one hand and the national state on the other:  
1) The Islamic state divides the people living within its borders 
with regard to who believes in the doctrines5 on which the 
Islamic government has been founded and who does not 
believe in them, that is Muslim and non-Muslim. 
2) Running the Islamic state is first and foremost the task of 
those who believe in its principles. It can certainly make use 
of the service of non-Muslims in its administration, but it can 
not give them positions in leadership or exercise of authority. 
3) It lies in the very essence of the Islamic state that it is 
obligated to establish a sharp distinction between Muslims 
and non-Muslims and that it makes it very clear which rights 
it can grant to non-Muslims and which it can not give. 
                                                 
4 Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 79. 
5 The word usūl can also be translated as “fundamentals” or “principles”. 
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4) The Islamic state resolves the intricacy of the presence of 
non-Muslim elements in its system by assuring them of a 
guarantee of certain rights; it prohibits their intermeddling 
in the management of its main system, but always keeps the 
door open for them if they should agree to Islamic doctrines 
and acknowledge them, in which case they will become 
members of the ruling class.6 
5) The Islamic state is obliged to grant the dhimmī non-Muslims 
all the rights that the shari‘a has prescribed for them. 
Nobody has any right to deny those rights or reduce them. Of 
course the Muslims certainly possess the right to grant them 
some further rights in addition to those rights (granted by the 
shari‘a) on the condition that this addition does not collide 
with Islamic principles. 
6.2.1.1. The Islamic State Divides the People According to Religion 
According to the first point above, the Islamic state classifies people according to religion. 
This is a cultural criteria of categorisation. It is a reproduction of previous Islamic discourse 
and could be an allusion to Mir Sayyid ‘Ali Hamadani’s Zakhīrat al-Mulūk7, of which the 
ninth chapter deals with principles of governance according to the shari‘a. Like Mawdudi, 
Hamadani divides the subjects into two categories, Muslim and kāfir, and says that their rights 
should depend on which religion they belong to. Muslims have twenty special rights, while 
the ahl-e dhimma have to comply with twenty restrictions.8 
6.2.1.2. Dhimmīs Are Excluded from Leadership 
In the second point above, Mawdudi introduces one of the main points of the article. He 
declares that in the Islamic state, non-Muslims can not hold positions in leadership or the 
exercise of authority. Khurshid Ahmad translates the latter half of this point somewhat 
differently. His translation goes like this: 
…Those who do not believe in the ideology of the State can, no 
doubt, be asked to cooperate, if they so like, with the Muslims in 
the task of administration but they should be neither called upon 
to undertake nor can be entrusted with the responsibility of 
policy-making.9  
It looks like Ahmad has tried to obscure and minimise what Mawdudi is saying. I would 
contend that Mawdudi is saying that non-Muslims should stay out of both policy-making and 
                                                 
6 This can also be translated as “in which case they will become members of the ruling party”. 
7 See chapter 4.2. 
8 Alam 2004: 43-45. See chapter 4.2. in this dissertation for the list of restrictions. 
9 Mawdudi: Islamic Law and Constitution: 274-275. 
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the exercise of authority. This is the point of view of the Muslim jurists, who were unanimous 
that the dhimmīs were to be excluded from public offices. This exclusion, according to their 
interpretation, is enjoined by the Qur’ān, the hadīths and “moral considerations”. However, 
some rare authors like Mawardi (d. 1058) accept the possibility of a dhimmī occupying a 
public post and also the high office of minister on the condition that he doesn’t have any 
decision making power.10 Mawdudi’s point of view seems to be close to that of Mawardi’s in 
that he accepts the possibility of a dhimmī occupying a public post. According to Ghazi b. al-
Wasiti, who wrote a treatise on the dhimmīs, “Abu Hanifa, al-Shafi‘i and other legal 
authorities hold that it is not lawful to appoint one of them to a position of influence in any 
province or to any station of trust; for unbelief is inconsistent with authority and with trust.”11 
In short, unbelief is considered to be disqualifying. In the year 850, the Caliph al-Mutawakkil 
forbade the employment of dhimmīs “in the government offices or in any official business 
whereby they might have authority over Muslims”.12 Before him, the Caliph ‘Umar II had 
written to the governors that no dhimmī should have authority over Muslims. He claimed that 
he had dismissed all secretaries and officials throughout the empire that were not Muslims.13 
In spite of this, there are sources claiming that “both Umawi and ‘Abbasi caliphs retained the 
officials employed by the Byzantine and Persian authorities to continue running the affairs of 
the state uninterrupted”.14 
Fakhr-e Mudabbir, whose work Ādāb al-Harb on warfare and “norms of governance”, 
a text that became normative for early Muslim rule in India, “recommends state offices only 
for religious, pious, and godfearing Muslims whose prime concern is to protect and promote 
the rights of Muslims…”15 Mawdudi would no doubt be familiar with this text and it seems to 
have influenced his thinking accordingly. 
6.2.1.3. The Islamic State Can Not Grant Equal Rights to Muslims and 
Non-Muslims 
According to the third point above, the Islamic state is obliged to establish a sharp distinction 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. It can not grant them equal rights. Mawdudi is saying 
that the Islamic state is discriminatory in its very essence. 
                                                 
10 Fattal 1958: 236-238. 
11 Ghazi b.al-Wasiti cited in Yeor 1985:180. 
12 Al-Tabari cited in Stillman 1979: 168. 
13 Tritton 1930 (reprint 1970): 21-22. 
14 Awang 1994: 191. 
15 Alam 2004: 29-30. 
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6.2.1.4. The Muslims Constitute the Ruling Class 
In the fourth point above, Mawdudi leaves no doubt that according to his interpretation of the 
shari‘a, the Muslims constitute the ruling class, the hukumrāṅ jamā‘at, and that the only way 
to become a member of that class is through conversion to Islam. Khurshid Ahmad, it seems, 
has found it necessary to add a whole lot more to this point. His translation goes like this 
To solve the problems arising out of the presence of non-
Muslims (i.e., the people not subscribing to the basic principles 
of the State) within its boundaries, an Islamic state guarantees 
them certain specifically state rights. Beyond those rights it does 
not permit them to meddle with the affairs of the State which is 
based on an ideology to which they honestly do not subscribe. 
Nevertheless, as Islam does not believe in false distinctions of 
race, colour, or territory, it always keeps the door open for them 
to embrace Islamic principles of life and become equal 
participants in all matters concerning the State and the 
government.16 
Note that Ahmad has omitted the clause where Mawdudi refers to the Muslims as hukumrāṅ 
jamā‘at, “the ruling class”.According to Ahmad, “Islam does not believe in false distinctions 
of race, colour, or territory”. According to our text, it does, however, believe in dinstinctions 
on the basis of religion. This runs contrary to articles 1, 2 and 21 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 10 December 1948, which states that  
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights… Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status… 
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his 
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.17 
It is evident that Mawdudi does not allow non-Muslims to take part in the government of their 
country on equal footing with Muslims. This will probably lead to a considerable pressure on 
the followers of other religions to embrace Islam as that is the only way of entrance to the 
ruling class and the way to acceptance by the Muslim majority of the state. Mawdudi’s notion 
of the Muslims constituting the ruling class in the Islamic state bears a semblance to the 
ideology of the apartheid regime in South Africa prior to the 1994 democratic transition.18 
                                                 
16 Mawdudi: Islamic Law and Constitution: 275-276. 
17 http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html Accessed 1 October 2007. 
18 Crawford 1998: 14. 
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6.2.1.5. The Rights of the Dhimmīs Are Prescribed by the Shari‘a 
According to the fifth point above, the Islamic state will grant the non-Muslims the rights 
prescribed by the shari‘a. Further rights may be added, in which case one has to make use of 
ijtihād. The latter part of the article is devoted to a detailed elaboration of these rights. 
6.2.1.6. Mawdudi’s Idea of the National Democratic State 
Now, let us take a look at what Mawdudi writes about the national states: 
1) The national state divides them (the people living within its 
borders) according to those who belong to the ethnic group19 
that actually are the founders and governors of the state and 
those who do not belong to it. In today’s terminology these 
two groups are called the majority and the minority. 
2) The national state will only rely on members of its own ethnic 
group for its leadership and the exercise of authority, and the 
smaller ethnic groups that are represented among its citizens 
will not be entitled to such confidence. This may not be 
clearly articulated, but the practical realities are like that. 
And even if a key position were to be given to somebody from 
a minority background, it would merely be an outward (and 
deceptive) gesture. In fact he would have no influence on 
policy-making. 
3) It is easy for a national state to pretend20 that it has 
established that from a theoretical perspective all the 
inhabitants of the country are one people and that on paper it 
grants them equal rights, while in practice it maintains full 
discrimination between the majority and the minority, and on 
the ground it does not give the minorities any rights at all.21 
4) In order to resolve the intricacy of the participation of other 
ethnic groups within its system the national state resorts to 
three different courses of action  
i. First, it gradually destroys their distinctiveness and seeks to 
assimilate them. 
ii. Second, it resorts to tyrannical methods such as murder, 
pillage and deportation in order to erase their existence. 
iii. Three, it keeps them as untouchables within (its borders). All 
of these three measures have been widely adopted by the 
                                                 
19 The word “qaum” can mean  people, nation, tribe, family, sect and caste. I have chosen to translate it “ethnic 
group” for want of a more precise definition. 
20 Literally “For a national state this hypocritical craftiness is easy…” 
21 Literally “any kind of rights at all.” 
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world’s national democracies, and these days the Muslims in 
India are having a bitter experience of it. 
5) Whatever rights are granted to the minorities in a national 
democratic state are granted by the majority, and in the same 
manner that the majority has the right to grant them, they 
also have the right to increase and decrease them and even 
take them away altogether. Therefore, in reality, as much as 
the minorities are entirely at the mercy of the majority in that 
system, there is not even any lasting guarantee of basic 
human rights.  
Mawdudi is saying that the national state divides the people according to ethnicity and not 
according to religion, as in the Islamic state. He claims that the ethnic minorities are excluded 
from leadership. He insinuates that the national state is making false pretensions of giving all 
its citizens equal rights. In fact the minorities are worse off than in the Islamic state as there is 
no shari‘a to guarantee certain minimum rights. Mawdudi’s idea of the national democratic 
state seems rather distorted and outdated at our point in time. His allegations under point two 
seem particularly far fetched. He is largely unaware of the ideal of cultural pluralism and 
peaceful co-existence, attained through a process of dialogue and bargaining. As for the 
allegations of “tyrannical methods such as murder, pillage and deportation” being directed 
against minorities in the national democratic states, the very same accusations are being 
hurled at Islamic states past and present.22 Albeit this is not a treatise on political science, we 
can briefly state that Mawdudi’s notion of the “tyrannous majority” seems to echo ideas found 
in the writings of liberal thinkers, such as Madison, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart 
Mill, who feared that “the people” could act against minorities. We know that Mawdudi had 
studied Western works in English on subjects like history, political science, and economics.23 
6.2.2. Concluding Remarks of the First Section 
In the last paragraph of this section Mawdudi sums up the main point of the comparison of the 
Islamic state versus national democracies: 
These are the fundamental differences that make Islam’s 
treatment of the dhimmīs completely different from the treatment 
of the minorities in the national democracies. Unless we keep 
                                                 
22 Yeor 1985: 61, 64, 95, 107, 109, 179, 209, 249; Stillman 1979: 295-297. Note the pillage and massacre of the 
Jewish quarter of Safed in 1799, cf. Yeʼor 2002: 72 as well as the genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 
from 1915-1917, mentioned in chapter 2. See also “Sudan’s president charged with genocide” at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sudans-president-charged-with-genocide-867167.html 
Accessed 5 August 2008. 
23 Nasr 1996: 16. 
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this in mind our reasoning will be confused24 and we can not be 
preserved from the misconception that the national democracies 
of the present day, in their constitutions, grant the minorities 
equal rights, while Islam is practicing illiberality in this matter. 
After these necessary clarifications we return to our original 
subject.  
Mawdudi is making the claim that Islam’s treatment of the dhimmīs is completely different 
from the treatment of minorities in the national democracies. Mawdudi is setting out to prove 
that Islam is not “practicing illiberality” in the area of minority rights.  
6.3. Division of Non-Muslim Subjects (Ghair Muslim Ra‘āyā kī Aqsām) 
In the second section of the article Mawdudi addresses the different categories of non-Muslim 
subjects in an Islamic state. He bases his discussion on the ordinances found in the classical 
books of fiqh, in particular Abu Yusuf’s treatise Kitāb al-Kharāj, written at the request of the 
Caliph Harun al-Rashid (r. 786-809).25 Abu Yusuf was an expert of Islamic jurisprudence, 
and his treatise became a textbook for study by the Hanafi school of law.26 To the best of our 
knowledge, this is a text that has been studied in the madrasas and dāru’l-‘ulūms (places of 
advanced religious learning) of South Asia for centuries, while Mawdudi is the first scholar to 
have translated excerpts of it into Urdu and thus made it more available for readers unfamiliar 
with Arabic. 
Mawdudi starts off by introducing the reader to the three categories of non-Muslim subjects 
according to Islamic law: 
Islamic law divides its non-Muslim subjects into the following 
three categories: 
a) Those who may have come under the Islamic state by means 
of a peace treaty or a contract (the mu‘āhidīn). 
b) Those who may have been conquered after they have fought 
and suffered defeat (the maftūhīn). 
c) Those who may have been included in the Islamic state due 
to other circumstances than war or peace.  
At first glance it would seem that the first two categories are irrelevant in the discussion of the 
status of non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan in 1948. However, in the following pages it 
                                                 
24 Literally “Unless we keep them in mind we can not avoid a confused discussion.” 
25 Encyclopaedia of Islam 1986-2004, Vol. 1: 164. 
26 Ben Shemesh in Yahya Ben Adam 1958: 11. 
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becomes clear that Mawdudi places the dhimmīs of Pakistan in the maftūhīn category. That 
probably has to do with the way South Asia was conquered by Islam. In Pakistan there has 
been a controversy as to which category the dhimmīs belong to. Some have argued that they 
belong to the third category.27 Mawdudi now engages in a four-page discussion of the terms 
offered to the people who were either defeated or entered into peace treaties with the Muslim 
conquerors during the time of the Islamic expansions. A common denominator was that they 
all had to pay kharāj (land-tax). The maftūhīn also had to pay jizya (poll-tax) in order to save 
their lives, properties, and honour. Mawdudi is not very clear on the terms of the treaties with 
the confederates, the mu‘āhidīn, other than that the terms of the peace treaty must not be 
altered, and that they have to pay kharāj. The mu‘āhidīn are the people who submit 
themselves to the Muslim invaders without fighting, or during a war.28 Let us now take a look 
at the terms for those who have fought and been conquered, the maftūhīn:  
The people who belong to the second category are those who 
may have remained fighting the Muslims until the end and not 
laid down arms until the Muslims had demolished their 
fortifications and entered their towns triumphantly. When 
conquered people of this category are made dhimmīs, certain 
specific rights are given to them, details of which are found in 
the books of fiqh. Below a summary is given of those ordinances 
from which the constitutional status of this category of dhimmīs 
becomes clear.  
6.4. Rights of Conquered Non-Muslims 
Here follows Mawdudi’s five point summary with references to books of fiqh (jurisprudence): 
The summary of the rights of the conquered dhimmīs can be translated like this:  
1) When the caliph accepts jizya (poll-tax) from them, the pact 
of dhimma will be established with them permanently, and it 
will be obligatory for the Muslims to protect their lives and 
property, for the protection of life and property is confirmed 
together with the very acceptance of jizya.29 From that point 
on neither the caliph nor the Muslims any longer have the 
right to seize their possessions or make slaves of them. His 
Eminence ‘Umar30, may God be pleased with him, wrote in 
                                                 
27 For a discussion of this, see Sookhdeo 2002: 132-133. 
28 Mawdudi: Islāmī Riyāsat mēṅ Zimmiyōṅ kē Huqūq:  8. 
29 There is reference to Badāʼi‘uʼl-Sanāʼi‘, Vol. 7: 111. 
30 According to Khurshid Ahmad, this is a reference to ‘Umar, the second caliph, cf. Islamic Law and 
Constitution: 281. 
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clear words to his Eminence Abu ‘Ubayda31, may God be 
pleased with him, that “When you have accepted jizya from 
them you no longer have any right to extort them”.32 
2) After the pact of dhimma has been established, they will be 
owners of their own land;33 the proprietary rights of the 
land will be transferred to their heirs, and they will obtain
full rights for selling, transferring and pawning their 





                                                
34
3) The amount of jizya will be fixed according to their financial 
means. More from the affluent, less from those of average 
means, and very little will be taken from the poor. And 
whoever does not have any means of income, or whoever 
relies on charity for his sustenance, will be excused from 
paying jizya. Although there is no fixed amount for jizya, in 
the fixing thereof it is necessary to bear in mind that one 
should fix an amount that will be easy for them to pay. His 
Eminence ‘Umar, may God be pleased with him, fixed the 
amount of jizya as one rupee per month for the affluent, 
eight annas35 per month for those of average means, and 
four annas per month for those of low income professions.36 
4) Jizya will only be charged from those that are fit for 
combat.37 Those who are unfit for combat, such as children, 
women, the insane, the blind, the handicapped, caretakers of 
holy places, monks, religious mendicants, those who are no 
longer fit to work, the old, those sick persons whose sickness 
lasts for the greater part of the year, female slaves, and so 
forth, are exempted from jizya.38 
5) The Muslims have the right to take possession of the places 
of worship in the towns that have been conquered by the 
power of the sword. But not to take advantage of that right 
and to leave them as they were as a gesture of favour is 
considered better and more commendable. During the time 
of his Eminence ‘Umar, may God be pleased with him, no 
 
31 According to Khurshid Ahmad, this is a reference to Abu ‘Ubayda, the Commander-in-Chief of Islamic 
armies, cf. Islamic Law and Constitution: 281. 
32 This is a quotation from Imam Abu Yusuf: Kitāb al-Kharāj, p. 82 in the Arabic edition Mawdudi was using. 
There exists a French translation by E. Fagnan, Paris 1921, and there is long excerpt of it in English in Bat Yeʼor: 
The Dhimmi, 1985, p. 165-172. See also Ben Shemesh’s English translation. Abu Yusuf (d. 795) was one of the 
founders of the Hanafī school of law, cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam 1986-2004, Vol. 1: 164. 
33 Literally “they themselves will be owners of their land.” 
34 There is a reference to Kamaluddin Ibn Hammam: Fath al-Qadīr, Vol.4: 359. 
35 One anna is the sixteenth part of a rupee. The one anna coin is no longer in use. 
36 Kitāb al-Kharāj, p. 36. Under Aurangzeb, “tailors, dyers, cobblers, shoemakers and artisans in a hundred other 
crafts were counted as poor”, cf. Lal 1999: 121. 
37 Literally “people of the battle.” 
38 The reference given is to Badāʼi‘uʼl-Sanāʼi‘, Vol. 7: 111-113; Fath al-Qadīr, Vol.4: 372-373; Kitāb al-Kharāj, 
p. 73. 
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place of worship was destroyed and no kind of attack was 
made against them in any of the countries that were 
conquered. Imām Abu Yusuf, may God be pleased with him, 
writes, “They were left as they were; they were not 
demolished and no attack was made on them”.39 
Demolishing ancient places of worship is prohibited in any 
circumstance.40 
According to the fourth point above, jizya will only be charged from those that are fit for 
combat. This was the way it was in theory. According to Armenian, Syriac, Serbian, and 
Jewish sources, the jizya was claimed from children, widows, orphans, and even the dead.41 
In both the first and the fourth point above there are references to slaves and enslavement. I
point 1 the compound verb 
n 
ghulām banā lēnā, “to make a slave of for one’s own benefit,” or 
“to enslave for oneself,” is used. In point 4 the word launḍī ghulām, “female slave”, “slave-
girl,” is used when speaking of dhimmīs that are exempted from paying the poll tax. It is hard 
to tell whether this refers to female slaves belonging to the Muslims or to the dhimmīs. There 
is no mention of slaves or slavery in Khurshid Ahmad’s translation. The idea of extortion is 
also toned down to “take liberties with them or with their properties”. Let us take a closer 
look at Khurshid Ahmad’s translation of point 1: 
As soon as the State accepts jizya from them, it becomes the 
obligatory responsibility of every Muslim to protect their lands 
and properties and their life and honour. The acceptance of 
jizya establishes the sanctity of their lives and property, and, 
thereafter, neither the Islamic State nor the Muslim public have 
any right to violate their property, honour or liberty. ‘Umar, the 
second Caliph, clearly enjoined Abu ‘Ubaidah [sic], the 
Commander-in-Chief of Islamic armies, as follows: “The 
moment you accept jizya from them you forego the right to take 
liberties with them or with their properties”.42 
When comparing Khurshid Ahmad’s translation with the Urdu original, I would argue that 
Mawdudi is more blunt and unambiguous than Ahmad makes him to be. The expression “to 
seize their possessions or make slaves of them” is definitely more dramatic than “to violate 
their property, honour or liberty.” This is a euphemism on the part of Khurshid Ahmad. He is 
toning down the sharpness of Mawdudi’s discourse. 
                                                 
39 The reference is to Kitāb al-Kharāj, p. 83. 
40 The reference is to Badāʼi‘uʼl-Sanāʼi‘, Vol. 7: 114. 
41 Yeʼor 2002: 69. 
42 Mawdudi: Islamic Law and Constitution: 281. 
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If we turn to Abu Yusuf and what he wrote about battle procedures, we find that there 
were at least three possible courses of action that could be taken after a Muslim army had 
conquered a place: 
a) The fighting men could be executed and the women and children taken as slaves. 
b) The conquered could be invited to embrace Islam, in which case they would be 
freemen. 
c) A poll tax (jizya) could be established. (It seems to be implied that the kharāj is to 
be imposed on them as well.)43 
6.5. Slavery 
Slavery did not start with Western colonialism; it was “the normal fate of captives in 
antiquity”.44 The slave population of Arabia consisted of slaves of Ethiopian, Persian, Greek 
and other origin.45 After the advent of Islam, if a non-Muslim who was “protected neither by 
treaty nor by a safe-conduct” fell into the hands of Muslims, he could be taken captive and 
enslaved.46 When Muhammad bin Qasim conquered the temple town Debal in Sindh in 712, 
all adult males were slain and all the women and children were enslaved.47 One fifth of the 
captives were sent to the caliph Walid I.48 According to Chachnama, when Sindh fell to 
Muhammad bin Qasim, Raja Dahir’s sister Bai and the other women at the fort of Rawar set 
themselves on fire in order to save themselves from the Muslims. This measure is referred to 
as “performing the rite of jauhar” and was resorted to several times during the medieval 
period after defeats where the men had been slain. Another famed jauhar took place in the 
fortress of Chittor during Akbar’s invasion in February 1568. According to Akbar Nama, 
about three hundred women perished in the fire. Captured women were sold as slaves, 
distributed among the Muslim soldiers or nobility, or placed in a harem. Emperor Akbar had 
                                                 
43 Abu Yusuf in Ye’or 1985: 171-172. 
44 Lewis 1986: 109. 
45 Ibid., 109. 
46 Schacht 1982: 127. 
47 Lal 1999: 17-18; K.S. Lal: Muslim Slave System in Medieval India: 
http://www.bharatvani.org/books/mssimi/ch3.htm Accessed 20 October 2007 
48 Lal 1999: 148.  
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5000 women in his harem. It is assumed that servants, singers and dancers were included in 
this number.49  
The unmarried female slave was “at the disposal of her male owner as a concubine”.50 
Concubinage was very common among the Muslim rulers and Muslim upper class in India. 
The child born of the concubine, if recognized by the master, was free and had the same rights 
as children from a marriage. The umm valad, the mother of such a child, would then become 
free by law on the master’s death. Besides, a slave could be given in marriage against his or 
her will.51 Sultan Sikandar Lodi (r.1489-1517), for example, was the son of a Hindu 
concubine.52 Considerable profit was made on slaves sold in India and abroad. Mahmud of 
Ghazni took huge numbers of slaves, both men and women, during his campaigns in India and 
sold them in the slave markets of Ghazni, Khurasan and elsewhere.53 In 1632 Shahjahan 
attacked the Portuguese settlement at Hugli in Bengal. According to Vincent A. Smith, “more 
than 400 prisoners were taken and brought to Agra, where they were offered the choice 
between conversion to Islam, and confinement or slavery under the most severe conditions”.54 
According to Lal, many of the captives were women. One of them, Maria de Taides, was 
married off to Ali Mardar Khan, and others “were distributed among the nobles”.55  
6.6. Kharāj and Jizya in India 
In the above summary of the rights of the conquered dhimmīs, Mawdudi conceals the fact that 
Abu Yusuf wrote that conquered land could be divided among those who had conquered it; 
that was up to the caliph to decide. If permitted to keep their houses and their land, the 
conquered would have to pay kharāj on it, in addition to jizya. According to Mawardi, “both 
taxes are imposed upon the polytheists in order to emphasize their inferior condition and their 
humiliation”.56 Abu Yusuf mentions the Bedouin “who converted in order to save their water-
                                                 
49 K.S. Lal: Muslim Slave System in Medieval India: http://www.bharatvani.org/books/mssimi/ch12.htm 
Accessed 20 October 2007; von Nör 1973: 249. 
50 Schacht 1982: 127. 
51 K.S. Lal: Muslim Slave System in Medieval India: http://www.bharatvani.org/books/mssimi/ch12.htm 
Accessed 22 October 2007; Schacht 1982: 127, 129. 
52 K.S. Lal: Muslim Slave System in Medieval India: http://www.bharatvani.org/books/mssimi/ch12.htm 
Accessed 22 October 2007. 
53 Lal 1999: 148. According to Lal, Mahmud of Ghazni “took 50 000 slaves in one campaign, 53 000 in another 
and 200 000 in a third one.” 
54 Smith 1958: 380. 
55 K.S. Lal: Muslim Slave System in Medieval India http://www.bharatvani.org/books/mssimi/ch12.htm Accessed 
22 October 2007. 
56 Mawardi in Yeʼor 1985: 175. 
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holes and their territory.” 57 Evidently, many converted in order to save their properties. We 
know that the Arabs annexed land in the new subject territories.58 Bat Ye’or explains: 
The rights of conquest first established at Khaybar led to the 
expropriation of the vanquished peoples by the transfer of their 
lands to the Islamic community. The dhimmī, thus dispossessed 
by the victors, retained the right to cultivate his land in 
exchange for the payment of a tax to the Muslim ruler. This tax, 
called kharāj, represents the Islamic community’s rights of 
ownership over the conquered lands of non-Muslim peoples. The 
kharāj thus transformed the former peasant-owner into a 
tributary, who tilled his land as a tenant – his heirs retaining the 
same right – whereas the freehold ownership was confiscated by 
the ruler.59 
According to Gustave Le Bon, “All land within the Moghul empire was regarded as the 
personal property of the sovereign”.60 The Egyptian scholar Ibn Naqqash (d. 1362), whose 
fatwa on the dhimmīs has been translated into French by François Alphonse Belin, confirms 
the view that the Jews of Khaybar were no longer considered owners of the land, but 
tenants.61 As far as we know, the Arabs were exempt from all taxes until after 720.62 
As we have seen under point 1 above, Mawdudi stresses the importance and significance of 
jizya, the poll tax. According to the Indian historian K.S. Lal, the Muslim rulers in India 
imposed both kharāj and jizya on the Hindu peasants.63 According to Baladhuri’s Futūh al-
Buldān (Book of Conquests), Muhammad bin Qasim, conqueror of Sindh, levied kharāj as tax 
upon the conquered.64 If we turn to a fourteenth century historian and political thinker, Ziya 
al-Din Barani, who was affiliated with the court of Muhammad Tughluq, he wrote that “the 
good Muslim king should not be content with merely levying the jizya and kharāj on Hindus, 
he should instead establish the supreme position of Islam by overthrowing infidelity and 
slaughtering its leaders (imāms), the Brahmans”.65 Ala-ud-din Khalji (r.1296-1316) asked his 
wise men to “supply some rules and regulations for grinding down the Hindus, and for 
depriving them of that wealth and property which fosters rebellion. The Hindu was to be so 
                                                 
57 Abu Yusuf, in Ye’or 1985: 166-167. 
58 Bæk Simonsen 1988: 141. 
59 Ye’or 1985: 52. 
60 Le Bon 1974: 79. 
61 Ibn Naqqash, in Yeʼor 1985: 188-189. According to this source, it was the Caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khattab who 
drove the Khaybari Jews out of Arabia, so their dhimma was not permanent after all. 
62 Bæk Simonsen 1988: 141, 143. 
63 Lal 1999: 127. 
64 Encyclopaedia of Islam 1986-2004, Vol. 2: 566. 
65 From Fatāwā-i Jahāndārī, in Alam 2004: 37.  
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reduced as to be left unable to keep a horse to ride on, to carry arms, to wear fine clothes, or 
to enjoy any of the luxuries of life.” Ala-ud-din’s tax collectors would string Hindu 
middlemen (who were responsible for the tax collection) together by the neck and enforce 
payment by blows. Ala-ud-din is said to have stated that “The Hindus will never become 
submissive and obedient till they are reduced to poverty”.66  
Emperor Akbar abolished jizya in 1564, but it was re-introduced under Aurangzeb in 
1679.67 Khafi Khan wrote that “On the publication of this order (reimposing the jizya) by 
Aurangzeb in 1679, the Hindus all round Delhi assembled in vast numbers under the jharokha 
of the emperor to represent their inability to pay and pray for the recall of the edict…But the 
Emperor would not listen to their complaints”.68 It is documented that, under rulers like 
Sultan Firoz Shah Tughluq and Aurangzeb, many Hindus who were unable to pay jizya 
converted to Islam in order to be exempted from it.69 These historical records suggest that the 
levying of jizya contributed to the impoverishment of the Hindus as well as conversions for 
the sake of escaping it. 
6.7. Regulations Regarding Places of Worship Belonging to 
Dhimmīs 
According to point five above, the Muslims have the right, if they so wish, to take possession 
of temples, churches and synagogues in the towns that have been taken by force. However, 
demolishing ancient places of worship is not permitted anywhere. What exactly is meant by 
“ancient” is hard to tell. Does it include all places of worship built before the advent of Islam? 
If we look at what transpired in India, the Muslim conquerors and rulers did not always 
adhere by these injunctions of the shari‘a. Mahmud of Ghazni destroyed all the temples of 
Mathura, causing the loss of priceless works of art.70 He also attacked and looted the famous 
Shiva temple at Somnath in Gujarat in 1025-1026.71 Taking possession of temples was 
perhaps even more common. In Gujarat, “the earlier Hindu monuments built in the Jaina style 
were simply converted into mosques…”72 The Spanish missionary Antonio Monserrate, who 
travelled from Goa to the court of Emperor Akbar at Fatehpur Sikri in 1579, got the 
impression that the Muslims had demolished “all the pagan temples”, and he also noticed a 
                                                 
66 Kulke and Rothermund 1998: 162-164. 
67 Lal 1999: 115. 
68 Ibid., 117-118. 
69 Ibid., 120. 
70 Smith 1958: 207. 
71 Kulke and Rothermund 1998: 153-154. 
72 Le Bon 1974: 122. 
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fortress (near the Tapti river in Gujarat) which had been built with fragments of Hindu 
temples that the Muslims had knocked down.73 Likewise, fragments of the idol that Mahmud 
carried off from Somnath were used in the steps of the great mosque and the royal palace at 
Ghazni, and “two are said to have been sent to Mecca and Medina, where they were placed in 
public streets to be trodden underfoot”.74  
 During the reign of Shahjahan, seventy-six temples were destroyed in the district of 
Benares alone.75 Shahjahan also ordered the destruction of the churches at Lahore, Thatta and 
Agra.76 The churches in Lahore and Agra had been built with financial support from Emperor 
Jahangir, who had been open to Christianity.77 The building of the churches at Lahore and 
Agra might have been contrary to the the regulations of the shari‘a , depending on whether or 
not Lahore and Agra were to be regarded as amsār al-muslimīn (cities founded by Muslims). 
The idea of a Muslim ruler financing the construction of churches is certainly foreign to the 
shari‘a. On the other hand, Christianity came to India long before Islam did. The Mar Thoma 
church of South India claims to be founded by the Apostle Thomas, one of Jesus’ disciples, 
who is believed to have come to India in about 50 or 52 A.D.78 According to Bardaisan’s 
Dialogue on Fate, written around 196, there were Christians among the Kaishans ruling the 
areas corresponding to present day Afghanistan and most of Pakistan at that point in time.79 
One of the church leaders who signed the Nicene creed in 325 was John the Persian, who 
represented churches in Persia and India.80  
6.8. General Rights of the Dhimmīs (Zimmiyōṅ kē ‘Ām Huqūq) 
In the second section of the article Mawdudi goes on to give an overview of the general rights 
of all three categories of dhimmīs as listed in 6.3. above. We will look at his main points: 
6.8.1. Protection of life (Hifāzat-e Jān) 
Regarding murder: 
                                                 
73 Monserrate 1986: 24, 30. 
74 The Cambridge History of India 1928, Vol. 3: 25. 
75 Smith 1958: 380. 
76 Sookhdeo 2002: 49-50. 
77 Ibid., 47-48. 
78 Sookhdeo 2002: 30. 
79 Young Handbook of Source Materials p. 19 cited in Sookhdeo 2002: 35. 
80 Young Handbook of Source Materials p. 28 cited in Sookhdeo 2002: 36. 
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The price of the life of a dhimmī is equal to that of a Muslim. If a 
Muslim kills a dhimmī, the retaliation that has to be made for it 
is the same as for killing a Muslim.  
Mawdudi is referring to the lex talionis, the law of retaliation (qisās). He is promoting the 
view of Abu Hanifa, founder of the Hanafi school of law. According to Malik, Shafi‘i and Ibn 
Hanbal, the qisās does not apply to a Muslim who kills a dhimmī as it can only be applied 
between equal parties.81 Mawdudi seems to be advocating the death sentence for murder, as 
according to Abu Hanifa, a Muslim who kills a dhimmī is to be sentenced to death.82 
6.8.2. Criminal Law (Faujdārī Qānūn) 
Regarding the Penal Code: 
The Penal Code is the same for dhimmīs and Muslims, and both 
have equal status. The same punishment for crimes that is meted 
out to Muslims will be meted out to dhimmīs as well. If a Muslim 
steals something from a dhimmī or a dhimmī steals something 
from a Muslim, in both cases the thief’s hand will be amputated. 
If a dhimmī falsely accuses a man or a woman of zinā (unlawful 
intercourse), or if a Muslim does so, the same punishment for 
qadhf (false accusation of unlawful intercourse) will be in force. 
Similarly, the punishment for zina will be the same for both a 
dhimmī and a Muslim. Of course, regarding wine, there is an 
exemption for dhimmīs.83 
In this passage Mawdudi refers to some of the serious crimes liable for hadd punishment, the 
hadd being “a right or claim of Allah”.84 These are considered very serious crimes indeed, 
which one can tell by the severity of punishment: flogging with 100 lashes or stoning for zina, 
and 80 lashes for qadhf and for drinking wine. The hadd punishment for sariqa (theft) is 
cutting off the right hand. In the case of a second theft, the left foot will be cut off.85 Mawdudi 
stresses that the Penal Law is the same for dhimmīs and Muslims. However, he conceals the 
fact that it is going to be difficult for the dhimmī to get justice if he is the one who has been 
offended. That is simply because a dhimmī can not be a witness in an Islamic court, “except in 
matters concerning other dhimmīs”.86 Besides, in the case of zinā, the witnesses have to be 
                                                 
81 Fattal 1958: 114-115; Yeʼor 1985: 57. 
82 Fattal 1958: 115. 
83 There is a reference to Kitāb al-Kharāj, pp.38-209, and Al-Mabsūt, Vol. 9, pp.57-58. Mawdudi explains that 
according to Imam Malik, there is an excemption for dhimmīs regarding zina. 
84 Schacht 1982: 176. 
85 Ibid., 175, 178-180. 
86 Schacht 1982: 132; See also Yeʼor 1985: 56. 
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present and throw the first stones in order for the punishment to be implemented. However, a 
dhimmī can neither be a witness nor the executor of a Muslim”.87  
6.8.3. Civil Law (Dīvānī Qānūn) 
Regarding Civil Law: 
 
The Civil Law is also the same for dhimmīs and Muslims, and 
there is full equality between the two…Those kinds of trade that 
are forbidden to us are also forbidden to them. Like usury is 
unlawful for us, it is also unlawful for them. Certainly, for 
dhimmīs there is an exception for liquor and pigs. They are 
entitled to make, drink and sell liquor, and they also have the 
right to rear, eat and sell pigs. If a Muslim spoils liquor or pigs 
belonging to a dhimmī, he is obliged to make amends for it. It is 
written in Durr al-Mukhtar: “The Muslim will pay the price of 
his liquor and his pigs if he spoils the liquor or injures the 
pigs”.88 
6.8.4. The Permanence of the Dhimma (Zimma kī Pāʼedārī) 
The pact of dhimma is permanent: 
From the Muslims’ side, the pact of dhimma is an everlasting 
commitment. That is, after they have committed themselves to it, 
they are not permitted to break it. However, the dhimmīs, on the 
other hand, have the right to abide by it as long as they like, or 
to cancel it. It is written in Badāʼi‘: “The pact of dhimma is 
indeed compulsory for us. That is, after we have made somebody 
a dhimmī, we can not break the dhimma in any circumstance, 
but for them it is not binding (that is, if they want to get out of it, 
they can)”.89 
No matter what serious crimes a dhimmī may commit, his 
dhimma will not be cancelled. Even if he goes to the extent of 
not paying the jizya, murdering a Muslim, insulting the Prophet 
(peace be upon him), or even raping a Muslim woman, it will 
not render his dhimma defective. He will be punished according 
to the crimes he has committed, but he will not be declared a 
rebel and excluded from the dhimma. Nevertheless, there are 
two events in which the dhimmī will be excluded from the 
dhimma: First, if he leaves the dāruʼl-islām (the territory of the 
Islamic state) and goes to meet the enemy, and second, if he 
excites disturbances in open rebellion against the Islamic state. 
                                                 
87 Schacht 1982: 132,176. 
88 There is a reference to Durr al-Mukhtār, Vol. 3: 272. According to Khurshid Ahmad, Alauddin’s Durr al-
Mukhtār is “an authentic collection of the judgements and fatwas (verdicts) of the Hanafi school of thought,” cf. 
Islamic Law and Constitution p. 285. 
89 There is a reference to Badāʼi‘uʼl-Sanāʼi‘, Vol. 7: 113 and Fath al-Qadīr, Vol. 4: 381-382. 
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In this section Mawdudi discusses the durability of the dhimma and the fact that for the 
dhimmī, it is not binding. However, Mawdudi does not make his readers aware of the fact that 
as soon as a dhimmī steps out of the dhimma, he becomes a harbī, “an enemy alien”, and his 
life and property is no longer protected, unless he gets a temporary amān (safe conduct).90 
Therefore, it is very unlikely that the dhimmī should withdraw from the dhimma. Next, 
Mawdudi reassures his readers that the dhimmī will not be excluded from the dhimma even if 
he gets convicted of the most serious crimes. However, it is very unlikely that the dhimmī will 
live to enjoy the continued benefits of the dhimma after serving a sentence for insulting the 
Prophet, which, according to the shari‘a, is death,91 or for zina (unlawful intercourse), which 
is stoning or flogging with 100 lashes, as we have discussed above. According to Ibn Naqqash 
(d. 1362), author of an important fatwā on the dhimmīs, the jurists were unanimous that taking 
a Muslim woman by force would end the dhimma pact,92 which is contrary to what Mawdudi 
is saying. 
According to Mawdudi, refusing to pay the jizya will not render one’s dhimma defective. 
Again, a different view is held by Ibn Naqqash, who wrote the opposite: “If the dhimmī 
refuses to pay the jizya, then his pact [dhimma] is broken and all of his possessions may be 
seized”.93 Finally, the two reasons Mawdudi gives for excluding a dhimmī from the dhimma, 
namely leaving the dāruʼl-islām and meeting the enemy, and rebelling against the Islamic 
state, have been of great concern for the dhimmīs over the years as it has had the dramatic 
consequence that the dhimmīs have been prohibited from seeking help from outsiders (such as 
Christian European nations) and fearful of spreading ideas contrary to Islam.94 
6.8.5. Personal Law (Šakhsī Mu‘āmlāt) 
Regarding personal affairs: 
The personal affairs of the dhimmīs will be settled according to 
the personal law of their own religion. Islamic law will not be 
enforced on them. Whatever is unlawful for us in personal 
matters; if it is lawful according to their religious and national 
                                                 
90 Schacht 1982: 131. 
91 Fattal 1958: 160; Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani 1975: 251; Ibn Naqqash in Yeʼor 1985: 183-184; According to 
Pakistan Penal Code: Offences Relating to Religion: Section 295-C, the punishment for insulting the Prophet is 
death or imprisonment for life. However, in 1990 “the Federal Shari‘a Court ruled that the penalty should be a 
mandatory death sentence, with no right to a reprieve or pardon.” Apparently, according to this source, this law 
has not been formally amended yet. Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blasphemy_laws_of_Pakistan 
92 Ibn Naqqash in Yeʼor 1985: 183. 
93 Ibn Naqqash, in Yeʼor 1985: 183. 
94  Ye’or 2002: 331. 
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law, then the Islamic court will judge according to their law 
only. 
6.8.6. Religious Ceremonies (Mazhabī Marāsim) 
Regarding the prohibition of public display of religious symbols: 
As for the public performance and proclamation of religious 
ceremonies and display of ethnic religious symbols, Islamic law 
is this, that the people of the dhimma can do it in full freedom in 
their own quarters, but in purely Muslim neighbourhoods it is 
up to the Islamic government to allow them to do it or to impose 
certain restrictions on them. The Badāʼi‘ says: “In 
neighbourhoods that don’t belong to amsār al-muslimīn, the 
dhimmīs will not be prevented from selling wine and pigs, taking 
out the cross and striking the wooden gong,95 no matter how 
many Muslims might be living there. However, such activities 
are intolerable in the amsār al-muslimīn, that is, in the towns 
that have been designated for Friday and ‘Id96 congregations 
and establishing the rule of hudūd…”97 
Mawdudi continues:  
But even in the amsār al-muslimīn they are only prohibited from 
taking out processions of crosses and idols and coming out to 
strike the wooden gong publicly in the bazaars. Otherwise, as 
long as they stay inside their ancient places of worship, they can 
display all their religious symbols. 
Notice the emphasis on ancient places of worship in the last paragraph. That is because the 
dhimmīs are not supposed to build any new places of worship in towns founded by Muslims. 
The ban on the display of religious symbols in certain areas is in accordance with the 16th 
restriction of the Covenant of ‘Umar, which reads “There should be no public demonstrations 
of their rituals and customs before the Muslims”, see chapter 4.2. Mawardi, too, forbade the 
display of crosses.98 
6.8.7. Places of Worship (‘Ibādatgāhēṅ) 
Regulations regarding old and new places of worship: 
                                                 
95 The wooden gong was used by Eastern Christians to summon the congregation, as church bells were not 
allowed in Muslim countries, cf. Platts 1982 (1884): 1115. 
96 Literally ‘īdain, dual, meaning “the two ‘Ids.” 
97 This quotation is taken from Badāʼi‘uʼl-Sanāʼi‘, Vol. 7: 113 and rendered in Arabic, followed by and Urdu 
translation. 
98 Mawardi in Yeʼor 1985: 179. 
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In the amsār al-muslimīn (cities founded by Muslims), the 
ancient places of worship belonging to the dhimmīs can not be 
interfered with. If they fall apart, they can be rebuilt in the same 
place. But they don’t have the right to build new places of 
worship.99 If there remain places of residence that are not 
amsār al-muslimīn (cities founded by Muslims), then the 
dhimmīs have a general permission to build new places of 
worship there. Likewise, as for the places that did not remain 
misr (that is, the imām abandoned the tradition of the 
convocation of Friday prayers and the celebration of festival
and the execution of hudūd), there the dhimmīs are entitled to 
build new places of worship and display their
s 
 religious symbols. 
This is the fatwa of Ibn ‘Abbas: In the cities that have been 
founded by Muslims, the dhimmīs do not have the right to build 
new churches, synagogues or temples, or strike the wooden 
gong or sell wine and pork openly. 
As for the remaining towns that have been founded by the 
barbarians and conquered by the Muslims, and whom Allah 
conquered by the hands of the Muslims, and they consented to 
submit to the hands of the Muslims, then the barbarians have 
those rights that will be agreed on in their contract and it is 
obligatory for the Muslims to abide by it. 
In the last paragraph Mawdudi uses the word ‘ajamī, meaning “barbarians”, for non-Muslims, 
while Khurshid Ahmad has translated it as simply “non-Muslims”. This is a euphemism on 
the part of the translator. As for the towns “that have been founded by the barbarians and 
conquered by the Muslims”, Mawdudi is rather vague as to whether or not the dhimmīs will 
be allowed to build new houses of worship, but according to Ibn Qayyim, “the whole territory 
has become the property of Muslims” and that is why it is “not allowed for non-Muslims to 
build any place of worship”.100 The same applies to the cities that have been founded by 
Muslims.101 
6.8.8. Alleviations in the Collection of Jizya and Kharāj (Jizya ō Kharāj kī 
Tahsīl mēṅ Ri‘āyāt) 
One must not resort to violence during the collection of jizya: 
In the matter of jizya and kharāj it is unlawful to use violence 
against the dhimmīs. It has been insisted on mildness and 
courtesy towards them, and it is forbidden to lay such an 
increase on them that they are unable to bear it. Caliph ‘Umar, 
                                                 
99 There are references to Badāʼi‘uʼl-Sanāʼi‘, Vol. 7: 114 and Sharah al-Siyar al-Kabir, Vol. 3: 251. 
100 Awang 1994: 185. 
101 Ibid., 184. 
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may God be pleased with him, issued the order that one should 
not harass them in order to make them pay more revenue than 
they are capable of.102 
Their possessions can not be auctioned in exchange for jizya. 
Caliph ‘Ali, may God be pleased with him, sent an edict to one 
of his governors saying that one should not sell their donkey,  
their cow, or their clothes for the realisation of kharāj…103 
It is prohibited to use any kind of violence against them in the 
collection of jizya. Caliph ‘Umar, may God be pleased with him, 
in the edict he wrote to the Governor of Syria, Abu Ubaida, may 
God be pleased with him, had included an ordinance that read: 
“Prevent the the Muslims from tyrannizing, harassing and 
seizing their belongings illegally”.104 
…Regarding those who are not paying what is due, the Muslim 
jurists allow for them to be sentenced to disciplinary 
imprisonment without labour.105 
Mawdudi is holding up the ideal that one should not use force against the dhimmīs during the 
collection of the two taxes. The testimonies of the sources are quite to the contrary: The 
dhimmīs would often receive a routine slap in the face as as sign of submission.106 As for 
overcharging, according to Ye’or, “All dhimmī chronicles throughout the centuries mention 
the excessive rates the Muslims charged in order to strip the community of its prosperity.”107 
There are many testimonies of harassment and torture inflicted by the tax-collectors.108 At the 
time of Shahjahan, the Hindu peasants that were unable to pay were sold in slave markets 
along with their families. The Spanish traveller Sebastian Manrique reported that “the 
peasants were carried off… to various markets and fairs (to be sold) with their poor unhappy 
wives behind them, carrying their small children all crying and lamenting to meet the revenue 
demand”.109 The revenue referred to here was probably kharāj as jizya had been abolished by 
Akbar and was not re-introduced again until the reign of Aurangzeb. Akbar, on the contrary, 
“prohibited enslavement and sale of women and children of the peasants who had defaulted in 
the payment of revenue”.110 It is interesting to note that Mawdudi seems to be in favour of 
imprisonment for those who are not paying what is due. In the Ottoman Empire, any dhimmī 
                                                 
102 There is a reference to Kitāb al-Kharāj, p. 8, 82. 
103 There is a reference to Fath al-Bayān, Vol. 4: 93. 
104 There is a referece to Kitāb al-Kharāj, p. 82. 
105 Ibid., 70. 
106 Yeʼor 2002: 70-71. 
107 Ibid., 72. 
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unable to produce the receipt for the jizya when stopped in the street was at risk of immediate 
imprisonment.111 
6.8.9. Trade Tax (Tijāratī Ṭēks) 
Regarding the double trade tax on dhimmī businessmen: 
As it is for Muslim traders, there will also be charged a tax on 
the merchandise of dhimmī traders when their stock-in-trade 
reaches 200 dirhams or they become owners of 20 miskals of 
gold.112 There is no doubt that the Muslim jurists levied a 5 % 
trade tax on dhimmī traders and a 2,5 % tax on Muslim traders, 
but this ruling was not based on any Qur’ānic text, but a result 
of ijtihād and was in fact necessitated by the circumstances of 
the time. At that point in time the Muslims were preoccupied 
with the defence of the country, and all trade had come on the 
hands of dhimmīs. Therefore the taxation of Muslim traders was 
reduced in order to boost their confidence and protect their 
trade. 
In a footnote, Mawdudi adds: 
But it is not necessary to use the same standard of minimum 
taxable income when imposing taxes today. This standard was 
fixed according to the circumstances of that day and age. 
In this section, Mawdudi is seeking to legitimate a double trade tax on dhimmīs. There should 
be no reason to double the trade tax as they are already paying jizya by way of compensation 
(according to Mawdudi’s reasoning, see below) for not being called upon to participate in the 
defence of the country. Trade was one of the few occupations left for dhimmīs after they lost 
the ownership of the land and were removed from public administration. They were excluded 
from the military, for obvious reasons. Ibn Taymiyya advised Muslims to “avoid a 
commercial partnership with Christians, since such partnership may contribute to their (the 
Christians’) prosperity, and consequently, perpetuate their infidelity…”113Again, this 
regulation seems to be a scheme of extorting the dhimmīs and depriving them of any chances 
of prosperity. 
                                                 
111 Yeʼor 2002: 69. 
112 There is a reference to Kitāb al-Kharāj, p. 70. One miskal is 4,68 gram, cf. Wehr 1976: 104. 
113 Makari 1983 131. 
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6.8.10. Exclusion114 from Military Service (Faujī Khidmat sē Istisnāʼ) 
Regarding military service: 
The dhimmī is excluded from military service, and defending the 
country from the enemy is a religious duty that is resting on the 
Muslims only. The reason for this is that as for the foundation 
on which the state is built, only the people who believe in its 
doctrine can and should fight for its protection… Therefore 
Islam has exempted the dhimmīs from military service, and only 
imposed on them the duty to pay their share of the defence 
budget.This is the very essence of jizya. It is not just a sign of 
submission, but also a substitution for military service and a 
compensation for not taking part in the defence of the country. 
Therefore jizya is only charged from men that are fit for combat. 
Mawdudi speaks of jizya as “not just a sign of submission”. Khurshid Ahmad has chosen to 
translate this as “not only a symbol of loyalty to the State,”115 having translated the word 
itā‘at as “loyalty” instead of “submission”. I would contend that Mawdudi’s idea is that of 
submission. This is one example of several euphemisms found in Ahmad’s translation. In his 
commentary to Sura 9: 29 (see also chapter 4), Mawdudi writes 
Jizya symbolizes the submission of the unbelievers to the 
suzerainty of Islam. “To pay jizya of their own hands humbled” 
refers to payment in a state of submission… In our view, jizya is 
the compensation which non-Muslims pay for the freedom they 
are provided to adhere to their erroneous ways while living 
under an Islamic state. The amount so received should be spent 
on the administration of that righteous state which grants them 
freedom and protects their rights. One of the advantages of jizya 
is that it reminds the dhimmīs every year that because they do 
not embrace Islam, they are not only deprived of the honour of 
paying zakāt , but also have to pay a price – jizya - for clinging 
to their errors.116 
His commentary of Sura 9 is probably written later than Islāmī Riyāsat mēṅ Zimmiyōṅ kē 
Huqūq (from 1948), as the first volume of Tafhīm al-Qur’ān did not appear until 1949.117 
Note the idea of submission in this quote. He adds that jizya is also a compensation for the 
religious freedom the non-Muslims enjoy in the Islamic state, a freedom that is somewhat 
limited, as we have seen above. Here he no longer speaks of jizya going towards the defence 
                                                 
114 The word istisnāʼ can be translated both as exception, exclusion and rejection. Khurshid Ahmad has chosen 
exemption in his translation of this text. 
115 Islamic Law and Constitution, p. 292. 
116 Mawdudi: Towards Understanding the Qur’ān, Vol. 3: 202. 
117 Ahmad and Ansari 1979: 40. The first volume probably covered Sura 1-3, as in the English translation. 
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budget. Instead, it should be spent on the administration of the state. Furthermore, he is saying 
that jizya is the price to be paid for not embracing Islam.  
6.9. Support from the Muslim Jurists (Fuqahā-ye Islām kī Himāyat) 
This is the headline of the third and final section of the article in the Urdu original. Mawdudi 
claims that the Muslim jurists have always stood up for the dhimmīs: 
These were the details of the laws that were appropriated 
concerning the rights and duties of the non-Muslim subjects in 
the early period of Islam. Now, before we continue, we would 
also like to say that after the Righteous Caliphs, in the era of the 
empires, whenever the dhimmīs were treated with injustice, it 
was the very circle of Muslim jurists that stood up for their 
defence and unanimously supported them.  
…And even if some ruler or king oppressed them and did 
injustice to them, then the people who were the guardians of 
Islamic law at the time, would never refrain from rebuking it. 
Mawdudi is saying that the Muslim jurists stood up for the dhimmis and unanimously 
supported them. This was not always the case. According to Encyclopaedia of Islam, certain 
jurists, such as Ibn Taymiyya, “insisted on an increasingly vexatious interpretation of the law 
regarding dhimmīs”.118 Ibn Taymiyya was in favour of “the strict restoration of the Covenant 
of ‘Umar” and “… often denounced the entry of members of minorities, especially the 
Christians, into public political positions”.119 Regarding India, the Mirʼāt-e Ahmadī states that 
Aurangzeb imposed jizya in 1679, after a petition by ‘ulamā and fuqahā (jurists).120 As we 
have seen above, there were strong protests from the Hindus all round Delhi. In other words, 
the imposition of jizya impoverished the Hindus and the fuqahā’s role in this respect can 
hardly be considered helpful. According to the Mirʼāt-e Ahmadī, the jizya “brought in 500 000 
rupees in the province of Gujarat”,121 so we are speaking of considerable sums. 
                                                 
118 Encyclopaedia of Islam 1986-2004, Vol. 2: 230.  
119 Makari 1983: 128. 
120 Encyclopaedia of Islam 1986-2004, Vol. 2: 566. 
121 Ibid., 566. 
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6.10. Additional Rights That May Be Granted to Non-Muslims (Zāʼid 
Huqūq jō Ghair Muslimōṅ kō Diyē Jā Saktē Haiṅ) 
We will now have a brief discussion of which additional rights 
an Islamic state may grant its non-Muslim citizens in this 
present day and age. 
6.10.1. Political Representation (Numāʼindagī aur Rāʼēdehī) 
Mawdudi’s subchapter on political representation is a rather long and elaborate one, deserving 
a thorough study in its own right. For the purpose of this review, I will summarize his main 
points only:122 
1) Since the Islamic State is an ideological state, a dhimmī can not become Head of 
State or a member of the šura (advisory council). 
2) However, since a modern day parliament is quite different from the šura, one 
could relax this rule to allow non-Muslims to become members of parliament. 
Even so, the influence of non-Muslim members of parliament would be strictly 
limited and all legislation would have to be within the framework of the Qur’ān 
and the sunna. 
3) An alternative solution would be to set up a separate representative assembly for 
the dhimmīs. This assembly would have more of an advisory role and no actual 
political power as such. 
The reason why a dhimmī can not become a member of the šura is that the šura used to elect 
the imām (the head of state), and according to the jurists only Muslims are allowed to take 
part in that. According to Awang, 
There is no evidence to suggest that the dhimmī had ever 
participated in the election of the Four Guided Caliphs nor do 
we encounter any report that the dhimmī had demanded such a 
right. This has led to the conclusion that the right to choose the 
imām was exclusively held by the Muslims.123 
In his article ”Some Constitutional Proposals” submitted to the First Constituent Assembly of 
Pakistan in 1952, Mawdudi launches the idea of a third assembly – for women only, as 
“according to Islam, active politics and administration are not the field of activity of the 
                                                 
122 Mawdudi: Islamic Law and Constitution, p. 295-296. 
123 Awang 1994: 194-195. 
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womenfolk. It falls under the men’s sphere of responsibilities.”124 According to the three-
assembly model that he proposes, the actual power and decision-making would be limited to 
the assembly consisting of Muslim men only, the majlis-e šura. These ideas are a far cry from 
the modern day ideal of all citizens taking part in the government of their country.  
6.10.2. Freedom of Expression (Azādī-ye Tahrīr ō Taqrīr Vaghairah) 
There will be limited freedom of expression within the framework of the shari‘a: 
The non-Muslims in this state will have the same freedom of 
expression, of opinion and conscience, and of association, as the 
Muslims themselves, and in this respect they will be subject to 
the same legal restrictions that apply to Muslims. As long as 
they remain within the limitations of the law, they may criticize 
the government and its officers, and even the Head of State. 
They will also have the same right to criticize Islam as the 
Muslims have to criticize their religion. As far as this criticism 
is concerned, both Muslims and non-Muslims will have to 
remain within the restrictions of the law. 
They will enjoy full freedom to talk about the good qualities of 
their religion, and if they go from one non-Islamic religion to 
another, the government will have no objection to it. For sure, 
no Muslim living within the borders of the Islamic state will 
have any legal right to change his religion. However, in the case 
of apostasy, whatever penalization will be involved, will befall 
the apostate himself and not the non-Muslim under whose 
influence he became an apostate. 
They will not be forced to believe or do anything that is against 
their conscience, and according to their conviction, they will be 
allowed to do anything that does not collide with the law of the 
land. 
Mawdudi ascertains that there will be no freedom of conscience for Muslims in the Islamic 
state; they will not be allowed to change their religion. Mawdudi also wrote a pamphlet called 
Murtadd kī Sazā (The Punishment of the Apostate) and as far as we know he supported the 
death penalty for apostasy.125 The good news is that the dhimmīs will be allowed to change 
their religion. This has not always been so: Mawardi did not allow for a dhimmī to convert to 
the religion of his choice. He wrote “Whoever converts from a Jewish to a Christian sect is 
not free to do so. According to the more correct of the two opinions he is obliged to become a 
                                                 
124 Ibid., 322. 
125  http://mcbwatch.blogspot.com/2005/08/panorama-mawdudi-and-selective-quoting.html Accessed 14 August 
2008 When I visited the Islamic Foundation I was unable to find Murtadd kī Sazā in the library there. As a result, 
I have not been able to read it for myself. 
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Muslim.”126  Apparently this was the view of the Shāfi‘ī and Hanbali schools of law, while 
the Hanafi and Maliki schools permitted the conversion of dhimmīs to other religions tolerated 
by Islam.127 There are examples of dhimmīs being sentenced to death and executed for 
converting to the “wrong” religion.128 
Mawdudi does not elaborate on “the limitations of the law” as far as freedom of 
expression is concerned. However, we have already seen in section 6.8.4. that the penalty for 
insulting the prophet is death. According to Mawdudi’s pamphlet Jihad in Islam, the Islamic 
government will also censor the cultural activities of the dhimmīs for the sake of the general 
welfare of the public “and for reasons of self-defence”.129 In order to get a better 
understanding of “the limitiations of the law”, it might be useful to turn to the writings of the 
jurists and the issues addressed under this point. According to a poll tax contract that Mawardi 
refers to, the contract would be nullified if the dhimmī would question the Muslim faith or 
attempt to entice a Muslim from his faith.130 There were also restrictions on the sale or 
display of religious books: according to Turtūšī’s version of the Covenant of ‘Umar, the 
dhimmīs were not permitted to display their crosses or their religious books in streets or 
markets visited by Muslims, neither were they allowed to pray in a loud voice in those 
places.131 Neither were the dhimmīs allowed to teach the Qur’ān to their children, nor use 
Arabic letters in their seals. They were not allowed to preach their own religion publicly.132 
By contrast, Mawdudi will allow the dhimmīs “to talk about the good qualities of their 
religion”. 
6.10.3. Ed
on in the public schools or in their 
have to go to the Islamic state schools. That is probably because the philosophy of the Islamic 
                                                
ucation (Ta‘līm) 
They will have to accept the educational system adopted by the 
State for the whole country, but as far as religious instruction in 
Islam is concerned, they will not be forced to study it. They will 
have full freedom to make appropriate arrangements for 
instruction in their own religi
own institutions of learning. 
According to this quote, there will be no private or separate schools for dhimmīs. They will all 
 
126 Mawardi in Yeʼor 1985: 176. 
127 Fattal 1958: 165. 
128 Yeʼor 1985: 177-178. 
129 Mawdudi: Jihad in Islam: 28. 
130 Mawardi in Yeʼor 1985: 176, 179. 
131 Fattal 1958: 62. 
132 Ibid., 61-62. 
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state does not permit any “fragmentation or dissolution of the unity of the state”.133 However, 
they will be allowed to make arrangements for instruction in their own religion. Since the 
classical period of Islam, there are indications that the dhimmīs have had to organize and pay 
for instruction of their children themselves, be it general or religious education. As they were 
constantly under heavy and discriminatory taxation, the resources left for education and 
institutions of learning were limited. According to al-Tabari’s Tārīkh al-Rusūl wa ʼl Mulūk, in 
the year 850 the Caliph al-Mutawakkil prohibited the children of the ahl al-dhimma studying 
in Muslim schools, “nor was any Muslim allowed to teach them”.134 Malik b. Anas, founder 
of the Maliki school of law, said that “It was not right for a Muslim to teach the Arabic script 
or anything else to a Christian.”135 There were also restrictions on the sale of scientific books 
to Jews or Christians.136 On top of that, they were “forbidden to buy a Qur’ān, or a book of 
Islamic law or of prophetic tradition, or to take one as a pledge.”137 It is hard to tell whether 
these restrictions were local or enforced in all corners of the Muslim world. 
 If we look to Pakistan, all the Urdu-medium Christian schools and colleges in the 
Punjab and Sindh were nationalized between 1972 and 1974, and no compensation was given. 
Since 1979 non-Muslim students in these schools were no longer allowed to study their own 
religion at school. The only religious instruction offered was Islamiyyat. Due to strong 
protests, a process of denationalization of these schools was begun in Sindh in 1990 and in 
Punjab in 1996. By 1999 this process was still incomplete.138 Another consequence of the 
“nationalization” of Christian schools was that “institutions set up to educate poor Christians 
were chiefly being attended by wealthy Muslims.”139 According to Stavenhagen (see chapter 
1), states with an “ideology of creating a single national culture” are prone to use school 
curriculums “to instil national values and suppress native cultures”. 
6.11. Mawdudi’s Last Word 
The last 2 ½ pages of the article contains no new material. Mawdudi repeats that non-Muslims 
can not hold key posts in government service. With the exception of the army, all other 
                                                 
133 Al-Faruqi cited in Awang 1994: 198. 
134 Stillman 1979: 167-168. 
135 Ibn Naqqash in Yeʼor 1985: 183. 
136 Ibn Abdun (Andalusian author, d. 1134), in Yeʼor 1985: 187. 
137 Sheikh al-Damanhuri in Yeʼor 1985: 204. 
138 Sookdeo 2002: 224-227. 
139 Ibid., 21. 
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professions will be open to them. He concludes his study of the rights of non-Muslims in the 
following manner 
It is hardly necessary to stress in the face of the above facts that 
the establishment of an ideological Islamic State is the greatest 
guarantee for non-Muslims in Pakistan.140 
This statement is a typical minimisation. Mawdudi is seeking to convince the reader that the 
restrictions presented in the preceding pages are in the best interest of the dhimmīs. 
6.12. Analysis of “The Rights of Dhimmīs in the Islamic State” 
6.12.1. Establishing the Topics of the Text 
This is a text about how people with a different religion are to be treated; it is a text about the 
minority policies of the Islamic state and the ideological legitimisation thereof. It is a text that 
identifies social actors like “the ruling class” and “the subjects” and the restrictions incumbent 
on the latter in the various spheres of social and public life.  
6.12.2. Investigation of the Discursive Strategies, the Linguistic Means 
and the Linguistic Realisations 
In this text the ingroup is the same as in the previous text, i.e. the Muslims, while the term 
kāfir has been substituted with the term “non-Muslim” (ghair muslim) for the outgroup. The 
non-Muslim is also referred to as dhimmī, which is a legal term defined by Islamic law. As for 
referential strategies141, Mawdudi uses collectivisation, religionisation (which is a form of 
culturalisation), primitivisation (another form of culturalisation), politicisation, 
economisation, militarisation, somatisation and social problematisation. By way of 
collectivisation, he uses the deictic “they” and the collectives “the people”, “majority”, and 
“minority” (the latter two only when describing national democratic states). As for 
religionisation, he uses the linguistic realisations “Muslim”, “non-Muslim” and “non-Muslim 
elements”. He makes use of the referential strategy primitivisation by the linguistic realisation 
“barbarian”, which is an “anthroponym denoting ‘primitivityʼ or lack of civilisation”.142 As 
for politicisation, he uses the referential strategy “classification” and the classonyms “the 
ruling class”, “slaves”, “the rich” and “the poor” (the latter two are also econonyms). As fo
the referential strategy “granting or deprivation of political rights”, he uses the term
“mu‘āhidīn”,“maftūhīn”, and “dhimmī”. He also uses the referential strategy “ascription or 
r 
s 
                                                 
140 Mawdudi: Islamic Law and Constitution: 299. (This excerpt is quoted in Khurshid Ahmad’s translation.) 
141 See table in Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 48-52. 
142 Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 50. 
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denying of political membership to a national/state organisation” with the linguistic 
realisations “citizen” and “subject”. 
As for economisation, he uses professionalisation and the professionyms (linguistic 
means) “trader” and “jurist” (linguistic realisations). He also uses anthroponyms referring to 
persons in terms of possessions: “the rich”, “those of average means”, and “the poor”. As for 
militarisation, he uses the militarionym “enemy”. There is also an example of the strategy 
criminalisation (which is one of the social problematisation strategies) and the criminonym 
“thief”. Finally, when speaking of the categories of dhimmīs exempted from paying jizya, he 
uses somatisation and the gerontonyms “old” and “children”, and “anthroponyms denoting the 
dysfunction of senses or a bodily handicap”, such as “the blind” and “the handicapped”, and 
an “anthroponym describing the state of health”, namely “those sick persons whose sickness 
lasts for the greater part of the year”. These are the linguistic realisations that seem to fit into 
Reisigl and Wodak’s table. 
While the predications in the text Muslim aur Kāfir kā Aslī Farq were explicit and 
easy to detect, the predications in this text are slightly more implicit by nature. Again, the 
predications are oppositional. The Muslims constitute the ruling class, the hukumrāṅ jamā‘at, 
while the non-Muslims (also referred to as dhimmīs) are the subjects, the ra‘āyā. There is also 
a predication of fragmentarisation; the non-Muslim subjects can be further divided into three 
different categories. The Muslims are the conquerors, while the non-Muslim subjects have 
been defeated or have agreed to a peace treaty, or else “been included in the Islamic state due 
to other circumstances than war or peace”. All professions and positions in society are open to 
Muslims, whereas dhimmīs are excluded from the military and can not be given “positions in 
leadership or exercise of authority”. If elected to the parliament, “the influence of non-Muslim 
members would be strictly limited”. The dhimmīs are obliged to pay the poll-tax, jizya, while 
Muslims don’t. Mawdudi also reproduces the discourse of the books of fiqh, according to 
which the dhimmīs have to pay jizya on pain of being slain, enslaved or dispossessed. Dhimmī 
traders are to be charged a 5 % trade tax while Muslim traders pay only half of that. The 
Muslims have the right to take possession of the places of worship in the conquered territories 
if they so please, while the dhimmīs have no right to build new places of worship in the amsār 
al-muslimīn (cities founded by Muslims). Mawdudi is not clear on whether or not he allows 
them to build new places of worship in territories founded by the “barbarians” and conquered 
by Muslims. As for freedom of conscience, however, the tables are turned: the dhimmīs are 
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free to go from one non-Islamic religion to another (as well as convert to Islam), while a 
Muslim will have no legal right to change his religion. 
There is a negative predicational qualification of the dhimmīs in that they are referred 
to as “non-Muslim elements” (ghair muslim ‘anāsir) that represent an intricacy in the system 
of the Islamic state. They are assigned “the quality of being a problem”.143 This is particularly 
negative because the dhimmīs represent the original inhabitants of the land, the indigenous 
peoples, while the Muslim elites, like Mawdudi, are descended from Arab, Afghan, Turkish 
and Mongol conquerors. By contrast, in German and Austrian discourses of difference (as 
described by Reisigl and Wodak), outgroups, such as migrants, “are metaphorised as ‘foreign 
bodies’ or alien elements”.144  
According to Reisigl and Wodak, “Comparisons and analogies are rhetorical 
techniques employed for equating predication and argumentation strategies”.145 In The Rights 
of Dhimmīs in the Islamic State there is an explicit comparison of the Islamic state and the 
national democratic state. There is an invention of an unreal scenario of “the tyrannous 
majority” in the national democratic state. This “tyrannous majority” will harass the 
minorities in every conceivable way and they will have no “guarantee of lasting human 
rights”. Basically, Mawdudi is saying that the national state may grant the minorities equal 
rights on paper but not in reality. This comparison appears to be a mitigation strategy on the 
part of Mawdudi; he is seeking to minimise the inequality of Muslims and dhimmīs in the 
Islamic state by contending that the minorities are worse off in the national democratic state, 
of which India is a typical example. 
Let us now look at the argumentation strategies employed by Mawdudi in order to 
justify the exclusion and discrimination of the dhimmīs. He starts off with the scheme called 
the topos of reality in the very first paragraph. He is saying that because Islamic rule is 
“definitively different from that of a national democratic government”, this will have major 
implications. In one of the following points he says that the Islamic state is discriminatory in 
its very essence, i.e. “it is obliged to establish a sharp distinction between Muslims and non-
Muslims”. In other words, the restrictions and “rights” that he is about to account for, are 
conditioned by the very essence of the Islamic state. What follows is the topos of law: the 
                                                 
143 Ibid., 54. 
144 Ibid., 59. 
145 Ibid., 109. 
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Islamic state will grant the dhimmī non-Muslims “all the rights that the shari‘a has prescribed 
for them”.  In the following discussion based on the books of fiqh, he is making use of the 
topos of authority; he is quoting the works of the jurists Al-Kasani (d. 1191), Abu Yusuf 
(731-798), Kamaluddin Ibn Hammam, Sarakhsi (d. 1090), and Alauddin ( Ibn ‘Abidin?). The 
latter is identified as the author of Durr al-Mukhtār, which is a collection of fatwas of the 
Hanafi school.146 
 There is a second occurrence of the topos of reality in the discussion of the exclusion 
from military service. Basically, Mawdudi is saying that one of the reasons the dhimmīs have 
to pay jizya is that they are excluded from military service (because reality is as it is, a 
specific action should be performed). Finally, there is an example of the topos of abuse: If the 
dhimmī leaves the territory of the Islamic state “and goes to meet the enemy”, and if he 
“excites disturbances in open rebellion against the Islamic state”, he will be excluded from the 
dhimma. In other words, if the right of dhimma is abused, it will be withdrawn. 
6.12.3. Other Theoretical Perspectives 
If we turn to the colonial paradigm and Homi K. Bhabha’s essay on difference as referred to 
in chapter 1, we have to extend the concept of ”racism” to include ”ethnicism” in order to 
apply his theories on Mawdudi’s discourse. Bhabha perceives colonial discourse as a form of 
governmentality that markes out a “subject nation” and “dominates its various spheres of 
activity”. If applied on The Rights of Dhimmīs in the Islamic State, we may say that the 
dhimmīs constitute “the subject nation” that is being dominated in its various spheres of 
activity. There is also a “cultural hierarchization”, by which the Muslims place themselves 
above the dhimmīs. This kind of cultural ideology is “prejudicial and discriminatory”, yet 
“considered appropriate” by the colonial rulers. It is a discourse that legitimises the privileges 
of the ruling class and the exploitation, exclusion and marginalisation of the subjects, the 
dhimmīs.  
We may also ask if Mawdudi fits the description of “the authoritarian personality” (as 
described in chapter 1), who is “susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda” and “blind 
obedience” (in this case to the shari‘a), who despises the weak and has a strong desire for 
super-ego domination, and who wants to “escape from the uncertainty of autonomy, self-
determination and freedom of decision into irrational, security-giving authoritarianism and 
totalitarianism…” Mawdudi’s biographers have described him as “unyielding”, 
                                                 
146 Mawdudi: Islamic Law and Constitution: 285. 
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“uncompromising”, “self confident”, the “know-it-all”, an “intellectual autocrat”, who did not 
allow for any opposing views within the Jama‘at. Yet “his expositions relied on the authority 
of Islamic edicts…” 147 Therefore, we can not put the blame on Mawdudi alone; he is just 
reproducing the discourse of the shari‘a, with the exception of section 6.10. on additional 
rights, where he has applied his own ijtihād.  
As for the challenge of cultural diversity, Crawford Young recommends “effective 
policies of accomodation” of ethnic groups (see chapter 1). He also writes that “policies 
viewed as beneficial by some communal segments may be seen as discriminatory by others”. 
This would certainly be true of the taxation policies advocated by Mawdudi. The 
discriminatory taxation imposed on the dhimmīs would no doubt be viewed as beneficial by 
the majority of the Muslims but seen as discriminatory from the dhimmīs’ point of view. 
According to Young, one of the primary concerns of the state should be “the material well-
being of society as a whole”. This goal can hardly be achieved by over-taxing a minority 
community already driven to the margins of society by exclusion from the military, exclusion 
from political leadership and key positions, and uncertain prospects of political representation 
or jobs in public administration. It is evident that Mawdudi does not allow for “sharing of 
power” with dhimmīs, and their political influence will be limited. As for the 3 million or so 
Christian dhimmī population of Pakistan, their sosio-economic status “is typically much lower 
than the average for the country as a whole”,148 and it is common knowledge that a large 
percentage of them have an underprivileged “scheduled castes” background, such as Chuhra, 
Bhil and Kohli.149 Therefore, exploiting them financially by discriminatory taxation seems 
particularly senseless. Ideally speaking, according to Young, the stronger communities should 
share resources with the weaker. According to Mawdudi’s Islamic discourse, however, it 
seems to be the other way around. 
We can not end this discussion without looking at the perspective of “indigenous 
peoples”. The dhimmīs of Pakistan can indeed be considered “the descendants of the original 
inhabitants” of the territory that was incorporated in Pakistan in 1947. In fact, Pakistani 
Christians have argued that they are more indigenous than many Muslims “who migrated to 
Pakistan from other parts of India at independence”.150 An issue of particular concern for the 
indigenous peoples is “the loss of their cultural identity” (see chapter 1). This concern is 
                                                 
147 Nasr 1996: 129-130. 
148 Sookhdeo 2002: 19, 68. 
149 Ibid., 52-53. I do not have the corresponding information about the Hindu minority in Pakistan. 
150 Ibid., 132-133. 
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particularly relevant in the Islamic state, where, according to Mawdudi, they will have no say 
in the choice of educational system, no separate schools, limited freedom for the exercise of 
their traditional religious customs, and face complicated restrictions regarding houses of 
worship. 
We also note that there is an implicit reference to segregation in section 6.8.6. 
regarding religious ceremonies that can be carried out “in full freedom in their (the dhimmīs’) 
own quarters”. Segregation was one of the conditions of the Covenant of ‘Umar (see section 
4.2.). However, there is very little to suggest that Mawdudi was in favour of segregation, and 
he does not seem to subscribe to all the twenty conditions of the Covenant of ‘Umar
7. Conclusion 
We have found several instances where Mawdudi has been censored by his editors and 
translators. This is particularly the case with Khurshid Ahmad’s translation of The Rights of 
Dhimmīs in the Islamic State. We found that he has omitted every reference to slaves and 
slavery. We also found several instances where he has made use of euphemisms (pleasant 
replacements for unpleasant words). For instance, he has substituted the expression “to seize 
their possessions or make slaves of them”1 with “to violate their property, honour or liberty”. 
Next, he has translated the word ‘ajamī as “non-Muslims” instead of “barbarians”. In the 
section on exclusion from military service, he has translated the word itā‘at as “loyalty” 
instead of “submission” and thereby modified the meaning of Mawdudi’s explanation of jizya. 
We also found that he has sought to obscure the passage where Mawdudi writes that the 
Islamic state can not give non-Muslims “positions in leadership or the exercise of authority”. 
He has also omitted the clause where Mawdudi refers to the Muslims as hukumrāṅ jamā‘at, 
“the ruling class”. As for Khurram Murad’s translation of The Fundamental Difference 
Between a Muslim and a Kafir, there is at least one example of a minimisation and one 
example of an addition, the minimisation being “Muslims are different from Kafirs [sic]” 
instead of “the Muslim belongs to a rank above the kāfir”.  
In the text The Fundamental Difference Between a Muslim and a Kafir Mawdudi 
establishes the ingroup, the Muslims, and the outgroup, the kāfirs. This is a cultural 
categorisation on the basis of religion. There is a positive self-stereotyping of Muslims and a 
negative stereotyping of kāfirs. These are typical features of ethnocentrism as described by 
social identity theory. As we have seen in the second text, The Rights of Dhimmīs in the 
Islamic State, Mawdudi favours the Muslims in economic, social and political competition 
with the kāfirs. This discrimination is legitimated by allusions to Qur’ānic teachings and 
references to the shari‘a and the classical books of fiqh. There is also an implication of 
ethnocide (i.e. cultural destruction) of indigenous non-Muslims in the suppressive educational 
and cultural policies of the Islamic state as envisioned by Mawdudi. 
Mawdudi’s discourse fits Stuart Hall’s definition of racist practice as it serves “to 
establish social, poltical and economic practices that preclude certain groups from material 
and symbolic resources”. We also agree with Albert Memmi in that this evaluation of 
                                                 
1  In Urdu: “un kī amlāk par qabza karēṅ yā unhēṅ ghulām banā lēṅ”. See appendix B 
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difference is advantageous to the “accuser” and detrimental to the victim. According to 
Memmi, the accuser may use this negative judgement to legitimise his or her privileges or 
aggressions. In chapter 3 we noticed an aggressive element in Mawdudi’s discourse on jihad 
and the struggle for Islamic world dominion. 
Our data does not support the postmodern view that colonial domination and 
exploitation, and doctrines of cultural (and racial) superiority are the other side of Western 
modernity. “Discourses of difference” are not confined to “the West”. We have found similar 
doctrines and ambitions of world dominion in Islamic discourse coming “from the South”. 
As far as we have been able to detect, there is a serious conflict between the ideology 
of the Islamic state and basic international human rights standards. For this reason, the Islamic 
state can not be considered a civil state (état de droit). 
 
Glossary1  
ahl al-dhimma: the beneficiaries of the dhimma 
ahl al-kitāb: unbelievers who possess a scripture 
‘ālim: a learned man, in particular one learned in Islamic legal and religious studies (plural: 
‘ulamā) 
amān: temporary safe-conduct; safety and protection granted to the harbi in Muslim 
territory, without which his life and property were at the mercy of any aggressor; also, quarter 
given in battle. 
amīr: military commander or leader; nowadays also used in the meaning director or president 
amsār: see misr 
amsār al-muslimīn: cities founded by Muslims 
dāruʼl-islām: the territory of the Islamic state 
dāru’l-‘ulūm: a place of advanced religious learning, superior to a madrasa 
dhimma: Originally a protection pact or treaty granted by the Prophet Muhammad to the 
Jewish and Christian populations whom he had subjected. 
dhimmī: indigenous non-Muslim who – subjected to Islamic law after the Arab or Turkish 
conquest – benefited from the dhimma. 
dīn: religion 
fatwā: the opinion of a muftī on a point of law (plural: fatāwā) 
faqīh: a specialist in the science of the sharī‘a (plural: fuqahā) 
                                                 
1 I am indebted to word explanations found in the works of Joseph Schacht, Bat Ye’or, Gilles Kepel, Hans 
Wehr, J.M.S. Baljon, S.V.R. Nasr and Barbara Daly Metcalf, as well as Platts’ and Bashir Ahmad 
Qureshi’s Urdu dictionaries and other works, see bibliography. My transcription of Urdu and Arabic words 
is a phonemic transcription and not a reversible transliteration of the spelling. Note, for example, that in Urdu the 




fiqh: jurisprudence; the science of the sharī‘a. 
fitra: primordial nature 





harbī: “in a state of war”, “enemy alien” 
hudūd: restrictive or penal ordinances of Islamic law 
ijtihād: independent judgement in a legal or theological question, as opposed to taqlīd. 
imām: leader, caliph 
jauhar: taking one’s own life. Rajput custom of killing the family before going out for a 
desperate battle. 
jizya: a fixed, obligatory Qur’anic poll tax, or tribute, paid by the dhimmīs to the Muslim 
state. 
kalima: the confession of faith  
kalām: theology, apologetics 
kāfir: unbeliever (plural kuffār, kāfirūn, kafara) 
kharāj: land-tax 
khatīb: a preacher, a reciter of a khutba 
khutba: a sermon which the preacher recites in the noon-service of the congregational 
mosque on Friday (plural khutubāt) 
kufr: unbelief 
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madrasa: a school of learning in Islamic subjects 
maulānā: “Our Lord”, a title given to a person respected for religious learning 
maulavī: somebody who is learned in Islamic sciences 
mellah: Jewish quarter 
misr: first used about the settlements developing out of the armed encampments of the 
Muslim conquerors. Later defined by the jurists as any populous urban centre where an amīr 
or governor resides and where the Qur’ānic penalties (hudūd) are applied (plural: amsār) 
murtadd: apostate 
muftī: a specialist in religious law who gives an authoritative opinion 
qadhf (qazf): false accusation of unlawful intercourse 
qādī (qāzī): an Islamic judge, a magistrate (who passes sentences in all cases of shari‘a law, 
religious, moral, civil and criminal) 
qisās: retaliation, settlement of accounts 
ra‘īyat: subject (plural ra‘āyā) 
sha‘āʼir: (sing. shi‘ār): visible symbols serving for the worship of God 
shaikh: a title for a Sufi master 
sharī‘a: the whole body of rules guiding the life of a Muslim, in law, ethics, and etiquette 
sunna: normative legal custom, particularly that associated with Muhammad 
takfīr: charge of unbelief, seduction to infidelity 
tafsīr: interpretation (of the Qur’ān) 
taqlīd: adoption of the legal decision of one of the Islamic schools of law 
‘ulamā: see ‘ālim 
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umm valad: a female slave who has borne a child to her owner 
umma: the religious community consisting of the followers of Muhammad 
usūl: doctrines, fundamentals, principles 
waqf: (plural auqāf) trust, foundation for public charity; a bequest of legacy for pious 
purposes, a religious or charitable endowment (as habitations for the poor, books for the use 
of learned men, etc.)  
zakāt: alms-tax 
zimma: see dhimma 
zimmī: see dhimmī 
zina: unlawful intercourse (fornication or adultery) 
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Transliteration of Excerpts from Mawdudi’s Text Muslim aur Kāfir kā 
Aslī Farq  
(See chapter five for English translation. The numbering of subchapters has been retained for 
easy reference. The page references are to the Urdu edition, see bibliography.) 
5.2.2. Muslims Are Superior to Kāfirs 
Har musulmān apnē nazdīk yeh samajhtā hai aur āp bhī zarūr 
aisā hī samajhtē hōṅgē ke musulmān kā darja kāfir sē ūṅcā hai. 
Musulmān kō Khudā pasand kartā hai aur kāfir kō nāpasand 
kartā hai. Musulmān Khudā kē hāṅ bakhšā jāēgā aur kāfir kī 
bakhšiš na hōgī. Musulmān jannat mēṅ jāēgā aur kāfir dōzakh 
mēṅ  jāēgā. (Page 1) 
5.2.3. Heaven and Hell 
Āj maiṅ cahtā hūṅ ke āp is bāt par ghaur karēṅ ke musulmān 
aur kāfir mēṅ itnā baṛā farq ākhir kyōṅ hōtā hai? Kāfir bhī 
Ādam (‘alaihissalām) kī aulād hai aur tum bhī. Kāfir bhī aisā hī 
insān hai jaisē tum hō. Voh bhī tumhārē hī jaisē hāth pāōṅ, 
āṅkh, kān rakhtā hai. Voh bhī isī havā mēṅ sāṅs lētā hai. Yehī 
pānī pītā hai. Isī zamīn par bastā hai. Yehī paidāvār khātā hai. 
Isi tarāh paidā hōtā hai aur isī tarāh martā hai. Usī Khudā nē us 
kō bhī paidā kiyā hai jis nē tum kō paidā kiyā hai. Phir ākhir 
kyōṅ us kā darja nīcā hai aur tumhārā ūṅcā? Tumhēṅ kyōṅ 
jannat milēgā aur voh kyōṅ dōzakh mēṅ ḍālā jāēgā? (Page 1) 
5.2.4. Who is a Kāfir? 
Yeh bāt zarā sōcnē kī hai. Ādmī aur ādmī mēṅ itnā baṛā farq 
sirf itnī sī bāt sē tō nahīṅ hō saktā ke tum ‘Abdullāh aur ‘Abd 
ur-Rehmān aur aisē hī dūsrē nāmōṅ sē pukārē jātē hō aur voh 
Dīn Dayāl aur Kartār Singh aur Rāberṭsan jaisē nāmōṅ sē 
pukārā jātā hai. Yā tum khatna karāte hō aur voh nahīṅ karātā. 
Yā tum gōšt khātē hō aur voh nahīṅ khātā. Allāh ta‘ālā jis nē 
sab insānōṅ kō paidā kiyā hai aur jō sab kā parvardagār hai aisā 
zulm tō kabhī nahīṅ kar saktā ke aisī chōṭī chōṭī  bātōṅ par apnī 
makhlūqāt mēṅ farq karē aur ēk bandē kō jannat mēṅ bhējē aur 
dūsrē kō dōzakh mēṅ pahuncā dē. (Page 1-2) 
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5.2.5 Islam and Kufr 
Islām kē ma‘nī Khudā kī farmāṅbarādarī [sic] kē haiṅ, aur kufr 
kē ma‘nī Khudā kī nāfarmānī kē. Musulmān aur kāfir donōṅ 
insān haiṅ. Dōnōṅ Khudā kē bandē haiṅ. Magar ēk insān is liē 
afzal ho jātā hai ke yeh apnē mālik kō pahcāntā hai, us kē 
hukm kī itā‘at kartā hai, aur us kī nāfarmānī kē anjām sē ḍartā 
hai. Aur dūsrā insān is liē ūṅcē darje sē gir jātā hai ke voh apnē 
mālik kō nahīṅ pahcāntā aur us kī farmānbardāri nahīṅ kartā. 
Isī vajah sē musulmān sē Khudā khuš hōtā hai aur kāfir sē 
narāz. Musulmān kō jannat dēnē kā va‘ada kartā hai aur kāfir 
kō kahtā hai ke dōzakh mēṅ ḍalūṅgā. (Page 2) 
5.2.6. Knowledge and Works 
Is sē ma‘lūm hōtā hai ke musulmān kō kāfir sē judā karnē vālī 
sirf dō cīzēṅ haīṅ. Ēk ‘ilm, dūsrē ‘amal. Ya‘nī pahlē tō usē yeh 
jānnā cāhē ke us kā mālik kaun hai? Us kē ahkām kya haĩ? Us 
kī marzī par calnē kā tarīqa kya hai? Kin kāmōṅ sē voh khuš 
hōtā hai aur kin kāmōṅ sē narāz hōtā hai? Phir jab yeh bātēṅ 
ma‘lūm hō jāēṅ tō dūsrī bāt yeh hai ke ādmī apnē āp kō mālik 
kā ghulām banā dē; jō mālik kī marzī hō us par calē aur jō apnī 
marzī hō us kō chōṛ dē. (Page 3) 
5.2.7. The Kāfir Is Ignorant and Disobedient 
Ye ‘ilm aur ye ‘amal hai jis kī vajah sē musulmān Khudā kā 
pyārā banda hōtā hai aur us par Khudā kī rahmat nāzil hōtī hai 
aur Khudā us kī ‘izzat kartā hai. Kāfir yeh ‘ilm nahīṅ rakhtā 
aur ‘ilm na hōnē kī vajah sē us kā ‘amal bhī yeh nahīṅ hōtā, is 
liē Khudā kā jāhil aur nāfarmān banda hōtā hai, aur Khudā us 
kō apnī rahmat sē mahrūm kar dētā hai. (Page 3-4) 
5.2.8. Mercy Is Reserved for Those Who Obey God 
Pas khūb acchī tarah samajh lō ke Khudā kē nazdīk insān aur 
insān mēṅ jō kuch bhī farq hai voh‘ilm aur ‘amal kē lihāz sē 
hai. Dunīā mēṅ bhī aur ākhirat mēṅ bhī us kī rahmat sirf unhī 
kē liē hai jō us kō pahcāntē haiṅ, aur us kē batāē hūē sīdhē 
rāstē kō jāntē haiṅ, aur us kī farmānbardārī kartē haīṅ. Jin 
lōgōṅ mēṅ yeh siffat nahīṅ hai, un kē nām khah Abdullāh aur 
Abd ur-Rehmān hōṅ, yā Dīn Dayāl aur Kartār Singh, Khudā kē 
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nazdīk un dōnōṅ mēṅ kōī farq nahīṅ aur un kō us kī rahmat sē 
kōī haqq nahīṅ pahunctā. (Page 5) 
5.2.9. Ruled by Kāfirs 
Bhāiyō, tum apnē āp kō musulmān kahtē hō, aur tumhārā imān 
hai ke musulmān par Khudā kī rahmat hōtī hai, magar zarā 
āṅkhēṅ khōl kar dēkhō, kyā Khudā kī rahmat tum par nāzil hō 
rahī hai? Ākhirat mēṅ jō kuch hōgā voh tō tum ba‘ad mēṅ 
dēkhōgē, magar is dunyā mēṅ tumhārā jō hāl hai is par nazar 
ḍalō. Is Hindūstān mēṅ tum naukar ḍar hō. Tumhārī itnī baṛī 
ta‘adād hai ke agar ēk šakhs ēk ēk kankarī phēnkē tō pahāṛ ban 
jāē. Lēkin jahāṅ itnē musulmān maujūd haīṅ vahāṅ kuffār 
hukūmat kar rahē haīṅ. Tumharī gardanēṅ un kī muṭṭhī mēṅ 
haīṅ ke jidhar cahēṅ tumhēṅ mōṛ dēṅ. Tumhārā sar jō Khudā 
kē sivā kisī kē āgē na jhuktā thā, ab insānōṅ kē āgē jhuk rahā 
hai. Tumhārī ‘izzat jis par hāth ḍalnē kī kōī himmat na kar 
saktā thā, āj voh khāk mēṅ mil rahī hai. Tumhārā hāth, jō 
hamēšā ūṅcā hī rahtā thā, ab voh nīcā hōtā hai aur kāfir kē āgē 
phailtā hai. Jahālat aur iflās aur qarzdārī nē har jaga tum kō 
zalīl o khār kar rakhā hai. Kyā yeh Khudā kī rahmat hai? (Page 
5-6) 
5.2.10 The Wrath of God 
Agar yeh rahmat nahīṅ hai, balke khulā hūā ghazab hai, tō 
kaisī ‘ajīb bāt hai ke musulmān aur us par Khudā kā ghazab 
nāzil hō! Musulmān aur zalīl hō! Musulmān aur ghulām hō! 
Yeh tō aisī nā mumkin bāt hai jaisē kōī cīz safēd bhī hō aur 
siyāh bhī jab musulmān Khudā kā mahbūb hōtā hai tō Khudā 
kā mahbūb dunyā mēṅ zalīl ō khār kaisē hō saktā hai? Kyā 
na‘ūzu bi-llāh tumhārā Khudā zālim hai ke tum tō us kā haqq 
pahcānō aur us kī farmānbardārī1 karō, aur voh nāfarmānōṅ kō 
tum par hākim banā dē, aur tum kō farmāṅbardārī kē mu‘āvazē 
mēṅ sazā dē? Agar tumhārā imān hai ke Khudā zālim nahīṅ 
hai, aur agar tum yaqīn rakhte hō ke Khudā kī farmāṅbardārī 
kā badla zillat se nahīṅ mil saktā, tō phir tumhēṅ mannā paṛegā 
ke musulmān hōnē kā da‘vā jō tum kartē hō usī mēṅ kōī ghaltī 
hai. Tumhārā nām sarkārī kaghazāt mēṅ tō zarūr musulmān 
                                                 
1 In this text the spelling of the word “farmānbardāri” is inconsistent. It is sometimes spelled “farmāṅbardārī” 
with a nūn ghunna instead of nūn and other times “farmānbardāri”. One example of misspelling also occurs, as 
we have seen above. 
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likhā jātā hai, magar Khudā kē hāṅ angrēzī sarkār kē daftar kī 
sanad par faislā nahīṅ hōtā. Khudā apnā daftar alag rakhtā hai. 
Vahāṅ talāš karō ke tumhārā nām farmāṅbardārōṅ mēṅ likhā 
hūā hai yā nāfarmānōṅ mēṅ. (Page 6) 
5.2.11 Learn from the Prophet 
Khudā nē tumhāre pās kitāb bhējī tā ke tum is kitāb kō paṛh 
kar apnē mālik kō pahcānō aur us kī farmānbardārī kā tarīqa 
ma‘lūm karō. Kyā tum nē kabhī yeh ma‘lūm karnē kī kōšiš kī 
ke is kitāb mēṅ kyā likhā hai? Khudā nē apnē nabī sallallāhu 
‘alaihi va sallam kō tumhārē pās bhējā, tā ke voh tumhēṅ 
musulmān bannē kā tarīqa sikhāē. Kyā tum nē kabhī yeh 
ma‘lūm karnē kī kōšiš kī ke us kē nabī sallallāhu ‘alaihi va 
sallam nē kyā sikhāyā hai? Khudā nē tum kō dunyā aur ākhirat 
mēṅ ‘izzat hāsil karnē kā tarīqa batāyā. Kyā tum us tarīqē par 
caltē hō? Khudā nē khōl khōl kar batāyā ke ke [sic] kaun sē 
kām haīṅ jin sē insān dunyā aur ākhirat mēṅ zalīl hōtā hai. Kyā 
tum aisē kāmōṅ sē bactē hō? Batāō tumhārē pās us kā kyā 
javāb hai? Agar tum māntē hō ke na tō tum nē Khudā kī kitāb 
aur us kē nabī sallallāhu ‘alaihi va sallam kī zindagī sē ‘ilm 
hāsil kiyā, aur na us kē batāē hūē tarīqē kī pairavī kī, tō tum 
musulmān hūē kab ke tumhēṅ us kā ajr milē? Jaisē tum 
musulmān hō vaisā hī ajr tumhēṅ mil rahā hai aur vaisā hī ajr 
ākhirat mēṅ bhī dēkh lōgē. (Page 6-7) 
Mawdudi tells his audience that there is probably no reason why God should reward them as 
he assumes that they have neither studied the Qur’ān nor followed the example of the prophet. 
He continues 
Maiṅ pahlē bayān kar cukā hūṅ ke musulmān aur kāfir mēṅ 
‘ilm aur ‘amal kē sivā kōī farq nahīṅ hai. Agar kisī šakhs kā 
‘ilm aur ‘amal vaisā hī hai jaisā kāfir kā hai, aur voh apnē āp kō 
musulmān kahtā hai, tō bilkul jhūṭ kahtā hai. Kāfir Qurān kō 
nahīṅ paṛhtā aur nahīṅ jāntā ke us mēṅ kyā likhā hai. Yehī hāl 
agar musulmān kā bhī hō tō voh musulmān kyōṅ kahlāē? Kāfir 
nahīṅ jāntā ke rasūlullāh sallallāhu ‘alaihi va sallam kī kyā 
ta‘līm hai aur āp nē Khudā tak pahunctē kā sīdhā rāsta kyā 
batāyā hai. Agar musulmān bhī usī kī tarah nāvāqif hō tō voh 
musulmān kaisē hūā? (Page 7) 
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Kāfir Khudā kī marzī par calnē kē bajāē apnī marzī par caltā 
hai. Musulmān bhī agar usī kī tarah khud sar ō āzār hō, usī kī 
tarah apnē zātī khayālāt aur apnī rāē par calnēvālā hō, usī kī 
tarah Khudā sē bē parvā aur apnī khāhiš kā banda hō, tō usē 
apnē āp kō “musulmān” (Khudā kā farmāṅbardār) kahnē kā 
kyā haqq hai? Kāfir halāl ō harām kī tamīz nahīṅ kartā aur jis 
kām mēṅ apnē nazdīk fāida yā lazzat dēkhtā hai us kō ikhtiyār 
kar lētā hai, cāhē Khudā kē nazdīk voh halāl hō yā harām. Yehī 
raviyya agar musulmān kā hō tō us mēṅ aur kāfir mēṅ kyā farq 
hūā? Gharaz yeh hai ke jab musulmān bhī islām kē ‘ilm sē 
utnā hī kōrā hō jitnā kāfir hōtā hai, aur jab musulmān bhī voh 
sab kuch karē jō kāfir kartā hai tō us kō kāfir kē muqāblē mēṅ 
kyōṅ fazīlat hāsil hō, aur us kā hašr bhī kāfir jaisā kyōṅ na hō? 
Ye aisī bāt hai jis par ham sab kō ṭhanḍē dil sē ghaur karnā 
cahiē. (Page 7-8) 
At this stage Mawdudi finds it necessary to reassure his audience that he has not set out to 
accuse them of being kāfirs. He continues: 
Mērē ‘azīz bhāiyō, kahīṅ yeh na samajh lēnā ke maīṅ 
musulmānōṅ kō kāfir banānē calā hūṅ. Nahīṅ, mērā yeh 
maqsad hargiz nahīṅ hai. Maiṅ khud bhī sōctā hūṅ, aur cahtā 
hūṅ ke ham mēṅ sē har šakhs apnī apnī jaga sōcē ke ham ākhir 
Khudā kī rahmat sē kyōṅ mahrūm hō gaē haiṅ? Ham par har 
taraf sē kyōṅ musībatēṅ nāzil hō rahī haiṅ? Jin kō ham kāfir, 
ya‘nī Khudā kē nāfarmān bandē kahtē haiṅ voh ham par har 
jaga ghālib kyōṅ haiṅ? Aur ham jō farmāṅbardār hōnē kā da‘vā 
kartē haiṅ, har jaga maghlūb kyōṅ hō rahē? Is kī vaja par maiṅ 
nē jitnā zyāda ghaur kiyā, utnā hī mujhē yaqīn hōtā calā gayā 
ke ham mēṅ aur kuffār mēṅ bas nām kā farq rah gayā hai, aur 
na ham bhī Khudā sē ghaflat aur us sē bē khaufī aur us kī 
nāfarmānī mēṅ kuch un sē kam nahīṅ haiṅ. Thoṛa sā farq ham 
mēṅ aur un mēṅ zarūr hai, magar us kī vajah sē ham kisī ajr kē 
mustahaqq nahīṅ haiṅ, balke sazā kē mustahaqq haiṅ. Kyōṅke 
ham jāntē aur māntē haiṅ ke Qurān Khudā kī kitāb hai aur phir 
us kē sāth voh bartāō kartē haiṅ jō kāfir kartā hai. Ham jāntē 
aur māntē haiṅ ke Muhammad sallallāhu ‘alaihi va sallam 
Allāh kē nabī haiṅ aur phir un kī pairavī sē us tarah bhāgtē haiṅ 
jaisē kāfir bhāgtā hai. (Page 8-9) 
5.2.12 Deadly Sins 
Ham kō ma‘lūm hai ke jhūṭē par Khudā nē la‘nat kī hai, rišvat 
khānē aur khilānē vālē kō jahannam kā yaqīn dilāyā hai, sūd 
khānē aur khilānē vālē kō badtarīn mujrim qarār diyā hai, 
ghībat kō apnē bhāī kā gōšt khānē kē barābar batāyā hai, fohš 
aur bē hayāʼī aur badkārī par sakht ‘azāb kī dhamkī dī hai. 
Magar yeh janne kē ba‘d bhī ham kuffār kī tarah yeh sab kām 
azādī kē sāth kartē haiṅ, gōyā hamēṅ Khudā kā kōī khauf hī 
nahīṅ. Yehī vaja hai ke ham jō kuffār kē muqāble mēṅ thōṛē 
bahut musulmān bannē hūē nazar ātē haiṅ, us par hamēṅ in‘ām 
nahīṅ miltā, balke sazā dī jātī hai. Kuffār kā ham par hukumrāṅ 
hōnā aur har jaga hamārā zak uṭhānā isī jurm kī sazā hai ke 
hamēṅ islām kī ne‘mat dī gaī thī aur phir ham nē us kī qadar na 
kī. (Page 9) 
5.2.13 Recover That Which Has Been Lost 
 ‘Azizō, āj kē khutbe mēṅ jō kuch maiṅ nē kahā hai, yeh is liē 
nahīṅ hai ke tum kō malāmat karūṅ. Maiṅ malāmat karnē 
nahīṅ ūṭhā hūṅ. Mērā maqsad ye hai ke jō kuch khōyā gayā hai 
us kō phir sē hāsil karnē kī kuch fikr kī jāē. Khōē hūē kō pānē 
kī fikr usī vaqt hōtī hai jab insān kō ma‘lūm hō ke us kē pās sē 
kyā cīz khōī gaī hai aur voh kaisī qīmatī cīz hai. Isī liē maiṅ 
tum kō caunkānē kī kōšiš kartā hūṅ. Agar tum kō hōš ā jāē, aur 
tum samajh lō ke haqīqat mēṅ bahut qīmatī cīz tumhārē pās thī 
tō tum phir sē us kē hāsil karnē kī fikr karōgē. (Page 9-10) 
5.2.14 Final Exhortation 
Maiṅ nē pichlē khutbe mēṅ tum sē kahā thā ke musulmān kō 
musulmān hōnē kē liē sab sē pahlē jis cīz kī zarūrat hai voh 
islām kā ‘ilm hai. Har musulmān kō ma‘lūm hōnā cahīē ke 
Qurān kī ta‘līm kyā hai, rasūl-e pāk (sallallāhu ‘alaihi va 
sallam) kā tarīqa kyā hai, islām kis kō kahtē haiṅ, aur kufr ō 
islām mēṅ aslī farq kin bātōṅ kī vajah sē hai. Is ‘ilm kē baghair 
kōī šakhs musulmān nahīṅ hō saktā. Magar afsōs hai ke tum isī 
‘ilm kō hāsil karnē kī fikr nahīṅ kartē. Is sē ma‘lūm hōtā hai ke 
abhī tak tum kō ihsās nahīṅ hūā ke tum kitnī baṛī ne‘mat sē 
mahrūm hō.  
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Mērē bhāiyō, māṅ apnē baccē kō dūdh bhī us vaqt tak nahīṅ 
dētī jab tak ke voh rō kar māngtā nahīṅ. Piyāsē kō jab piyās 
lagtī hai tō voh khud pānī ḍhūnḍtā hai, aur Khudā us kē liē 
pānī paidā bhī kar dētā hai. Jab tum kō khud hī piyās na hō tō 
pānī sē bharā hūā kūāṅ bhī tumhārē pās ā jāē tō bēkār hai. 
Pahlē tum kō khud samajhnā cāhiē ke dīn sē nā vāqif rahnē 
mēṅ tumhārā kitnā baṛā nuqsān hai. Khudā kī kitāb tumhārē 
pās maujūd hai, magar tum nahīṅ jāntē ke is mēṅ kyā likhā hai. 
Is sē zyāda nuqsān kī bāt aur kyā hō saktī hai? Namāz tum 
paṛhtē hō magar tumhēṅ nahīṅ ma‘lūm ke us namāz mēṅ tum 
apnē Khudā kē sāmnē kyā ‘arz kartē hō. Is sē baṛh kar aur kyā 
nuqsān hō saktā hai? Kalima, jis kē zarī‘ē sē tum islām mēṅ 
dākhil hōtē hō, us kē ma‘nī tak tum kō ma‘lūm nahīṅ aur tum 
nahīṅ jāntē ke us kalima kō paṛhnē kē sāth hī tum par kyā 
zimmadārīāṅ ‘āʼid hōtī hai. Ēk musulmān kē liē kyā is sē bhī 
baṛh kar kōī nuqsān hō saktā hai?  
Khētī kē jal jānē kā nuqsān tum kō ma‘lūm hai, rōzgār na 
milnē ka nuqsān tum kō ma‘lūm hai, apnē māl kē zāʼe‘ hō jānē 
kā nuqsān tum ko ma‘lūm hai, magar islām sē nā vāqif hōnē kā 
nuqsān tumhēṅ ma‘lūm nahīṅ. Jab tum kō is nuqsān kā ihsās 
hōgā tō tum khud ā kar kahōgē ke hamēṅ is nuqsān sē bacāō. 
Aur jab tum khud kahōgē tō inšā Allāh tumhēṅ is nuqsān sē 
bacānē kā bhī intizām hō jāēgā. (Page 10-11) 
Appendix B 
Transliteration of Excerpts from Mawdudi’s Text Islāmī Riyāsat mēṅ 
Zimmiyōṅ kē Huqūq 
(See chapter six for English translation. The numbering of subchapters has been retained for 
easy reference. The page references are to the Urdu edition, see bibliography.) 
6.2. The Rights of Dhimmīs (Zimmiyōṅ kē Huqūq) 
Islāmī hukūmat mēṅ ghair muslimōṅ kē huqūq par bahs karnē 
sē pahlē yeh zehn-nišīn kar lēnā zarūrī hai ke islām kī hukūmat 
dar asl ēk usūlī (ideological1) hukūmat hai aur us kī nau‘īyat ēk 
qaumī jamhūrī (national democratic2) hukūmat sē qat‘an 
mukhtalif hai. Dōnōṅ qism kī riyāsatōṅ kē is nau‘ī farq kā 
masla zēr-e bahs par kyā asar paṛtā hai, us kō hasb-e zail nikāt 
sē acchī tarah samjhā jā saktā hai. (Page 5) 
6.2.1. A Comparison of the Islamic State and the National Democratic State 
1) Islāmī hukūmat apnē hudūd mēṅ rahnē vālē lōgōṅ kō is 
lihāz sē taqsīm kartī hai ke kaun un usūlōṅ kō māntē haiṅ 
jin par islāmī hukūmat kī binā rakhī gaī hai aur kaun unhēṅ 
nahīṅ māntē, ya‘nī muslim aur ghair muslim. (Page 5) 
2) Islāmī hukūmat kō calānā dar asl un lōgōṅ kā kām hai jō us 
kē usūlōṅ kō māntē hōṅ. Voh apnē intizām mēṅ ghair 
muslimōṅ kī khidmāt tō zarūr iste‘māl kar saktī hai, magar 
rahnemāī ō kārfarmāī kē manāsib unhēṅ nahīṅ dē saktī. 
(Page 5-6)  
3) Islāmī hukūmat-e ‘ain apnī nau‘īyat hī kē lihāz sē is bāt par 
majbūr hai ke muslimōṅ aur ghair muslimōṅ kē darmiyān 
vāzeh imtiyāz qāim karē aur sāf sāf batā dē ke voh ghair 
muslimōṅ kō kyā huqūq dē saktī hai aur kyā nahiṅ dē saktī. 
(Page 6) 
4) Islāmī hukūmat kō apnē nizām mēṅ ghair muslim ‘anāsir kī 
maujūdgī sē jō pēcīdagī pēš ātī hai usē voh is tarah hall kartī 
                                                 
1 The English word “ideological” is inserted into the Urdu text. 
2 The English words “national democratic” are inserted into the Urdu text. 
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hai ke unhēṅ muta‘aiyin huqūq kā zimma (guarantee3) dē 
kar mutmaʼinn kar dētī hai; apnē usūlī nizām kē hall ō ‘aqd 
mēṅ un kī mudākhalat rōk dētī hai, aur un kē liē har vaqt 
yeh darvāza khulā rakhtī hai ke agar islām kē usūl unhēṅ 
pasand ā jāēṅ tō voh unhēṅ qabūl karkē hukumrāṅ jamā‘at 
mēṅ šāmil hō jāēṅ. (Page 6-7)  
5) Islāmī hukūmat zimmī ghair muslimōṅ kō voh tamām 
huqūq dēnē par majbūr hai jō sharī‘at nē un kē liē muqarrar 
kiyē haiṅ. Un huqūq kō salb karnē yā un mēṅ kamī karnē kā 
ikhtiyār kisī kō nahīṅ hai. Albatta musulmānōṅ kō yeh 
ikhtiyār zarūr hāsil hai ke voh un huqūq kē ‘ilava kuch 
mazīd huqūq unhēṅ ‘atā kar dēṅ, ba-šartē-ke yeh izāfa islām 
kē usūlōṅ sē mutasādim na hōtā hō. (Page 7)  
This is what he writes about the national states: 
1) Qaumī hukūmat unhēṅ is lihāz sē taqsīm kartī hai ke kaun 
lōg us qaum sē ta‘alluq rakhtē haiṅ jō dar asl riyāsat kī 
banānē aur calānē vālī hai, aur kaun lōg us sē ta‘alluq nahīṅ 
rakhtē. Āj kal kī istilāh mēṅ is kē liē aksariyat aur aqalliyat 
kē alfāz iste‘māl kiyē jātē haiṅ. (Page 5)  
2) Qaumī hukūmat apnī rahnemāʼī ō kārfarmāʼī kē liē sirf apnē 
afrād-e qaum hī par e‘timād kartī hai aur dūsrī qalīluʼl-ta‘dād 
qaumēṅ jō us kē šahrīōṅ mēṅ šāmil hōṅ, us e‘timād kī 
mustahaqq nahīṅ hōtēṅ. Yeh bāt cahē sāf sāf kahī na jātī hō, 
magar ‘amalan hōtā isī tarāh hai. Aur agar aqallīyat kē kisī 
fard kō kabhī kōī kilīdī mansab diyā bhī jātā hai tō yeh 
mahz ēk numāʼišī harkat hōtī hai. Pālīsiyōṅ kī …[illegible] 
mēṅ fīʼl-haqīqat us kā kōī dakhl nahīṅ hōtā. (Page 5-6)  
3) Qaumī hukūmat kē liē yeh munāfiqāna cālbāzī āsān hai ke 
voh mulk kē tamām bāšindōṅ kō nazariyē kē e‘tibār sē ēk 
qaum qarār dē kar kāghaz par sab kō musāvī huqūq dē dē, 
magar ‘amalan aksariyat aur aqalliyat kā pūrā imtiyāz qāim 
rakhē aur zamīn par aqalliyatōṅ kō kisī qism kē huqūq na 
dē. (Page 6)  
4) Qaumī hukūmat kō apnē nizām mēṅ ghair qaumī ‘anāsir kī 
šumūliyat sē jō pēcīdagī pēš ātī hai usē hall karnē kē liē voh 
                                                 
3 The English word is inserted into the Urdu text. 
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tīn mukhtalif tadbīrēṅ ikhtiyār kartī hai. Ēk yeh ke un kī 
infirādiyat kō ba-tadrīj miṭā kar apnē andar jazb karnē, 
dūsre yeh ke un kī hastī kō mahv karnē kē liē qatl ō ghārat 
aur ikhrāj kē zālimāna tarīqē ikhtiyār karē. Tīsrē yeh ke un 
kō apnē andar achūt banā kar rakh dē. Yeh tīnōṅ tadbīrēṅ 
dunyā kī qaumī jamhūrī riyāsatōṅ mēṅ ba-kasrat ikhtiyār kī 
gaī haiṅ, ab tak kī jārī hī haiṅ, aur āj Hindūstān mēṅ khud 
musulmānōṅ kō un kā talkh tajriba hō rahā hai. (Page 6-7) 
5) Qaumī jumhūrī hukūmat mēṅ aqalliyatōṅ kō jō huqūq bhī 
diyē jātē haiṅ voh aksariyat kē ‘atā karda hōtē haiṅ, aur 
aksariyat jis tarāh unhēṅ ‘atā karnē kā haqq rakhtī hai usī 
tarāh voh un mēṅ kamī bēšī karnē aur biʼl-kul salb kar lēnē 
kā bhī haqq rakhtī hai. Pas dar haqīqat us nizām mēṅ 
aqalliyatēṅ sar-ā-sar aksariyat kē rahm par jitnī haiṅ aur un 
kē liē ibtidāʼī insānī huqūq tak kī kōī pāʼedār zamānat nahīṅ 
hōtī. (Page 7)  
6.2.2. Concluding Remarks of the First Section 
 
Yeh bunyādī ikhtilāfāt haiṅ jō zimmiyōṅ kē sāth islām kē sulūk 
aur aqalliyatōṅ kē sāth qaumī jumhūriyatōṅ kē sulūk kō ēk 
dūsrē sē biʼl-kul mumtāz kar dētē haiṅ. Jab tak unhēṅ pēš-e 
nazar na rakhā jāē, insān khalt-e mabhas sē nahīṅ bac saktā aur 
na us ghalat fahmī sē mahfūz rah saktā hai ke maujūda zamānē 
kī qaumī jumhūriyatēṅ tō apnē dastūrōṅ mēṅ aqalliyatōṅ kō 
biʼl-kul musāviyāna huqūq dētī haiṅ magar islām is mu‘āmlē 
mēṅ tang nazarī sē kām lētā hai. In zarūrī tauzīhāt kē ba‘ad ab 
ham apnē asl mauzū‘ kī taraf rujū‘ kartē haiṅ. (Page 7-8) 
6.3. Division of Non-Muslim Subjects (Ghair Muslim Ra‘āyā kī Aqsām) 
The three categories of non-Muslim subjects: 
Islāmī qānūn apnī ghair muslim ra‘āyā kō tīn aqsām par taqsīm 
kartā hai. 
a) Ēk voh jō kisī sulhnāmē yā mu‘āhadē kē zarī‘ē sē islāmī 
hukūmat kē taht āē hōṅ. 
b) Dūsrē voh jō laṛnē kē ba‘ad šikast khākar maghlūb hūē 
hōṅ. 
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c) Tīsrē voh jō jang aur sulh dōnōṅ kē sivā kisī aur sūrat sē 
islāmī riyāsat mēṅ šāmil hūē hōṅ. (Page 8) 
The terms for those who have fought and been conquered, the maftūhīn:  
Dūsrī qism mēṅ voh lōg šāmil haiṅ jō ākhir vaqt tak 
musulmānōṅ sē laṛtē rahē hōṅ aur jinhōṅ nē us vaqt hathiyār 
ḍālē hōṅ jab islāmī faujēṅ un kē istehkāmāt kō tōṛ kar un kī 
bastiyōṅ mēṅ fātihāna dākhil hō cukī hōṅ. Is qism kē maftūhīn 
kō jab zimmī banāyā jātā hai tō un kō cand khās huqūq diyē 
jātē haiṅ, jin kī tafsīlāt fiqhī kitābōṅ mēṅ maujūd haiṅ. Zail 
mēṅ un ahkām kā khulāsa diyā jātā hai jin sē zimmiyōṅ kī is 
jamā‘at kī āʼīnī haisiyat vāzeh hōtī hai. (Page 10-11) 
6.4. Rights of Conquered Non-Muslims 
1) Jab imām un sē jizya qabūl kar lē tō hamēša kē liē ‘aqd-e 
zimma qāim hō jāēgā, aur un kī jān ō māl kī hifāzat karnā 
musulmānōṅ par farz hōgā, kyōṅke qabūl-e jizya kē sāth hī 
‘ismat-e nafs ō māl sābit hō jātī hai. Is kē ba‘d imām kō yā 
musulmānōṅ kō yeh haqq bāqī nahīṅ rahtā ke un kī amlāk 
par qabza karēṅ yā unhēṅ ghulām banā lēṅ. Hazrat ‘Umar, 
razi allāh ‘anhu, nē hazrat Abū ‘Ubayda, rāzī allāh ‘anhu, 
kō sāf likhā thā ke “Jab tum un sē jizya qabūl kar lō tō phir 
tum kō un par dastdarāzī kā kōī haqq bāqī nahīṅ rahtā.” 
(Page 11) 
2) ‘Aqd-e zimma qāim hō jānē kē ba‘ad apnī zamīnōṅ kē 
mālik vohī hōṅgē, un kī milkiyat un kē vurasāʼ kō muntaqal 
hōgī, aur un kō apnē [sic] amlāk mēṅ bai‘, hiba, rahn 
vaghaira kē jumla-e huqūq hāsil hōṅgē. Islāmī hukūmat kō 
unhēṅ bē-dakhl karnē kā haqq na hōgā. (Page 11) 
3) Jizya kī miqdār un kī mālī hālat kē lihāz sē muqarrar kī 
jāēgī. Jō māldār haiṅ un sē ziyāda, jō mutavassituʼl-hāl haiṅ 
un sē kam, aur jō gharīb haiṅ un sē bahut kam liyā jāēgā. 
Aur jō kōī zarī‘a-ye āmadnī nahīṅ rakhtē, yā jin kī zindagī 
kā inhisār dūsrōṅ kī bakhšiš par hai, un kō jizya mu‘āf kar 
diyā jāēgā. Agarce jizya kē liē kōī khās raqm muqarrar 
nahīṅ hai, lēkin us kī ta‘yīn mēṅ yeh amr madd-e nazar 
rakhnā zarūrī hai ke aisī raqm muqarrar kī jāē jis kā adā 
karnā un kē liē āsān hō. Hazrat ‘Umar, rāzī allāh ‘anhu, nē 
māldārōṅ par ēk rupaya māhāna, mutavassituʼl-hāl lōgōṅ 
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gharīb mehnat-e pēša lōgōṅ par cār 
āna mahīna jizya muqarrar kiyā thā. (Page 11-12) 
4) Jizya sirf un lōgōṅ par lagāyā jāēgā jō ahl-e qitāl haiṅ. 
Ghair ahl-e qitāl, maslan baccē, auratēṅ, dīvānē, andhē, 
apāhaj, ‘ibādatgāhōṅ kē khādim, rāhib, sannyāsī, az kār 
rafta, būṛhē, aisē bīmār jin kī bīmārī sāl kē ēk baṛē hissē tak 
mumtada hō jāē, aur launḍī ghulām vaghaira jizya sē 
mustasnā haiṅ. (Page 12) 
5) Ba-zōr-e šamšīr fath hōnē vālē šahr kē ma‘bad par 
musulmānōṅ kō qabza kar lēnē kā haqq hai. Lēkin us haqq 
sē istifāda na karnā aur ba-tarīq-e ehsān un kō ‘alā hāla 
qāim rahnē dēnā aulā aur afzal hai. Hazrat ‘Umar, rāzī allāh 
‘anhu, kē zamāna [sic] mēṅ jitnē mamālik fath hūē un mēṅ 
kōī ma‘bad na tōṛā gayā aur na us sē kisī qism kā ta‘arruz 
kiyā gayā. Imām Abū Yūsuf, rāzī allāh ‘anhu, likhtē haiṅ: 
“Un kō un kē hāl par chōṛ diyā gayā, na mismār kiyā gayā 
aur na un sē kisī qism kā ta‘arruz kiyā gayā.” Qadīm 
ma‘bad kō mismār karnā ba-har hāl nā-jāʼiz hai. (Page 12-
13) 
6.8. General Rights of the Dhimmīs. (Zimmiyōṅ kē ‘Ām Huqūq) 
6.8.1. Hifāzat-e Jān (Protection of life) 
Zimmī kē khūn kī qīmat musulmān kē khūn kē barābar hai. 
Agar kōī musulmān zimmī kō qatl karēgā tō us kā qisās usī 
tarāh liyā jāēgā jis tarah musulmān kō qatl karnē kī sūrat mēṅ 
liyā jātā hai. (Page 13) 
6.8.2 Faujdārī Qānūn (Criminal law) 
Ta‘zīrāt kā qānūn zimmī aur musulmān kē liē yaksāṅ hai aur us 
mēṅ dōnōṅ kā darja musāvī hai. Jarāʼim kī jō sazā musulmānōṅ 
kō dī jāēgī vohī zimmī kō bhī dī jāēgī. Zimmī kā māl 
musulmān curā lē yā musulmān kā māl zimmī curāē, dōnōṅ 
sūratōṅ mēṅ sāriq kā hāth kāṭā jāēgā. Zimmī kisī mard yā 
‘aurat par zinā kī tohmat lagāē yā musulmān aisā karē, dōnōṅ 
sūratōṅ mēṅ ēk hī hadd-e qazf jārī hōgī. Isī tarah zinā kī sazā 
bhī zimmī aur musulmān kē liē yaksān hai. Albatta šarāb kē 
mu‘āmlē mēṅ zimmīōṅ kē liē istisnā hai. (Page 15) 
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6.8.3. Dīvānī Qānūn (Civil Law) 
Dīvānī qānūn bhī zimmī aur musulmān kē liē yaksāṅ hai aur 
dōnōṅ kē darmiyān kāmil musāvāt hai…Tijārat kē jō tarīqē 
hamārē liē mamnū‘ haiṅ vohī un kē liē bhī hai. Sūd jis tarah 
hamārē liē harām hai usī tarah un kē liē bhī hai. Albatta 
zimmiyōṅ kē liē sirf šarāb aur sūr kā istisnā hai. Voh šarāb 
banānē, pīnē aur bēcnē kā haqq rakhtē haiṅ, aur unhēṅ sūr 
pālnē, khānē aur firōkht karnē kē bhī huqūq hāsil haiṅ. Akar 
[sic] kōī musulmān kisī zimmī kī šarāb yā us kē sūr kō talaf kar 
dē tō us par tāvān lāzim āēgā. Durruʼl-mukhtār mēṅ hai: 
“Musulmān us kī šarāb aur us kē sūr kī qīmat adā karēgā agar 
voh usē talaf kar dē.” (Page 16) 
6.8.4. Zimma kī Pāʼedārī (The Permanence of the Dhimma) 
The pact of dhimma is permanent: 
 
‘Aqd-e zimma musulmānōṅ kī jānib abadi luzūm rakhtā hai, 
ya‘nī voh usē bāndhnē kē ba‘d phir usē tōṛ dēnē kē mukhtār 
nahīṅ haiṅ. Lēkin dūsrī jānib zimmiyōṅ kō ikhtiyār hai ke jab 
tak cāhēṅ us par qāim rahēṅ aur jab cāhēṅ tōṛ dēṅ. Badāʼi‘ mēṅ 
hai: ”‘Aqd-e zimma hamārē haqq mēṅ tō lāzim hai, ya‘nī ēk 
martaba zimmī banā lēnē kē ba‘d ham us zimma kō kisī hāl 
mēṅ tōṛ nahīṅ saktē. Lēkin un kē liē ye lāzim nahīṅ haiṅ (ya‘nī 
agar voh hamārē zimma sē khārij hōnā cahēṅ tō hō saktē 
haiṅ).” 
Zimmī khāh kaisē hī baṛē jurm kā irtikāb karē, us kā zimma 
nahīṅ ṭūṭtā. Hattā ke jizya band kar dēnā, musulmān kō qatl 
karnā, nabī sallallāhu ‘alaihi va sallam kī šān mēṅ gustākhī 
karnā yā kisī musulmān ‘aurat kī ābrū rēzī karnā bhī us kē 
haqq mēṅ nāqis-e zimma nahīṅ hai. Un af‘āl par usē mujrim kī 
haisiyat sē sazā dī jāēgī, lēkin bāghī qarār dē kar zimma sē 
khārij nahīṅ kar diyā jāēgā. Albatta sirf dō sūratēṅ aisī haiṅ jin 
mēṅ ēk zimmī khārij az zimma hō jātā hai. Ēk ye ke voh dāruʼl-
islām kō chōṛ kar dušmanōṅ sē jā milē. Dūsrē yeh ke hukūmat-
e islāmī kē khilāf sarīh baghāvat karkē fitna ō fasād bar-pā karē. 
(Page 17-18)  
6.8.5. Šakhsī Mu‘āmlāt (Personal Law) 
Zimmiyōṅ kē šakhsī mu‘āmlāt un kī apnī millat kē qānūn 
(Personal Law) kē mutābiq tai kiyē jāēṅgē. Islamī qānūn un 
par nāfiz nahīṅ kiyā jāēgā. Hamārē liē šakhsī mu‘āmlāt mēṅ jō 
kuch nājāʼiz hai, voh agar un kē mazhabī ō qaumī qānūṅ mēṅ 
jāʼiz hō tō islāmī ‘adālat un kē qānūn hī kē mutābiq faisla 
karēgī… (Page 18) 
6.8.6. Mazhabī Marāsim (Religious Ceremonies) 
Mazhabī marāsim aur qaumī ša‘āʼir kō pablik mēṅ e‘lān ō izhār 
kē sāth adā karnē kē muta‘alliq islāmī qānūn ye hai ke ahluʼz-
zimma khud apnī bastiyōṅ mēṅ tō un kō pūrī azādī kē sāth kar 
sakēṅgē albatta khālis islāmī ābādiyōṅ mēṅ hukūmat-e islāmī 
kō ikhtiyār hōgā ke un mēṅ azādī dē yā un par kisī qism kī 
pābandiyāṅ ‘āʼid kar dē. Badāʼi‘mēṅ hai: “Jō bastiyāṅ amsār-e 
muslimīn mēṅ sē nahīṅ haiṅ un mēṅ zimmiyōṅ kō šarāb ō 
khinzīr bēcnē aur salīb nikālnē aur nāqūs bajānē sē nahīṅ rōkā 
jāēgā khāh vahāṅ musulmānōṅ kī kitnī hī kasīr ta‘dād ābād hō. 
Albatta ye af‘āl amsār-e muslimīn mēṅ nā pasandīda haiṅ, 
ya‘nī un šahrōṅ mēṅ jinhēṅ jum‘a ō ‘īdain aur iqāmat-e hudūd 
kē liē makhsūs kiyā gayā hō…” (Page 19-20) 
Mawdudi continues:  
Lēkin amsār-e muslimīn mēṅ bhī un kō sirf salībōṅ aur 
mūrtiyōṅ kē julūs nikālnē aur ‘alāniya nāqūs bajātē hūē 
bazārōṅ mēṅ nikalnē kī mumāna‘at kī gaī hai. Varna apnē 
qadīm ma‘ābid kē andar rah kar voh tamām ša‘āʼir kā izhār kar 
saktē haiṅ. Hukūmat-e islāmiya us mēṅ dakhl na dēgī. (Page 
21) 
6.8.7. ‘Ibādatgāhēṅ (Places of Worship) 
Regulations regarding ancient and new places of worship: 
Amsār-e muslimīn mēṅ zimmiyōṅ kē jō qadīm ma‘ābid hōṅ un 
sē ta‘arruz nahīṅ kiyā jā saktā. Agar voh ṭūṭ jāēṅ tō unhēṅ usī 
jaga dōbāra banā lēnē kā haqq hai. Lekin nayē ma‘ābid banānē 
kā haqq nahīṅ hai. Rahē voh maqāmāt jō amsār-e muslimīn 
nahīṅ haiṅ tō un mēṅ zimmiyōṅ kō nayē ma‘ābid banānē kī bhī 
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‘ām ijāzat hai. Isī tarah jō maqāmāt ab “misr” na rahē hōṅ, 
ya‘nī imām nē un kō tark karkē vahāṅ iqāmat-e jum‘a ō a‘yād 
aur iqāmat-e hudūd kā silsila band kar diyā hō, un mēṅ bhī 
zimmiyōṅ kō nayē ma‘ābid kī ta‘mīr aur apnē ša‘āʼir kē izhār 
kā haqq hāsil hai. 
 Ibn ‘Abbas kā fatvā ye hai: “Jin šahrōṅ kō musulmānōṅ nē 
ābād kiyā hai un mēṅ zimmiyōṅ kō ye haqq nahīṅ hai ke nayē 
ma‘ābid aur kanāʼis ta‘mīr karēṅ yā nāqūs bajāēṅ yā ‘alāniya 
šarāb aur sūr kā gōšt bēcēṅ. 
 Bāqī rahē voh šahr jō ‘ajamiyōṅ kē ābād kiyē hūē haiṅ aur jin 
kō Allāh ta‘ālā nē musulmānōṅ kē hāth par fath kiyā aur unhōṅ 
nē musulmānōṅ kē hukm kī itā‘at qabūl kar lī tō ‘ajam kē liē 
vohī huqūq haiṅ jō un kē mu‘āhadē mēṅ tai hō jāēṅ aur 
musulmānōṅ par un kā adā karnā lāzim hai. (Page 21-22) 
6.8.8. Jizya ō Kharāj kī Tahsīl mēṅ Ri‘āyāt (Alleviations in the Collection of Jizya and 
Kharāj) 
Jizya ō kharāj kē mu‘āmlē mēṅ zimmiyōṅ par tašaddud karnā 
mamnū‘hai. Un kē sāth narmī aur rifq kī tākīd kī gaī hai aur un 
par aisā bāṛ ḍālnē sē man‘ kiyā gayā hai jisē uṭhānē kī un mēṅ 
qudrat na hō. Hazrat ‘Umar, rāzī allāh ‘anhu, nē hukm diyā thā 
ke … (Arabic quotation) jitnā māl dēnā un kī tāqat sē bāhar hō 
us kē adā karnē kī unhēṅ taklīf na dī jāē. (Page 22) 
Jizya kē ‘ivaz un kī imlāk kā nīlām nahiṅ kiyā jā saktā. Hazrat 
‘Ali, rāzī allāh ‘anhu, nē apnē ēk ‘āmil kō farmān bhējā thā ke 
… (Arabic quotation) kharāj mēṅ un kā gadhā, un kī gāʼe, un kē 
kapṛē na bēcnā… (Page 22-23) 
Jizya kī tahsīl meṅ un par har qism kī sakhtī karnē sē man‘ 
kiyā gayā hai. Hazrat ‘Umar, rāzī allāh ‘anhu, nē šām kē 
gōvarnar hazrat Abū ‘Ūbaida, rāzī allāh ‘anhu, kō jō farmān 
likhā thā us mēṅ min-jumla (?) aur ahkām kē ēk ye bhī thā ke: 
…(Arabic quotation) Musulmānōṅ kō un par zulm karnē , aur 
unhēṅ satānē aur nājāʼiz tarīqē sē un kē māl khānē sē man‘ 
karō. (Page 23) 
Fuqahā-ye islām nē nādihandōṅ kē haqq mēṅ sirf itnī ijāzat dī 
hai ke unhēṅ tadībānan qaid bē mašaqqat kī sazā dī jā saktī hai. 
(Page 24)  
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6.8.9. Tijāratī Ṭēks (Trade Tax) 
Regarding the double trade tax on dhimmī businessmen: 
Musulmān tājirōṅ kī tarah zimmī tājirōṅ kē amvāl-e tijārat par 
bhī ṭēks liyā jāēgā jabke un kā rās ul-māl 200 dirham tak 
pahunc jāē yā voh 20 misqāl sōnē kē mālik hō jāēṅ. Is mēṅ 
šakk nahīṅ hai ke fuqahā nē zimmī tājir par tijāratī mahsūl 5 
fīsadī lagāyā thā aur musulmān tājir par 2 ½ fīsadī, lēkin yeh 
fe‘l kisī nass par mabnī na thā balke ijtihād par mabnī thā aur 
dar asl vaqtī masāleh us kē muqtazī thē. Us zamānē mēṅ 
musulmān zyādahtar mulk kī hifāzat mēṅ mašghūl thē aur 
tamām tijārat zimmiyōṅ kē hāth mēṅ ā gaī thī. Isī liē 
musulmān tājirōṅ kī himmat afzāʼe aur un kī tijārat kē tahaffuz 
kē liē un par ṭēks kam kar diyā gayā. (Page 26) 
In a footnote, Mawdudi adds: 
Magar yeh zarūrī nahīṅ hai ke āj bhī ṭēks ‘āʼid karnē kē liē yehī 
nisāb rakhā jāē. Yeh nisāb us zamānē kē hālāt kē lihāz sē thā. 
(Page 26, 2nd footnote) 
6.8.10. Faujī Khidmat sē Istisnāʼ (Exclusion from Military Service) 
Zimmī faujī khidmat sē mustasnā haiṅ aur dušman sē mulk kī 
hifāzat karnā tanhā musulmānōṅ kē farāʼiz mēṅ dākhil kiyā 
gayā hai. Is kī vajah yeh hai ke ēk usūl par jō riyāsat qāʼim hō 
us kī hifāzat kē liē vohī lōg laṛ saktē haiṅ aur unhī kō us kē liē 
laṛnā cāhiē jō us usūl kō haqq māntē haiṅ… Isī liē islām nē 
zimmiyōṅ kō faujī khidmat sē mustasnā karkē un par sirf yeh 
farz ‘āʼid kiyā hai ke voh mulkī hifāzat kē masārif mēṅ apnā 
hissa adā kar dēṅ. Jizya kī asl [sic] haisiyat yehī hai. Voh na 
sirf itā‘at kā nišān hai, balke faujī khidmat sē istisnāʼ kā badal 
aur mulkī hifāzat kā mu‘āvaza bhī hai. Cunāṅce jizya sirf qābil-
e jang mardōṅ hī par lagāyā jātā hai. (Page 27) 
6.9. Fuqahā-ye Islām kī Himāyat (Support from the Muslim Jurists) 
Yeh haiṅ us qānūn kī tafsīlāt jō sadar-e avval mēṅ ghair muslim 
ra‘āyā kē huqūq ō farāʼiz sē muta‘alliq banayā gayā thā. Ab āge 
baṛhnē sē pahlē ham ye bhī batā dēnā cāhtē haiṅ ke hulafāʼ-ye 
[sic] rāšidīn kē ba‘d bādšāhī daur mēṅ jab kabhī zimmiyōṅ kē 
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sāth bē insāfī kī gaī tō voh fuqahā-ye islām hī kā girdah thā jō 
āgē baṛh kar un kī himāyat kē liē khaṛā hō gayā aur muttafiq hō 
kar un kā pušt-panāh banā. (Page 29) 
…Aur agar kabhī kisī amīr yā bādšāh nē un par jabr ō zulm kiyā 
bhī hai tō jō lōg us ‘ahd mēṅ islāmī qānūn kē pāsbān rahēṅ 
haiṅ. voh kabhī us par malāmat karnē sē bāz nahīṅ rahē. (Page 
31) 
6.10. Zāʼid Huqūq jō Ghair Muslimōṅ kō Diyē Jā Saktē Haiṅ (Additional Rights That May 
Be Granted to Non-Muslims) 
… Ab ham mukhtasar taur par yeh batāēṅgē ke maujūdah 
zamānē mēṅ ēk islāmī riyāsat apnē ghair muslim šahriyōṅ kō 
usūl-e islām kē mutābiq mazīd kyā huqūq dē saktī hai. (Page 
32) 
6.10.1. Numāʼindagī aur Rāʼēdehī (Political Representation) 
(No transcription.) 
6.10.2. Azādī-ye Tahrīr ō Taqrīr Vaghairah (Freedom of Expression) 
Limited freedom of expression within the framework of the shari‘a: 
Ghair muslimōṅ kō is riyāsat mēṅ tahrīr ō taqrīr aur rāʼē ō 
zamīr aur ijtimā‘ kī vohī azādī hāsil hōgī jō khud musulmānōṅ 
kō hāsil hōgī, aur is mu‘āmlē mēṅ jō qānūnī pābandiyāṅ 
musulmānōṅ kē liē hōṅgī vohī un kē liē bhī hōṅgī. Qānūn kī 
hudūd mēṅ rahtē hūē voh hukūmat par, us ke hukkām par aur 
khud raʼīs-e hukūmat … [illegible] tanqīd kar sakēṅgē. Unhēṅ 
islām par bhī tanqīd kā itnā hī haqq hāsil hōgā jitnā 
musulmānōṅ kō un kē mazhab par tanqīd kā haqq hōgā. Is 
tanqīd mēṅ musulmānōṅ kō bhī usī tarah qānūn kā pāband 
rahnā hōgā jis tarah ghair muslimōṅ kō.  
Voh apnē mazhab kī khūbīāṅ bayān karnē mēṅ pūrī tarah azād 
hōṅgē aur agar ēk ghair islāmī mazhab kā pai-rav kisī dūsrē 
ghair islāmī mazhab kō qabūl kar lē tō hukūmat kō us par kōī 
e‘tirāz na hōgā. Albatta kōī musulmān islāmī riyāsat kē hudūd 
mēṅ rahtē hūē apnā dīn badalnē kā majāz na hōgā. Lēkin 
irtidād kī sūrat mēṅ muʼākhazah jō kuch bhī hōgā khud 
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murtadd sē hōgā na ke us ghair muslim sē jis kā asar qabūl kar 
kē voh murtadd hūā hai. Unhēṅ apnē zamīr kē khilāf kōī 
‘aqīdah yā ‘amal ikhtiyār karnē par majbūr na kiyā jāēgā, aur 
apnē zamīr kē mutābiq voh aisē sab kām karne kē majāz hōṅgē 
jō qānūn-e mulkī sē mutasādim na hōtē hōṅ. (Page 33-34) 
6.10.3. Ta‘līm (Education) 
Unhēṅ nizām-e ta‘līm tō vohī qabūl karnā hōgā jō riyāsat pūrē 
mulk kē liē banāēgī, lēkin jahāṅ tak islām kī mazhabī ta‘līm kā 
ta‘alluq hai, us kē paṛhnē par voh majbūr na kiyē jāēṅgē. 
Unhēṅ pūrā haqq hōgā ke mulkī darsgāhōṅ mēṅ, yā khud apnī 
makhsūs darsgāhōṅ mēṅ, apnē mazhab kī ta‘līm kā mustaqill 
intizām karēṅ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 125
 126
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
